<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Immortality (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_15/PaperSummary_15141.htm">Personal Identity and Immortality</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/S/Author_Shoemaker (David).htm">Shoemaker (David)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction, 2009, Chapter 1</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=600><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_15/PaperSummary_15141.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_15/PaperCitings_15141.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_15/PapersToNotes_15141.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">For the meaning of any abbreviations in what follows <a name="63"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_860.htm">Click here for Note</A> <ol type="1"><li><B>Motivating Introduction</B>: The impending death of Gretchen Weirob  the case from <a name="109"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_651.htm">Perry (John) - A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality</A>". A pastor and a former philosophy student of hers fail to convince her (a life-long atheist) that it is rational for her to anticipate <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">post-mortem survival</A><SUP>1</SUP> (taken to be  surviving the death of her body ). <ul type="disc"><li><U>Note</U>: See <a name="110"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3758.htm">Kagan (Shelly) - Death</A>" (<a name="64"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_792.htm">Click here for Note</A>) for a Yale course on Death. </li><li>See also:- <ul type="square"><li>Some correspondence on Resurrection, <a name="65"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_3/Notes_386.htm">Click here for Note</A>, and </li><li>For my general thoughts on Resurrection, <a name="66"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_97.htm">Click here for Note</A>, while</li><li>For comments on <a name="81"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2800.htm">Russell (Bertrand) - Do We Survive Death?</A>", <a name="67"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_759.htm">Click here for Note</A>, and</li><li>For comments on <a name="111"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_569.htm">Bynum (Caroline) - Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200 - 1336</A>", <a name="68"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_768.htm">Click here for Note</A> (for the Introduction). </li></ul></li></ul></li><li><B>Background</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>What she requires (but does not get) is:- <BR>&rarr; the <U>rational anticipation</U> of <BR>&rarr; the mere <U>metaphysical possibility</U> of continued post-mortem experiences <BR>&rarr;  from the <U>inside</U> . </li><li>She does not require survival to be <U>probable</U>, just <U>metaphysically possible</U>, but this seems too weak a requirement, as some gerrymandered solutions to the problem are prima facie too improbable to be worthy of any rational credence. </li><li><U>Note</U>: Just what does  <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_906.htm">probable</A><SUP>2</SUP> mean in this context? </li><li>But, <U>personal identity</U> is key  it is essential for any surviving being to be <U>her</U>. And, in particular, not someone exactly similar to her. </li><li>The burden of proof is on the person proposing that <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">post-mortem survival</A><SUP>3</SUP> is possible. On the standard materialist conception of  I  the default view  just how is <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">post-mortem survival</A><SUP>4</SUP> <U>possible</U> if my body has been cremated?</li><li>The <B>Body Criterion</B> (of personal identity) (<B>BC</B>): X at t1 is the same person as Y at t2 iff X s body is the same as Y s body. </li><li><U>Note</U>: The Body Criterion <a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_907.htm">(BC</A><SUP>5</SUP>) as stated doesn t mention that either X or Y are persons. It s usually assumed that both are, but Olson (in <a name="82"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3508.htm">Olson (Eric) - Persistence</A>" and elsewhere) has it that only X need be (or alternatively only Y need be). We discuss the BC later in this Chapter. </li><li>If the body is destroyed at death, and the BC is true, then it is impossible to survive. </li><li><U>Note</U>: Shoemaker references <a name="83"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4934.