- Gareth Evans's argument against ontically vague identity2 has been picked over on many occasions. But extant proposals for blocking the argument do not meet well-motivated general constraints on a successful solution. Moreover, the pivotal position that defending ontically vague identity3 occupies vis a vis ontic vagueness more generally has not yet been fully appreciated.
- This paper advocates a way of resisting the Evans argument meeting all the mentioned constraints: if we can find referential indeterminacy in virtue of ontic vagueness, we can get out of the Evans argument while still preserving genuinely ontically vague identity4.
- To show how this approach can vindicate particular cases of ontically vague identity5, I develop a framework for describing ontic vagueness in general in terms of multiple actualities. The effect, overall, is to provide a principled and attractive approach to ontically vague identity6 that is immune from Evansian worries.
- Although the Evans argument against vague identity7 has been much discussed, proposals for blocking it have not so far satisfied general conditions which any solution ought to meet.
- Moreover, the relation between ontically vague identity8 and ontic vagueness more generally has not yet been satisfactorily addressed.
- I advocate a way of resisting the Evans argument which satisfies the conditions.
- To show how this approach can vindicate particular cases of ontically vague identity9, I develop a framework for describing ontic vagueness in general in terms of multiple actualities.
- This provides a principled approach to ontically vague identity10 which is unaffected by the Evans argument.
Footnote 1: I’m not sure where this came from as it’s not the same as that in the published paper. I originally had the pre-publication version, so maybe it came from there
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