- Considers arguments for the following radical claim: the fact that we could save a greater number of lives is not a reason to save some people rather than others when we cannot save everyone.
- Against this view, an argument is presented that claims to prove that it is worse if more die than if fewer do, but then a counterargument is given that considerations of justice and fairness might stand in the way of preventing this worse state of affairs, requiring us to give to a group with the greater number of people and to a group with the smaller number equal chances to be saved. This means there would be a conflict between considerations of the right (e.g. justice, fairness), and considerations of the good (e.g. maximizing lives saved).
- The arguments offered are based around the claims of John M. Taurek on conflict situations in which some can be helped and some cannot: his brand of consequentialism, which involves an evaluation of outcomes relative to an individual's interests combined with an agent-neutral theory of permission to act.
- The aspects addressed all centre around the aggregation argument — aggregation vs non-aggregation.
Part II - Saving Lives: General Issues
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