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Possibility of Resurrection</A>", but doesn t consider whether a body can be an <a name="6"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_78.htm">intermittent object</A><SUP>6</SUP>, re-constituted post-mortem. This seems to have been the mediaeval view, with all the concomitant worries about the resurrection of those consumed by cannibals. Note, however, that such views don t take seriously the difference between an <U>organism</U>, which continuously exchanges matter with its environment, and a <U>body</U>, which  considered as a mass of matter  as a corpse  arguably does not. </li><li>Pending a Note of my own on Van Inwagen s strange idea in the above paper, the summary offered by Shoemaker is that God  whisks away the body of the soon-to-be-deceased at the point of death, and replaces it with a simulacrum, which is then dealt with as expected. The point of this is that Weirob s knock-down objection to the metaphysical possibility of resurrection (the destruction of the body) is undermined. <U>A</U> body is destroyed, but it s not <U>your</U> body. Your body  even though it <U>will</U> die  off scene (this death is required for theological reasons)  is salted away for future resurrection. Shoemaker sees the following objections:- <ol type="a"><li> without clarifying the  whisking , how are we to know whether bodily identity is preserved? </li><li> doesn t this process make God a deceiver? </ol></li><li>My thoughts on the above are that:- <ol type="a"><li>The whisking and salting must be within the power of an omnipotent being, so aren t problematical as such  though we do need to know the identity-preserving mechanisms. </li><li>Allowing God to be a deceiver may simply be redefining the concept  God . Deception may be impossible for the traditional concept of God  who cannot lie , but maybe there are other coherent concepts of the divine that don t require this attribute. Also, one could say that  on the traditional conception of  God  if it s logically necessary for God to act in a certain way to keep his promises, then he doesn t need to point this out, and so isn t strictly deceiving anyone, since we can work out what must be going on (if we re as smart as Van Inwagen, or have him to enlighten us). </ol></li><li>However, I don t accept this weaselling. As noted above   mere metaphysical possibility isn t enough for rational expectation. We ve no reason to believe in this whisking, especially since God hasn t told us anything about it. </li><li>On the presumption that the Body Criterion is insufficient to provide for rational anticipation of resurrection (whatever its merits as a criterion of Personal Identity), we move on to look for alternative criteria that meet the following requirements:- <ol type="a"><li>Provide a <U>mechanism</U> whereby pre- and post-mortem identification is seen as rational.</li><li>Is possible  ie. isn t absurd or incoherent.</ol></li></ul></li><li><B>The Soul Criterion (SC)</B>: X at t1 is the same person as Y at t2 iff X s soul is the same as Y s soul. <ul type="disc"><li>Shoemaker describes the soul as being  your essence , that might survive the destruction of your body, but goes on to give Plato and Aristotle s accounts:- </li><li><B>Plato</B>: The soul is what the person really is, a non-physical thing that is the prisoner of the body. For Plato (and more or less similarly, Descartes) the soul is a <U>substance</U>, and is the sort of thing that persists. </li><li><B>Aristotle</B>: The soul is the organising principle of the (in fact, any) body. All persons have a common form (the soul), but different physical manifestations. This is not a substance-concept, so Aristotelian souls don t persist. This is why Aquinas, who adopted Aristotle s concept of the soul, insisted on the resurrection of the body. </li><li>So, only Plato s conception of the soul is even prima facie grounds for rational anticipation of <a name="7"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">post-mortem survival</A><SUP>7</SUP> thereby. What are the objections? </li><li>Firstly, more detail is required of the concept. Is a soul:- <ol type="a"><li>A purely psychological substance, whose essence is to think (as Descartes maintained)?</li><li>A substance whose psychology is separable from it?</li><li>Something I <U>have</U> or something I <U>am</U> (or something else)? </ol></li><li>Shoemaker makes the assumption that  we can directly and reliably know about the existence and nature of <U>only</U> those substances we can perceive with our senses . If this foundation of empiricism (not here challenged by Shoemaker) is true, then:-</li><li>How can we determine whether souls exist or what they are like, given that they are immaterial substances? </li><li>Shoemaker notes that there are many and various objections to the existence (or coherence) of Platonic souls as such, but he (and Weirob) allow their existence for the sake of the argument. Their objection is that they don t even do the work they are conceived of to do. </li><li>This leads to Weirob s <em>Reductio</em>:- <ol type="i"><li>If the Soul Criterion were true, we could never have the grounds to judge if X is the same person as Y,</li><li> But we do this all the time,<BR>So, </li><li>The Soul Criterion is false. </ol></li><li>The