Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It)
Todman (Theo)
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Write-up1 (as at 14/07/2026 17:31:12): Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It)

Chapter Contents

  1. Abstract2
  2. Methodology3
  3. Introduction4
  4. Note Hierarchy5
  5. Main Text6
  6. Concluding Remarks7
  7. Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed8
  8. Works Read9
  9. Further Reading10
  10. References & Reading List

Abstract
  1. This Chapter describes what Animalism is, with an excursus on animals and organisms and their persistence.
  2. It puts forward the arguments in favour of animalism, those against being reserved for Chapter 811.
  3. It focuses on the account of Eric Olson, the primary contemporary exponent of Animalism.


Research Methodology

Chapter Introduction14
  1. As we saw in Chapter 0215, nothing is more obvious than that we are Human Animals16. We will cover the disadvantages of this view – which leads so many contemporary philosophers to fail to accept Animalism17 – in Chapter 0818.
  2. So, while saying that we are human animals might seem to be the default position – and so the burden is on others to demonstrate that we are not – the historical situation – in particular the acceptance of various forms of the psychological view – places a burden on the Animalist to present the case for animalism with as much rigour as possible. Saying ‘it’s obvious’ isn’t enough.
  3. Firstly, it needs to be made clear what the claim that ‘we are animals’ – the Biological View19 – amounts to. The Animalist makes the claim that this is one of numerical identity. We’re not simply animals in the sense of having animal bodies, while ‘really’ being something else. Being members of the species Homo Sapiens20 is what we really are.
  4. So, our persistence criteria are Biological Criteria21, and the implications of this need to be spelled out.
  5. Despite the ‘obviousness’ of the Biological View, most contemporary philosophers are unconvinced, as was noted in the Chapter 122. I have a Note detailing just which Philosophers can be counted as Animalists23. Eric Olson24 was probably responsible for clarifying and popularising the position. I also have a Note on David Wiggins25, though his status as a card-carrying Animalist is doubted by some, including Olson.
  6. The Biological View is often referred to as the Organism View, so we need to consider what Organisms26 are, and – indeed – what Life27 is, including when it starts – Animation28. I’ve referenced my Note on Quantum Mechanics29 here as recent research has attempted to implicate it in the mechanism of life. We discuss life’s end – Death – in Chapter 1130.
  7. Recently, some philosophers have tried ascribing intentionality to Plants31, which I think is muddying the waters, just as is trying to include fish in the moral community.
  8. We need to consider Evolution32, especially as this is a major consideration in why we are animals. I also have Notes on Genetics33 and Origins34, which are connected to this subject and others.
  9. After all this ground-clearing, we need to consider Animals35 themselves – especially those at the higher end of the spectrum most closely related to Homo Sapiens in their abilities and potential moral considerability, leading on to Animal Rights36.
  10. Finally, we get down to the actual Arguments for Animalism37, of which Olson’s favourite is the Thinking Animal Argument38.


Note Hierarchy
  1. Animalism39
    1. Human Animals40
    2. Biological View42
    3. Biological Criterion43
    4. Animalists44
  2. Organisms48
    1. Life49
    2. Plants52
    3. Evolution53
  3. Animals56
    1. Animal Rights57
  4. Arguments for Animalism58
    1. Thinking Animal Argument59


Main Text
  1. Animalism60
    1. There are different interpretations of Animalism, which I need to compare and contrast. My preferred option is Olson61’s, namely, that animalism is the view that we are identical to human animals62 and that, since human animals63 don’t have any psychological properties essentially, neither do we.
    2. Olson is probably the best-known active Animalist64. His two books below need to be analysed in exhaustive detail.
      → "Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology" and
      → "Olson (Eric) - What are We? A Study of Personal Ontology".
      Follow the above link for other animalists.
    3. Olson’s claim is not that there are no non-animal persons, but that human persons are essentially animals. Other animalists, such as Wiggins65, insist (or are said to insist, or used to insist) that the only persons are indeed human beings66, or are (maybe) other animals.
