The Relevance of Metaphysics to Bioethics: A Reply to Earl Conee
Chappell (Tim), Chappell (Sophie Grace)
Source: Mind, Vol. 109, No. 434, Apr., 2000, pp. 275-279
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    This paper is a response to Earl Conee, "Metaphysics and the Morality of Abortion1," Mind, 1999, pp. 619-645. Conee argues that "the metaphysical views offered on behalf of moral conclusions about abortion2," whether pro- or anti-abortion3, "do nothing in defense of those conclusions." I dispute Conee's account of what makes a premise in an argument a metaphysical premise and I consider three different versions of what Conee might mean by saying that a premise "does nothing" in an argument. None of them, I find, makes Conee's argument plausible.

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