point of the objection is an epistemological one. If the Soul Criterion is the correct account of Personal Identity, then  because we can t see souls  we can t individuate them, and so we can never tell whether an individual is the same person from one moment to the next. </li><li>Shoemaker notes that this isn t the same as the problem of misidentification  where an exactly similar individual (an identical twin, say) is mistaken for another. Here, the problem is one of principle rather than practice. We can put in controls to prevent misidentification, but we can t do this if the Soul Criterion is correct, as no identification of Souls is possible. </li><li><U>Note</U>: I need to review the various conceptions of the soul, as I suspect some of this may have more force against Platonic souls than Cartesian ones. Is a Platonic soul supposed by Shoemaker to be a bare particular? <a name="69"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_100.htm">Click here for Note</A> (eventually) for a general note on Souls. Are both Platonic and Cartesian souls supposed all to, have certain standard attributes (lack of extension, the ability to think) but no qualities that distinguish them one from another other <a name="8"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_102.htm">haecceity</A><SUP>8</SUP>?; some of the references from this Note will consider such matters. </li><li>Possible response  use a proxy for soul-identification, either <ol type="a"><li>The Body, or</li><li>Psychology. </ol></li><li><B>The body as proxy for the soul</B>: this is alleged not to work for another epistemological reason  because we could never determine that there was a  same body, same soul relation. <BR>&rarr; Weirob s  Chocolate Centre analogy.<BR><U>Note</U> - all these arguments are considered by Locke in <a name="84"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5555.htm">Locke (John) - Of Identity and Diversity</A>" (<a name="70"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_876.htm">Click here for Note</A>).</li><li><B>Psychology as proxy for the soul</B>: this takes the body as a normally reliable indicator of sameness of person, but what really establishes identity is sameness of psychology. Radical personality changes indicate a different person, even in the presence of identity of body. But psychology is what souls do, so sameness of psychology is a much better indicator of sameness of soul than sameness of body. The objection to this defence is that it confuses similarity with identity. We can tag the body, so can tell if it s the very same one, but we can t do this with the soul  all we can see are similar states of mind, which might or might not belong to the very same soul. <BR>&rarr; Weirob s  River / River Water analogy.</li><li><B>Response to objections</B>: Weirob s arguments seem to confuse epistemology with metaphysics. She admits that there might <U>be</U> souls, but denies that they meet her requirement that they can help with practical questions of re-identification. But, we can reject this requirement. Metaphysically, the Soul Criterion might be the right account of Personal Identity, even if it is of no help in answering our epistemological questions. </li><li>But, Shoemaker suggests that  since the Soul Criterion, if correct, would undermine all our practical concerns that involve matters of Personal Identity  we should reject it on these grounds alone (if there aren t more compelling metaphysical grounds for the rejection of souls). Shoemaker leaves the question whether this is correct to the final Chapter (<a name="85"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15133.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Ethics - Conclusion: Notes on Method</A>").</li><li>But for now, Shoemaker claims that the issue is that  whether or not it is the correct metaphysical account of Personal Identity  the Soul Criterion can never satisfy Weirob s request for rational anticipation of <a name="9"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">post-mortem survival</A><SUP>9</SUP>. </li><li>Whether this is so is a very deep question. The claim is that as a soul is separable from both body and psychology, there s no guarantee that we d see the post-mortem world  from the inside . But is this so? Take the worst case  or is it the best case?  the soul is associated with a new resurrection body distinct from my pre-mortem one, and a new, improved psychology, free of propensities to sin  but would this be me? This situation is somewhat similar to the traditional Christian hope of resurrection, and it has some force even there. The difference is that in the  worst case , I don t have <U>any</U> physical or <a name="10"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>10</SUP> with my past  while, presumably, in Christian resurrection I do, at least psychologically, and even physically for those that are  changed (ie. <a name="11"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_37.htm">metamorphosed</A><SUP>11</SUP> at