|The Trolley Problem|
|Source: Kamm - Morality, Mortality (Vol. 2) - Rights, Duties, and Status, Chapter 6|
|Paper - Abstract|
|Paper Statistics||Notes Citing this Paper||Colour-Conventions||Disclaimer|
Part I considered how to determine whether there is a moral difference between killing and letting die per se, but in the two chapters of Part II, the consideration is when it is and when it is not permissible to kill some to save others. Ch. 6 first examines in some detail the arguments John Harris has made for a survival lottery (where we may select from among healthy people the one who will die to save another or who will share a fair risk of death with another), and considers a very limited context in which a curtailed survival lottery might be installed. The rest of the chapter is devoted to consideration of the many attempts to solve the problem of why we may not ordinarily kill one to save more (as in the Transplant1 Case, where a non-consequentialist would believe that we may not chop up one innocent non-threatening person, who would not otherwise die, to transplant2 his organs into a greater number of people in order to save their lives) but may kill via redirection of threats (as in the Trolley Case, where there is a choice between killing one or killing a greater number by turning/redirecting, or failing to turn/redirect, a runaway trolley). These attempts include the views of Philippa Foot, proponents of the Doctrine of Double Effect (e.g. Michael Costa), Warren Quinn, James Montmarquet, Judith Thomson, and Bruce Russell. A detailed examination is also made of whether the notion of ‘being already involved’ is a moral notion or can be given a non-moral description.
For The Trolley Problem, see (eg.) Link.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
|© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Oct 2018.||Please address any comments on this page to email@example.com.||File output: |
Website Maintenance Dashboard
|Return to Top of this Page||Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page||Return to Theo Todman's Home Page|