<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Gilmore (Cody) - Time Travel, Coinciding Objects and Persistence (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_14/PaperSummary_14933.htm">Time Travel, Coinciding Objects and Persistence</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/G/Author_Gilmore (Cody).htm">Gilmore (Cody)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Zimmerman (Dean), Ed. - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 3</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=800><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_14/PaperSummary_14933.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_14/PaperCitings_14933.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_14/PapersToNotes_14933.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><u>Author s <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P14933_1">Introduction</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P14933_1"></A></u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li><a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_760.htm">Endurantism</A><SUP>2</SUP>, roughly stated, is the view that material objects lack temporal extent and persist through time by  enduring  that is, by being <em>wholly present</em> at each moment of their careers. Perdurantism is the opposing view that material objects persist by  perduring  that is, by being temporally extended and having different <em>temporal parts</em> located at different times. In this paper I offer an argument against perdurantism, one based largely on premises that have been used in arguments against <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_760.htm">endurantism</A><SUP>3</SUP>. Perdurantists can resist the argument, but not, I think, without weakening at least one of the relevant <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_760.htm">anti-endurantist</A><SUP>4</SUP> arguments. In one way or another, then, this chapter is meant to alter the overall debate between <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_760.htm">endurantists</A><SUP>5</SUP> and perdurantists to the benefit of the former. </li><li>The heart of the chapter is the presentation of a new type of coincidence puzzle. A coincidence puzzle is an apparent counter-example to the following, widely accepted <em>anti-coincidence principle</em>: <ul type="disc">It is impossible for numerically distinct material objects to <em>coincide</em> - that is, to be (i) wholly present in exactly the same location and (ii) composed, at some level of decomposition, of all the same parts, or all the same matter at the given location </ul>To <em>solve</em> such a puzzle, as I shall use the term, is to show that the case in question does not in fact constitute a genuine counter-example to the principle. </li><li>Existing coincidence puzzles can be divided into two types, corresponding to the manner in which they bear upon the <a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_760.htm">endurantism</A><SUP>6</SUP> versus perdurantism debate. Puzzles of the first type (involving temporary spatial co-location) can be solved simply by abandoning <a name="6"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_760.htm">endurantism</A><SUP>7</SUP> in favour of perdurantism, whereas those of the second type (involving career-long spatial co-location) remain equally puzzling on both views. In this paper I show that if backward <a name="7"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1133.htm">time travel</A><SUP>8</SUP> is possible, then a <em>third</em> type of coincidence puzzle arises. Puzzles of this third type confront perdurantists, and can be solved simply by shifting to <a name="8"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_760.htm">endurantism</A><SUP>9</SUP>.</li><li>The plan for this chapter is as follows. In Section 2 I introduce some new terminology and show how it applies to the older puzzles. In Section 3 I give two examples of the new type of puzzle. Finally, in Section 4, I present the argument against perdurantism and discuss a number of possible responses. </li></ol></FONT><hr><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>Comment: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Part III: Coincident Objects and Temporal Parts</li><li>See <a name="W2519W"></a><A HREF = "http://www.marcsandersfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/paper_Gilmore.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> for an electronic pre-print. </li><li>I seem to have an electronic copy of the published chapter as well; a nicely-formatted pdf. </li></ul><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_P14933_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P14933_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: I have omitted several useful footnotes, including one that excludes <a name="9"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_761.htm">exdurantism</a> from the discussion. <BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T08:13" pubdate>02/08/2018 08:13:21</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>