Christ s return). Now, in the  worst case , would there be anything of <U>me</U> that persists? Would I have anything to look forward to (or  if I went to the other place  to fear)? Would I still have <U>my</U> window on the world, but one in which I ve utterly lost my context  say like a severe stroke victim? Is there, in such cases, a continuity  maybe in virtue of the soul s <a name="12"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_102.htm">haecceity</A><SUP>12</SUP>  that s more than that non-existent continuity between two unconnected individuals (which is the case as Shoemaker describes it)? </li></ul></li><li><B>The Memory Criteria (MC)</B>:<ul type="disc"><li>Shoemaker considers what we do when we wake up and  re-identify ourselves . This is a first-person perspective, rather than the third-person considered hitherto. The idea is that re-identification is undertaken indexically   I have awoken , not  Theo has awoken . It s clear (says Shoemaker) that we don t check we are (or have) the same <U>soul</U>, but he also claims that we don t check we ve the same <U>body</U> either. This is not just because we don t expect it to have changed (though it might have changed radically, say, if we d been in a 50-year coma). But even if it <U>had</U> changed, this wouldn t persuade us that we were a different person. </li><li>The reason is that there s a long history of TEs that claim to show that we might wake up in an entirely different body  <a name="86"></a>"<A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_11/PaperSummary_11705.htm">Kafka (Franz), Pasley (Malcolm) - Metamorphosis and Other Stories</A>" being the classic case (though Locke s <em>Prince and Cobbler</em> is older; see my BA Finals paper on this topic, converted to Note form (<a name="71"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_876.htm">Click here for Note</A>)). </li><li>Combined, these thoughts  in particular that persons are neither bodies nor souls  imply that Persons aren t <U>substances</U>. If not, what are they? Shoemaker introduces a discussion of <U>games</U>, not that persons are games, but that they might be a whole made up of parts in accord with certain rules, much as games are. </li><li>Maybe a better attempt is a <U>life</U>, for which see <a name="87"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4876.htm">Wollheim (Richard) - Living</A>". </li><li>The portfolio of alternative memory criteria is the obvious first choice, as this is what is said to make the awakened bug think it is the man that slept. Memories connect our various stages. </li><li>There are many objections to the coherence of these TEs, and they seem to beg the question of what it is that enables this first-person perspective in the first place. If it was the soul, then body changing might be coherent. But if it is the brain, or the body as a whole, then it isn t. </li><li><B>Memory Criterion 1  MC1</B>: X at t1 is the same person as Y at t2 iff Y remembers the thoughts and experiences of X. <BR><U>Objections to MC1</U> <ol type="i"><li><B>Butler s 1736 Objection</B>: <a name="13"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_78.htm">Intermittent existence</A><SUP>13</SUP> caused by amnesia. <a name="72"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_876.htm">Click here for Note</A> (section  Problems with Locke s Account of Personal Identity , item 3 ( Amnesia ), admittedly not quite covering this issue). Shoemaker has a footnote on MC1 being a <U>sufficient</U> but not <U>necessary</U> condition for personal identity. It might satisfy the metaphysical requirement for immortality if remembering a past life was sufficient for survival. But Shoemaker has higher aims. </li><li><B>Reid s 1785 Objection</B>: The Brave Officer. Failure of transitivity. This is a much more serious objection, as it implies a contradiction  since identity is a transitive relation. <a name="73"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_876.htm">Click here for Note</A> (section  Problems with Locke s Account of Personal Identity , item 4 ( Transitivity )). </ol></li><li><B>Memory Criterion 1a  MC1a</B>: X at t1 is the same person as Y at t2 iff <ol type="a"><li>Y <U>directly</U> remembers the thoughts and experiences of X, <U>OR</U></li><li>Y directly remembers the thoughts and experiences of some Z, who & Q, who & R, & , who directly remembers the thoughts and experiences of X. </ol>&rarr; ie. the ancestral of the  remembers relation. <BR><U>Objections to MC1a</U> <ol type="i"><li><B>False memories</B>: being deluded into thinking I remember commanding at Waterloo doesn t make me Napoleon. But we can t patch this up by saying that only <U>genuine</U> memories count, as this makes MC1a circular. <a name="74"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_876.htm">Click here for Note</A> (section  Problems with Locke s Account of Personal Identity , item 1 ( Priority )).