A First-Person Asymmetry
Montmarquet (James)
Source: Analysis, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Jun., 1987), pp. 167-170
Paper - Abstract

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Philosopher’s Index Abstract

  1. Time was when discussions of the first-person standpoint were almost entirely concerned with its special epistemic assets: with the privileges and apparent prerogatives of self-knowledge.
  2. More recently, attention has been drawn to the necessary limitations and deficiencies of such knowledge, e.g., with the 'epistemic blindspots' attaching to agent's predictions of their own decisions. (Cf. such essays of Roy Sorenson's as 'Uncaused Decisions and Pre-decisional Blindspots', Philosophical Studies, 45, 1984, pp. 51-6.)
  3. The present discussion falls within this latter 'tradition'.

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