The Inexplicability of Identity
Candlish (Stewart)
Source: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 49, Number 1, May1971 , pp. 23-37(15)
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsBooks / Papers Citing this PaperNotes Citing this PaperDisclaimer

Author’s Abstract

  1. Most of those who have exercised their wits in grappling with the account of numerical identity1 that stems originally from Leibniz, which is contained in the so-called Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles2, have puzzled over whether the principle is logically true or merely contingently true.
  2. I have found myself wondering both whether it is true at all, and indeed what on earth it is intended to be saying.
  3. Because it is a principle used most often by logicians, and because it can apparently be clearly stated symbolically, I shall try to get at its nature by means of various formal statements.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

© Theo Todman, June 2007 - June 2020. Please address any comments on this page to File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page