</li><li><B>Circularity</B>: if for memories to be genuine I need identity, I cannot use memory as a <U>criterion</U> of identity. (David) Shoemaker claims that (Sydney) Shoemaker and Derek Parfit claim that I <U>can</U> have genuine memories of experiences other than my own. Scientists  copy a memory trace into my brain. I  seem to remember , but am not deluded because I m in on the act and know the experience wasn t mine. The issue is one of <a name="14"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causality</A><SUP>14</SUP>. Delusions (of course) have <U>some</U> cause, but it s not of the right sort, with no connection to the original experience. (David) Shoemaker seems to think that the <a name="15"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_104.htm">transplanted</A><SUP>15</SUP> (though he says  copied ) memory-trace example is a case of genuine memory not presupposing identity. </ol></li><li>Is this  <a name="16"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_897.htm">Quasi-memory</A><SUP>16</SUP> ? This isn t genuine memory (which is why it s called Quasi-). There s a causal relation between two events of experiencing, but the present experience isn t one of remembering but of experiencing for the first time. It s not re-lived but first-lived for the person who has the Q-M. But we ll let this pass, and move on to & </li><li><B>Memory Criterion 2  MC2</B>: X at t1 is the same person as Y at t2 iff <ol type="a"><li>Y <U>seems</U> to remember the thoughts and experiences of X, either directly of ancestrally <U>AND</U></li><li>Y s seeming to remember is caused in the right way. <BR></ol><U>Motivation</U> <ol type="i"><li>The  causal clause is to circumvent the  delusion objection. </li><li>The claim is that the  copying of the memory trace does provide a cause of the right sort, because the actual memory trace is a record of an experience, and not a record of an experience that never happened to anyone. <BR></ol><U>Objections to MC2</U> <ol type="i"><li><B>Copying</B>:  Copying memory traces seems all wrong  for surely this will fall foul of reduplication objections (see later).  <a name="17"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_104.htm">Transplanting </A><SUP>17</SUP> memory traces might have more going for it, but is the sort of thing that (because of the distributed and intertwined realisation of  memory traces ) may be either forever practically impossible or even metaphysically impossible. </li><li><B>Brains</B>: However, it may be the case that my brain makes backup copies of its own memory traces, to provide fault-tolerance. So, we need to be careful about copying  some copyings may be of the right causal form, while others aren t. It looks to me as though the copyings must involve the same brain, so that copyings from one brain to another are of the wrong sort. To be a memory, the memory-trace must have got into my brain (or indeed, <U>any</U> brain) by the right sort of causal process. This is  please note  in order to be a memory at all, not just <U>my</U> memory. </li><li><B>Reliable Storage Mechanisms</B>: It seems at first sight that what we want is  any old reliable storage mechanism. So, the thought is that we might download the memories from one body (the pre-mortem one) and <a name="18"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1246.htm">upload</A><SUP>18</SUP> them to another (the resurrection one). The fact that this is not the usual causal mechanism is not relevant if it is reliable. The trouble is, that it isn t & </li><li><B>Reduplication</B>: the problem with the <a name="19"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1246.htm">download/upload</A><SUP>19</SUP> proposal is that we need to stop multiple <a name="20"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1246.htm">uploads</A><SUP>20</SUP>  which Shoemaker takes to be equivalent to fission. (More on which later. <a name="75"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_33.htm">Click here for Note</A>). The reason for the reduplication problem is that identity is transitive. So if the pre-mortem person is identical to two resurrection persons, then those  two persons have to be identical to one another. Shoemaker does briefly consider the possibility of  distributed persons whereby the two resurrected bodies do house one person apparently living two lives, but rules that this stretches the concept of personhood too far. </li><li><B>Real-Life Reduplication</B>: Note, however, that there are well known issues here that apply to real-life situations, not just TEs  <a name="21"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_86.htm">Multiple Personality Disorder</A><SUP>21</SUP>) and <a name="22"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_116.htm">Commissurotomy</A><SUP>22</SUP>.