    4. I incline to agree with Olson on the topic of what we are67, but need to press hard with thought experiments68 to see why we can’t separate the two – that is, why we can’t separate where we go as persons69 from where we go as animals: our personhood can’t be pealed off from our animality and ported to some other infrastructure – or at least not while preserving our identity.
    5. There is a distinction between persons and human animals. Is the distinction empirical or conceptual? Why can’t I copy my consciousness70 onto a machine71 and that machine be me? There seem to be two issues here.
      1. Firstly, my intuition72 is that phenomenal consciousness essentially involves a brain-like infrastructure and
      2. Secondly, copying a consciousness onto a machine isn’t identity-preserving, even if possible, but is the creation of a simulacrum73 (or – significantly – multiples thereof).
    6. Basically, I reject both functionalism74 and the idea of consciousness “hopping from one infrastructure to another”. Incidentally, I rather hope we can’t copy our phenomenal consciousness onto a machine, or the possibility of hell on earth unfolds. The nasty business of very extended torment could be delegated to another machine that neither knows nor cares what it is doing.
    7. Also, should we consider fetuses75 and the senile or those in a PVS76 as persons? See Baker77 who alleges that those who have, will have or have had the capacity for a first-person perspective78 should be accounted persons. But is this simply arbitrary retrofitting of philosophy to Christian doctrine (though Wiggins79 seems to share this view; individuals are persons if typical individuals of their kind are persons)?
    8. I must also discuss animals80 under this head. If we are identical to (human) animals then to what, exactly, are we identical – that is, just what is a human animal – and that are their persistence conditions81? Note that there are disagreements about the referent of “animal” – is it the organism82 or the body83? The key issue is with corpses84. Feldman thinks they are animals, but Olson thinks they aren’t. Death85 is central to the enquiry. Just when does the person or animal commence86 or cease to be? If he is resuscitated (or resurrected87 / reincarnated88, assuming these to be possible) what happens in the interregnum89?
    9. As noted above and elsewhere90,91, I need to investigate the termini of human existence, and the issues they raise for the various views – the “fetus problem92” for the constitution view and the “corpse problem93” for animalism.
    1. Human Animals94
      1. I haven’t anything to say currently here other than what is covered in a bunch of related topics.
      2. However, as this is what I think answers the question What Are We?95, and is the plural of the title of "Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology", it seems sensible to create this topic as one onto which detailed discussion may eventually be hived off.
      3. The main point – often re-iterated – is that we are Animals96, and while we are animals of a special kind97, there is no ontological98 difference – other than of degree – between our species99 and other animals.
      4. I note further that Baker100 might agree with this as far as it goes, but she thinks there is a major ontological difference when the human animal becomes a person101. I deny this, as will most animalists102.
    2. Biological View115
      1. The Biological View (BV) is that we are116 biological organisms117, and – in particular – have the persistence conditions118 of biological organisms. Since the organisms we are are obviously human animals119, this view is effectively just Animalism120.
      2. However, it is just possible that the BV and Animalism might part company for some philosophers. Maybe you might think that we are essentially animals, but can metamorphose121 from one species to another or be reincarnated122 as an individual of another species – or as a different individual of the same species. These might count as variants of the BV, but would not be Animalism123 as commonly understood, since it presupposes that we cease to be at death, and are essentially human animals124 and, indeed, essentially one and the same human animal.
      3. The BV is to be distinguished from older physicalist125 variants – in particular the “Body View126”.
      4. For the detailed principles of individuation and persistence criteria associated with the BV, see the Biological Criterion127.
    3. Biological Criterion128
      1. Biological Criteria are the criteria of identity129 associated with the biological view130 of what we131 human beings132 are.
      2. Animalism133 takes this biological view, that we are human animals134 (as distinct from persons135, or immaterial souls136). So, our persistence criteria are those of animals137.
      3. What should be discussed here is just what these criteria are.
      4. Biological identity criteria in general are slightly wider than those of animals in particular, as they include those for plants138 and other biological organisms139.
      5. Locke140 made the first stab at what this criterion might be. His view was that it was the participation in a single life141 that made an organism142 the same organism over time. The concept of a life is itself in need of explanation, and may not (in the absence of vitalism) be logically prior to the concept of an organism.
