Vagueness, Realism, Language and Thought
Robinson (Howard)
Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Monday 8 December 2008
Paper - Abstract

Paper SummaryNotes Citing this Paper


Author's Abstract

    The problems of vagueness and the sorites1 paradox arise because we try to treat natural language as if it were a unitary formal system. In fact, natural language contains a large variety of representational ontologies that serve different purposes and which cannot be united formally, but which can intuitively be taken as ways of seeing a common basic ontology. Using this framework, we can save classical logic from vagueness and avoid the sorites2.

Comment:

Draft non-citable version. The final version of this paper will be published in the 2009 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Link (Defunct).

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  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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