</li><li><B>Lewis</B>: Note also that Lewis s <a name="23"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_42.htm">perdurantist</A><SUP>23</SUP> approach to <a name="24"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_33.htm">fission</A><SUP>24</SUP> is a possible answer to the reduplication objection. </li><li><B>Quick Fix</B>: So, to avoid the reductio of reduplication, we could make a  no competitors stipulation & </ol></li><li><B>Memory Criterion 3  MC3</B>: As for MC2, but with an additional  No competitors clause.<BR><U>Objections to MC3</U><ol type="i"><li><B>Absurdity</B>: Shoemaker s view is that while MC3 isn t self-contradictory, it is  deeply absurd , which is almost as bad. It s like the  Branch-Line case in <a name="25"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_46.htm">Teletransportation</A><SUP>25</SUP>; one copy is made and is you, then another copy is made and what was you is no longer you. There are questions of priority here, and a better case for non-absurdity can be made than Shoemaker attempts. But there are cases where there s no principled choice. See the discussions under  <a name="26"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_41.htm">Closest Continuer</A><SUP>26</SUP> . </li><li><B>Your Experience</B>: Shoemaker seems to assume that if we had the right sort of <a name="27"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causality</A><SUP>27</SUP>, you would wake up in the resurrection body. And he may be right  but he also seems to assume that even without the right sort of <a name="28"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causality</A><SUP>28</SUP>, there would still be continuity of experience, even without identity. Again, he may be right, but this takes me to my <a name="29"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_38.htm">forward versus backward continuity</A><SUP>29</SUP> theme. While someone would wake up, this waking-up would not be something you experience, even if the waker-up would claim to be you. This has something (though I don t know what) to do with how conscious states propagate. Resurrection to a new body is too much of a hop, though resurrection of the same body doesn t seem so problematical (it seems analogous to resuscitation from a coma). </li><li><B>Identity and Experience</B>: Can one imagine continuity of experience in the case of fission? It seems difficult to do so, whether or not identity is preserved. We might, for instance, say that whatever we might <U>think</U>, because fission involves loss of identity, whatever we might <U>imagine</U> we would experience, we couldn t <U>in fact</U> experience. We re just deluded by the TE. However, what if we adopt a <a name="30"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_42.htm">perdurantist</A><SUP>30</SUP> approach to fission, so that prior to fission there were two co-habiting individuals whose stages just happened to be spatially coincident. Then we cannot use non-identity as a knock-down proof of inconceivability, as identity is preserved for both fission products. In that case continuous (if intermittent) conscious experience out to be possible, whether we can conceive of it or not. </li><li><B>Christ</B>: So, St. Paul s claim that if the dead don t rise, then Christ is not risen doesn t quite work. As a generality the dead might not rise (if their bodies have been destroyed). But Christ may be a special case. Jesus Christ (is said to have) risen in his own body, somewhat  glorified , but still so that there is a continuity that is lacking for the generality of mankind. </ol></li></ul></li><li><B>The Body Criterion (BC)</B>: Shoemaker starts off with an awkward case  the fusion of X s body with Y s brain, to make F. Who is F? Note that the example is taken from Barbara Harris s <em>Who is Julia?</em>. <ul type="disc"><li>Olson (and Weirob here) claims that F=X, taking the brain to be just another organ, but & </li><li> Most would say that the brain is special, and either that in consequence F=Y, or that the TE is underspecified or incoherent. </li><li><B>Methodological Aside</B>: Shoemaker notes that the standard practice in this area is to test TEs against our Intuitions, which he equates to  pre-philosophical common-sense judgements . This is supposed to be analogous to scientific investigation (as would be indicated by TEs being Thought <U>Experiments</U>), where theories are checked against  the facts . However, Shoemakers account of our Intuitions makes them sound like prejudices, and not at all like the data with which science deals. A (philosophical) theory is judged successful in accord with how many of our intuitions it can account for. But how reliable are these intuitions, especially in unusual situations? This is a standard objection to <a name="31"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_32.htm">TEs</A><SUP>31</SUP> generally.