      6. It seems to me that the biological criterion could (theoretically, at least) allow for metamorphosis143 (provided that the metamorphosis144 is into another organism). There are, however, sortal145 objections to metamorphosis146.
      7. The jumping-off point for this topic is probably "Wilson (Jack) - Biological Individuality - The identity and Persistence of Living Entities". However, the book is at pains to point out that the persistence criteria for exemplars of particular species – and, indeed, their principles of individuation – differ greatly. Standard views are overly influenced by the assumption that all biological individuals are like large mammals rather than, say, strawberry plants147. However, as we are large mammals, I’m not too worried about this fine point.
      8. Note that the biological criterion is to be distinguished from the body criterion148, with which the psychological criterion149 was originally contrasted.
    4. Animalists150
      1. Who is an animalist depends on who you ask. Some are self-proclaimed, and others are claimed to be so by others.
      2. The following would definitely seem to be animalists:-
        1. Michael R. Ayers,
        2. Andrew M. Bailey,
        3. Stephan Blatti,
        4. William Carter,
        5. David Hershenov,
        6. David Mackie,
        7. Eric Olson,
        8. Paul Snowdon,
        9. Peter Van Inwagen, and151
        10. Richard Wollheim.
      3. In addition,
        1. David Wiggins, and
        2. Bernard Williams
        are sometimes claimed (I think by Stephan Blatti).
      4. Olson in "Olson (Eric) - What are We? A Study of Personal Ontology" has Carter, Ayers, van Inwagen and Snowdon; but also:-
        1. Joshua Hoffman and Gary Rosenkrantz, and
        2. Trenton Merricks.
      5. However, in "Olson (Eric) - Psychology and Personal Identity", Olson claims that – contrary to appearances – David Wiggins and Jay Rosenberg are supporters of the PV152.
      6. "Bailey (Andrew M.) - The Elimination Argument" agrees that Merricks and van Inwagen are animalists.
      7. "Johansson (Jens) - What is Animalism?" has Ayers, Carter, Mackie, Merricks, Olson, Snowdon, Van Inwagen, and Wiggins153, but also:-
        1. John McDowell, and
        2. Derek Parfit.
      8. It is likely that many atheist or agnostic philosophers who don’t specifically treat of personal identity are animalists. "Quinn (Philip L.) - Review of Antony Flew's 'The Logic of Mortality'" seems to describe Antony Flew as such, though Quinn doesn’t use the term “animalist”.
      9. "Bourget (David) & Chalmers (David) - The PhilPapers Surveys: What Do Philosophers Believe?" has a question on Personal Identity, and it seems that only just under 17% of faculty at elite philosophy departments are even inclined towards animalism, with just under 6% being convinced. No recognised Animalist appears to have responded to the survey (or at least allowed their opinions to be published). I did, however, spot that my former supervisor – Jennifer Hornsby – claimed to be an animalist, though I don’t think she’s written anything on the subject.
  2. Organisms169
    1. Organisms feature highly in animalist discussions of personal identity, in that according to animalism170, human persons171 are (numerically identical172 to) human animals173, which are organisms.
    2. According to some philosophers – for instance Peter Van Inwagen – sorites174 and multiple-occupancy175 arguments yield that the only things that exist176 are simples and organisms.
    3. Organisms are to be distinguished from their bodies177, which have different persistence conditions178, for example post-mortem as corpses179.
    4. An organism seeks to maintain itself against its environment, and exchanges matter180 with it. An organism possesses none of its matter essentially181, and may indeed replace all – or at least most of182 – its matter many times during its life183.
    5. When organisms ultimately fail in the above endeavour, they die184.
    6. Prior to this, they are alive185; organisms are the only things that may properly be said to be alive – life is a biological process186. Other things may exist187, and come to an end, but they do not literally live188 or die189.
    7. Normally, a proper part of an organism is not an organism. Presumably organelles – such as mitochondria – are (parasitic) organisms living within, and – collectively if not individually – essential190 parts191 of, other organisms.
