Two Spheres, Twenty Spheres, And The Identity Of Indiscernibles
Della Rocca (Michael)
Source: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (2005) 480–492
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. I argue that the standard counterexamples to the identity of indiscernibles1 fail because they involve a commitment to a certain kind of primitive or brute identity that has certain very unpalatable consequences involving the possibility of objects of the same kind completely overlapping and sharing all the same proper parts.
  2. The only way to avoid these consequences is to reject brute identity and thus to accept the identity of indiscernibles2.
  3. I also show how the rejection of the identity of indiscernibles3 derives some of its support from its affinity with a Kripkean account of trans-world identity and theories of direct reference.

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  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

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