|A Materialist Ontology of the Human Person|
|Van Inwagen (Peter)|
|Source: Van Inwagen (Peter) & Zimmerman (Dean) - Persons: Human and Divine|
|Paper - Abstract|
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From "Zimmerman (Dean) - Persons: Human and Divine - Three Introductory Questions"
Global materialism is the thesis that everything (other than abstract objects if such there be) is material. Local materialisms are theses to the effect that everything within some specified domain, such as the created world or the natural world, is material. A local materialist, like van Inwagen, may accept the existence of God or of angels. In this Chapter, he attempts to combine a Platonic ontology of abstract objects with a local materialism according to which human persons are material substances. He then goes on to examine the consequences of his theory for "token–token identity theory" — the view that "tokens" of mental state types, such as types of pain, are identical with "tokens" of physical types, such as types of brain processes — and also for property dualism.
Part 3: Materialism
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