    8. In particular, a brain192 is not an organism, but an organ. We are organisms, not organs, whatever psychological TEs193 might imply, so we are not our brains. See my remarks on Brains194, BIVs195 and Brain Transplants196 for discussion of whether we could survive as197 our brains in a worst-case scenario and whether our brains are ‘just another organ’ as Olson198 claims.
    9. The chapter on ‘Crowd Intelligence199’ in "Wohlleben (Peter) - The Inner Life of Animals: Surprising Observations of a Hidden World" suggests that ants and bees – while organisms in their own right – might be considered as cells in a Superorganism. Also, that there is such a thing as a ‘Hive Mind200’. This thought might also suggest that human (and other) Societies201 are Superorganisms. Finally, it relates to the thought that some organisms can be Scattered Objects202, that is if Superorganisms are themselves organisms.
    10. For all this, see:-
      → Wikipedia: Superorganism
      → Wikipedia: Collective intelligence
      → Wikipedia: Swarm intelligence
    11. See "Wilson (Jack) - Biological Individuality - The identity and Persistence of Living Entities" for a full discussion of the persistence203 of organisms, though this considers the generality. The book thinks that the general topic is too much swayed by considerations of large mammals, which – of course – is what we are, and the only organisms whose persistence conditions I care about in this research.
    1. Life204
      1. There are (at least) two sub-topics that fall under this topic:-
        1. Lives: Life as an (extended) event – the career of an individual.
          → See "Wollheim (Richard) - The Thread of Life"
        2. Life: Life as a biological process.
          → See "Wilson (Jack) - Biological Individuality - The identity and Persistence of Living Entities"
      2. I assume that lives can be had by individuals that do not have (biological) life, but think it unhelpful to talk of non-biological individuals as “alive”, except in a figurative sense.
      3. Life – and its correlate, death205 – is a biological process, on which the word of the biologist (maybe as clarified by the philosopher) is final.
      4. I’m open to the idea that alternative biologies – other than the carbon-based exemplar ubiquitous on earth – are possible – or at least conceivable. So, anything sufficiently complex that “can extract energy from its environment, grow, repair damage to its body, and reproduce” is alive (Elliott Sober). We wouldn’t want to deny that aliens are alive, nor – just maybe – sufficiently complex machines of the far future.
      5. I have a question on the “reproductive” requirement above. At most, this must apply to “typical representatives” – else the infertile would not be alive. But – important though reproduction is for evolution206 – I’m not sure why this is essential. Note that computer hardware is unlikely to reproduce – or at least it’s not necessary that it should, as it can be manufactured. However, computer programmes would be able to – this seems to be claimed of AIs, who are hoped to be able to produce improved versions of themselves.
      6. What I object is the notion that computer programmes are – or will eventually be – “alive” in the same sense as organisms are alive, though their hosting computers might be.
      7. I say this by analogy with my thoughts on the supposed consciousness207 of computer programs: computer programs can’t be conscious, though the hardware that runs them might be. However, I’m not sure the analogy works, as the “living” is said to be at the program level, and not to involve any physical changes to the computer (other than the usual changes to the contents of memory locations).
      8. So, "Tegmark (Max) - Life 3.0: Being Human in the Age of Artificial Intelligence" has – as is indicated by the book’s title – three versions of life, but only Life 1.0 is ‘life’ in my sense; the others are – or impact on – ‘lives’:-
        1. Life 1.0: Biological Evolution208 – no hardware or software change within a lifetime.
        2. Life 2.0: Cultural Evolution209 – software, but not hardware, change within a lifetime. Learning.
        3. Life 3.0: Technological Evolution210 – potential for both software and hardware change within a lifetime.
      9. "Al-Khalili (Jim) & McFadden (Johnjoe) - Life on the Edge: The Coming of Age of Quantum Biology" has recently raised the question whether quantum phenomena211 are essential to life. This is not parallel with speculation on the association of quantum phenomena with Consciousness212 as it seems to be based on hard science – mechanisms – rather than ‘explaining’ one mystery with another.
      10. So, interesting philosophical questions about Life include:-
        1. Just what is (biological) life?
        2. When does biological life begin? This is presumably an empirical question, the answer to which will vary from species to species.
