Reductionism about Persons; And What Matters
Chappell (Tim), Chappell (Sophie Grace)
Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 98 (1998), pp. 41-57
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. This paper's Section 1 examines Derek Parfit1's main, metaphysical, argument for reductionism about personal identity.
  2. Section 2 considers three possible ethical arguments for reductionism, and suggests a new approach to the question of what matters2 about personal identity which has to do with the notion of an ethical narrative.

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