|Vagueness, Realism, Language and Thought|
|Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Monday 8 December 2008|
|Paper - Abstract|
|Paper Summary||Notes Citing this Paper|
The problems of vagueness and the sorites1 paradox arise because we try to treat natural language as if it were a unitary formal system. In fact, natural language contains a large variety of representational ontologies that serve different purposes and which cannot be united formally, but which can intuitively be taken as ways of seeing a common basic ontology. Using this framework, we can save classical logic from vagueness and avoid the sorites2.
Draft non-citable version. The final version of this paper will be published in the 2009 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Link (Defunct).
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