        3. Are there borderline cases of life?
        4. When does life cease? Again, the answer to this question will be species-dependent.
        5. Can life intermit213? Does it make sense to say that so-and-so died214 (on the operating table, say) and then revived?
      11. Interesting philosophical questions about Lives include:-
        1. How are lives individuated?
        2. What sort of things can have lives?
        3. How closely coupled is the life of a human organism215 with the life of a human person216?
        4. Can a life lived courtesy of a human organism be continued after the death217 of that organism?
      • Animation218
        1. “Animation” is an important matter. Just when does a particular life219 begin, and does it require any “vital force” or “infused soul220” (as the term implies)? Of course, the scientific answer to the latter question is that it doesn’t. However, such notions are central to many religious claims, though are not assumed by Christian Materialists221.
        2. We also need to consider:-
          1. Reanimation, and
          2. Suspended animation
        3. Both of these concepts are beloved of the Transhumanists222, at least those who are interested in the idea that their body223 or brain224 might be frozen until the time comes when it is possible for their reanimation.
        4. Suspended animation – in the form of cryoscopic suspension – appears as a TE225 in "Clark (Andy) & Kuhn (Robert Lawrence) - Aeon: Video - Andy Clark - Virtual immortality", to try to demonstrate that we are “patterns in information space226”.
      • Quantum Mechanics227
        1. Quantum Mechanics, per se, is very peripheral to my research concerns, but is connected – or alleged to be connected – to sub-topics that are slightly less peripheral.
        2. At a first guess, these include:-
          1. Consciousness228: either because – doubtfully – QM “explains” consciousness or – equally doubtfully, in my view – because “observers” are conscious and so consciousness is involved in the measuring process and the “collapse of the wave function”.
            • My view on the former has been that “explaining” one scarcely-understood phenomenon by another even-less-understood phenomenon has been a non-starter. Also, the mechanisms proposed have been very dubious.
            • My view on the latter is that the “observer” is any interfering macroscopic object, the record of which (eg. on a photographic plate) may or may not be viewed by a conscious observer, but has the record nonetheless.
          2. Life229: because QM may be involved – or necessary for – various life-processes and indeed the origin of life itself.
          3. Teletransportation230: Because of quantum entanglement.
          4. Transhumanism231: because of quantum computing and the impact this might have on superintelligence and AI generally.
        3. The Many Worlds Interpretation of QM is sometimes said to involve either a very profligate example of Fission232, or a spreading out of the “Quantum Self233” across all these worlds. This is discussed in "Ball (Philip) - Beyond Weird: Why Everything You Thought You Knew About Quantum Mechanics is ... Different", pp. 288-305, Chapter “There is no other ‘quantum’ you”.
    2. Plants234
      1. I’d never imagined having to say anything about Plants under the topic of Personal Identity. However, there appears to be a movement in biology and analytic philosophy to include plants in the category of organisms235 with minds236, on account of their ability to take advantage of their environment.
      2. I think this is absurd and is simply changing the meaning of “mind237”.
      3. A good place to start to consider the principles involved may be "Segundo-Ortin (Miguel), Etc - Plant Cognition - A Methodological Primer: Theories, Methods and Challenges".
    3. Evolution238
      1. One of the arguments for Animalism239, due to Stephan Blatti, is that from our evolutionary origins. If we’ve evolved from animals240, then it’s likely that’s what we are241. This requires careful consideration, because it would seem to provide the default view of what we are – but then so does common sense.
      2. Species evolve – both improving the characteristics of average exemplars of that species but also generating new species. So – prima facie – there’s no reason not to describe the emergence of human persons242 as “more of the same” from non-person hominids, ie. just tweaking their capacities – rather than as making an “ontological change” – as Baker243 argues.
      3. The persistence criteria244 for species also makes an interesting topic of research, as does deciding just what “species” are: for instance, are they concepts245 or universals246 or are they collections of concrete individuals247? Is the evolution of a new species a form of metamorphosis248?
      4. There will be some considerable overlap between this discussion and that on Homo Sapiens249.
      5. There’s also an overlap between speculations on the future of human evolution and Transhumanism250.
      6. Evolutionary Psychology has much to say (and much that is disputed) about what makes us tick – what makes us what we are251 in both a narrative252 and a metaphysical sense.
