| Vagueness, Realism, Language and Thought |
|---|
| Robinson (Howard) |
| Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Monday 8 December 2008 |
| Paper - Abstract |
| Paper Statistics | Books / Papers Citing this Paper | Notes Citing this Paper | Disclaimer |
Author's AbstractThe problems of vagueness and the sorites1 paradox arise because we try to treat natural language as if it were a unitary formal system. In fact, natural language contains a large variety of representational ontologies that serve different purposes and which cannot be united formally, but which can intuitively be taken as ways of seeing a common basic ontology. Using this framework, we can save classical logic from vagueness and avoid the sorites2.
Comment:
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
| © Theo Todman, June 2007 - Dec 2025. | Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. | File output: Website Maintenance Dashboard | Return to Top of this Page | Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page | Return to Theo Todman's Home Page |