      7. There’s also the question of the evolution of consciousness253; when, why and how did it evolve?
      8. I might add a discussion of cultural evolution – see especially "Heyes (Cecilia M.) - Cognitive Gadgets: The Cultural Evolution of Thinking" – and how this has made us what we are254 by extending our cognitive capacities.
      • Origins255
        1. Our origins – just when “we” came into existence – are closely tied up with whatever “we” are256.
        2. So, an Animalist257 (who thinks that we are essentially animals258, rather than persons259, and for whom psychology260 is irrelevant to our identity) would insist that we come into existence earlier than would a supporter of the Psychological View261, or of the Constitution View262 (for whom a First-Person Perspective263 is definitive of our identity). Our psychology – and particularly a psychology rich enough to qualify us as persons264 – comes into existence fairly late on in our development.
        3. For modal265 reasons, endurantists266 can’t have “us” coming into existence before the possibility of twinning267 is past, though perdurantists268 don’t have this worry.
        4. I would also like to discuss Saul Kripke’s views on origins-essentialism.
          1. Metaphysically, I could not have been born other than from the particular egg-sperm combination from which I was born, and consequently
          2. Practically, I could not have been conceived other than at the time at which I was conceived.
        5. There are ethical ramifications in the context of abortion269 debates (and infanticide, for that matter), but I cannot pursue these in any detail.
      • Genetics270
        1. Genetics would seem to be a fairly peripheral topic as far as my thesis is concerned, though it is relevant insofar as some philosophers claim that we are identical to our genome, or that our genome is an essential Property271 of a Human Being272 (or any other Animal273 or Plant274 with a genome).
        2. As such, it has connections to What We Are275, our Origins276 and whether or not we are Information277.
        3. Of course, that we are NOT identical to our genome is proved by the fact of identical twinning278. Then there’s the question of gene editing which -we may assume – doesn’t cause us to lose our identities any more than transplant279 surgery does.
  3. Animals280
    1. According to the Animalists281, human animals are what we are282. Some philosophers, eg. Baker283, seem to think that describing us as animals is demeaning, but this seems to muddle together all the varieties of animal into one bestial bunch. Clearly, there are lots of differences between lug-worms and the great apes, and further – but much less significant – differences between the non-human great apes and ourselves.
    2. Several points need to be made here.
      1. Firstly, what all animals have in common is that they are organisms284 and have common persistence-conditions285 (PCs) in virtue of this fact; or at least large mammals like ourselves do. In particular, our – and their – psychology286 – however important to us287 – and them – is irrelevant to our persistence288, and hence, to our numerical identity (though not to our Narrative Identity289). The persistence of animals (and other organisms) is covered in detail in "Wilson (Jack) - Biological Individuality - The identity and Persistence of Living Entities".
      2. Secondly, the contentious point is whether aspects of the psychology290 of some higher animals are so distinctive that (as Baker claims) an ontological291 difference beyond the mere existence of a new species is in evidence. Baker thinks the watershed is a First Person Perspective292.
      3. Leading on from this is the claim that the FPP293 is so important, that we are not animals, but persons294.
    3. A question to consider, probably under the topic of organisms295, is whether the PCs of all organisms are the same. Plants296 and animals are both organisms.
    4. Non-animalists raise issues about the presumed supreme moral status and cognitive abilities of human beings297. Demonstrating that these abilities – however well or badly exemplified by humans as a species or as individuals – are on a continuum with those of the higher animals – in particular the great apes – rather than unique in kind to human beings – requires the researcher into personal identity to investigate just what the cognitive and moral capacities of animals actually are. This study is stimulated by Locke’s298 claim that personhood299 is a forensic property300.
    5. It is difficult to imagine what it is like to be a non-human animal. Partly, this is because of their differing sensory modalities. I’ve found "Yong (Ed) - An Immense World: How Animal Senses Reveal the Hidden Realms Around Us" particularly enlightening in this regard (much more that "Nagel (Thomas) - What is it Like to Be a Bat?").
    6. Another recent find worth pursuing is "Wandrey (Mona-Marie) & Halina (Marta) - The Evolution of Animal Consciousness", touching additionally – as it does – on the topics of Consciousness301 and Evolution302.
    1. Animal Rights303
      1. The motivation for including this topic – which is in its primarily ethical aspect largely tangential to my Thesis (which focuses on metaphysics) – is at least fivefold:-
        1. Firstly, as Locke noted, personal identity is a forensic304 matter.
        2. As I’m inclined towards animalism305, the status of other animals is relevant – in particular in resisting the claims of those (eg. Lynne Rudder Baker) that when a First Person Perspective306 comes into existence, we get a major ontological307 change.
        3. Some animal rights theorists – eg. Gary Francione in "Francione (Gary) - Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation" – want to give (at least some) animals the legal and moral standing of persons308.
        4. Other contemporary philosophers – eg. Peter Carruthers in "Carruthers (Peter) - The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice" – argue that animals have no rights at all.
        5. My view is somewhere in the middle. I’m not a fan of rights (in the absence of a contract) but think that human beings have duties to one another and to the higher animals in virtue of the others’ needs.
      2. A passage in the advertising blurb for "Calarco (Matthew) - Thinking Through Animals: Identity, Difference, Indistinction" is:-
        • The rapidly expanding field of critical animal studies now offers a myriad of theoretical and philosophical positions from which to choose.
        • It uses three rubrics — identity, difference, and indistinction — to differentiate three major paths of thought about animals.
          1. The identity approach aims to establish continuity among human beings and animals so as to grant animals equal access to the ethical and political community.
          2. The difference framework views the animal world as containing its own richly complex and differentiated modes of existence in order to allow for a more expansive ethical and political worldview.
          3. The indistinction approach argues that we should abandon the notion that humans are unique in order to explore new ways of conceiving human-animal relations.
        • Each approach is interrogated for its relative strengths and weaknesses, with specific emphasis placed on the kinds of transformational potential it contains.
      3. A fairly recent book that catalogues the atrocities and discusses the issues is "Ricard (Matthieu) - A Plea for the Animals: The Moral, Philosophical, and Evolutionary Imperative to Treat All Beings with Compassion".
      4. Also deserving of a mention is "Rowlands (Mark) - The Philosopher and the Wolf" which contrasts supposed lupine virtues with simian vices. I’m not convinced.
  4. Arguments for Animalism309
    1. I’m not currently aware of many arguments in favour of Animalism310. Rather, Animalists argue that Animalism is – or ought to be – the default position, and try to pick off the arguments of those who have other positions on personal identity.
    2. The main argument – covered next - is Olson311’s Thinking Animal Argument312, which is both an argument for Animalism and intended as a refutation of the Constitution View313.
    3. However, there are others, and saying that ‘it’s just obvious’ that we are animals is insufficient, especially since most philosophers deny this ‘obvious’ fact.
    4. The only other argument I’m aware of (or can remember) is the “Animal Ancestors Argument” as given in "Blatti (Stephan) - A New Argument for Animalism", with an attempted rebuttal by "Gillett (Carl) - What you are and the evolution of organs, souls and superorganisms: a reply to Blatti".
    1. Thinking Animal Argument314
      1. This argument is otherwise known as the “too many minds” argument, the “too many thinkers” argument, or Olson315’s “master argument”. For many years, Olson has trotted out this argument at every opportunity.
      2. The basic idea is that a human animal316 thinks, and if it is not identical to the person317, then we have too many thinkers – the animal318 and the person319, unless we deny that one or other of them thinks, which is at the least very counter-intuitive.
      3. Additional to this metaphysical problem, we have – Olson says – an epistemological question. Which one are we? The animal or the person?
      4. While I’m inclined to accept animalism320, I think this argument fails, and it does the cause for animalism no good by having it as the main argument in its favour.
        1. This form of argument has been used by nihilists321 to argue that there are no ordinary things, usually invoking vagueness322 and fuzzy boundary considerations. Which of the many cats (give or take a few atoms) is the “real cat”? There’s no principled reason and I can’t know which. So there are no cats, or if there are, I can’t know which of the many cat-a-likes is the real cat. Since there are ordinary things, there must be something wrong with this argument form (though I don’t yet have a strong opinion as to just what it is).
        2. I accept Moore’s “two hands” argument – nothing is plainer than that I have two hands, so any metaphysical or epistemological theory that says I haven’t, or can’t know that I have, must have something wrong with it. I do know that there are arguments against the existence of hands and other “arbitrary undetached parts”, so maybe it’s safer to stick to cats. Olson (see "Marshall (Richard) & Olson (Eric) - Eric T. Olson: The Philosopher with No Hands"), as well as Peter Van Inwagen (eg. in "Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts"), argue against the existence of hands, though van Inwagen is happy with the existence of cats and other organisms, so I need to address their arguments head-on to determine the subtleties thereof.
        3. Baker323 and other supporters of the Constitution View324 have answers to the argument used as an argument against their view (along the lines of “thinking derivatively”).
        4. There are also resources like “Lewis counting”, as in perdurantism325 where a “soon to fission326” entity is really two entities sharing stages. Our language is fit for purpose.


Concluding Remarks
  1. Having discussed Animalism, we can now in our next Chapter327 turn to the main alternative I want to consider, the Constitution View and the arguments for it.
  2. This is work in progress328.


Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed329
  1. This section attempts to derive the readings lists automatically from those of the underlying Notes, but removing duplicated references. The list is divided into:-
  2. As this is a “core” chapter, the coverage of the literature will be very complete, if not exhaustive, when it comes to Animalism itself.
  3. For background topics, it will be more selective332.
  4. I’ve not been overly careful to segregate the reading-list of this Chapter from that of Chapter 8333. I will address the segregation in due course. There will, in any case, be some overlap.
  5. Many aspects of these papers will need to be either ignored or reserved for other chapters.


Works on this topic that I’ve actually read334, include the following:-
  1. Animalism
    1. Animalism335
    2. Human Animals341
    3. Biological View352
    4. Biological Criterion357
    5. Animalists
  2. Organisms
    1. Organisms393
    2. Life
    3. Plants398
    4. Evolution399
  3. Animals
    1. Animals408
    2. Animal Rights409
  4. Arguments for Animalism
    1. Arguments for Animalism413
    2. Thinking Animal Argument415

A further reading list might start with:-
  1. Animalism
    1. Animalism426
    2. Human Animals428
    3. Biological View430
    4. Biological Criterion432
    5. Animalists
  2. Organisms
    1. Organisms441
    2. Life
    3. Plants447
    4. Evolution448
  3. Animals
    1. Animals451
    2. Animal Rights453
  4. Arguments for Animalism
    1. Arguments for Animalism454
    2. Thinking Animal Argument455


In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1: Footnote 14: Footnote 47: Footnote 65:
  1. I’m not clear on whether Wiggins is or is not an Animalist.
  2. "Ferner (Adam) - Metaphysics and biology: a critique of David Wiggins’ account of personal identity" has him as a Human Being Theorist.
Footnote 151:
  1. The evidence for this – by way of self-confession – is in "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Materialism and the Psychological-continuity Account of Personal Identity".
Footnote 153:
  1. David Wiggins is a difficult case, as is discussed at length in "Ferner (Adam) - Metaphysics and biology: a critique of David Wiggins’ account of personal identity".
  2. Wiggins has his own Note later.
Footnote 182:
  1. See "Frisen (Jonas), Etc. - Retrospective Birth Dating of Cells in Humans" for the argument that cerebral grey-matter retains its carbon atoms from infancy, and hence that neurons are as old as the individual. However, other cells are replaced – sometimes frequently.
Footnote 329: Footnote 332: Footnote 337: Footnotes 354, 370: Footnote 355: Footnotes 356, 359: Footnote 361: Footnote 374: Footnote 378: Footnote 380: Footnote 383: Footnote 403: Footnote 404: Footnote 410: Footnote 411: Footnote 412: Footnote 425: Footnote 431: Footnote 434: Footnote 438: Footnote 439: Footnote 443: Footnote 444: Footnote 452:

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2026
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)


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