</li></ul></li><li><U>Three objections to the BC</U> <ul type="disc"><li><B>The Brain is Special</B>: The argument goes that while we can <a name="32"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_104.htm">transplant</A><SUP>32</SUP> livers and such-like, the <a name="33"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_55.htm">brain</A><SUP>33</SUP> is not just another organ. The reasons given may seem to presuppose the PV, and lead on to the Brain-Based PC (see later). The reasons are that the brain preserves my memories and psychology, and while my liver might keep me alive  I could make do with  any old set of vital organs (even mechanical ones)  the same isn t true of  my brain. The psychology in the brain is the  me that s being preserved by vital organs. <BR><U>Response</U> <ol type="i"><li>Maybe this is a case of survival without <a name="34"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_108.htm">what matters</A><SUP>34</SUP>. Ie. the body that survives with the <a name="35"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplanted brain</A><SUP>35</SUP> (F) is X, but X doesn t have <a name="36"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_108.htm">what matters</A><SUP>36</SUP> to her in survival; she lacks the psychological factors just rehearsed. </li><li>But, we still need to consider the status of Y s brain and its psychology. It continues to exist (lodged in X s body) and (we suppose) continues to experience a first person perspective as Y (if out of context). Is it supposed to be part of X? Would the FPP really be continuous? All the usual questions. </li><li>Sometime I need to look through <a name="112"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_139.htm">Popper (Karl) & Eccles (John) - The Self and Its Brain</A>" (and <a name="113"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_204.htm">Eccles (John) - Evolution of the Brain, Creation of the Self</A>"), however wearying, in case Popper or Eccles had anything useful to say on the possibility of a particular brain being important (but not essential) to the maintenance of self. <BR></ol></li><li><B><a name="37"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_68.htm">Dicephalus</A><SUP>37</SUP></B>: Shoemaker quotes the familiar case of Abigail and Brittany Hensel, <a name="38"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_68.htm">conjoined</A><SUP>38</SUP> <a name="39"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1173.htm">twins</A><SUP>39</SUP> that share all organs below the waist, but not above, and (while having two spinal cords) have  nervous systems that are interconnected and partially shared which  allows them to coordinate their activities fairly well , including being able to play the piano. Shoemaker thinks that it s obvious that there is only one body, but two persons. This is taken as a knock-down argument against the BC, though not, it seems, against the <a name="40"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_53.htm">Biological View</A><SUP>40</SUP>, which is discussed in the next chapter (see <a name="88"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15140.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern</A>"). <BR><U>Response</U><ol type="i"><li>For other discussions on this topic, <a name="76"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_68.htm">Click here for Note</A> (and see <a name="89"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7623.htm">Blatti (Stephan) - Animalism, Dicephalus, and Borderline Cases</A>"). Shoemaker gives <a name="W1365W"></a><A HREF = "https://www.search.com/reference/Abigail_and_Brittany_Hensel" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> - which is still there, though the photo isn t. There are multiple references on the web  eg. <a name="W197W"></a><A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abigail_and_Brittany_Hensel" TARGET = "_top">Wikipedia: Abigail and Brittany Hensel</A>. </li><li>I agree with Shoemaker that there are two persons. However, I disagree that there is one body. There are two bodies that share parts. Not sure if there are  normal examples of this  maybe plants that share a root system? </ol></li><li><B>Parfit s Vagueness Objections</B>: just how much body is required for identity-preservation? Shoemaker imagines a body being  pared down bit by bit, and asks precisely how much has to remain before identity ceases. He says there has to be a limit, but thinks it ludicrous that  a few cells could make the difference between identity and non-identity, life and death. <BR><U>Response</U><ol type="i"><li>This is an objection to the real existence of bodies as such, and not just as a criterion of (personal) identity. Also, presumably Shoemaker s suggestion of percentages presuppose all parts of the body are equally important, and that we can start paring away at any place we feel like. </li><li>There have been arguments along <a name="41"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1172.htm">Sorites-lines</A><SUP>41</SUP> against the existence of bodies (and many other things)  for instance <a name="114"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_49.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Material Beings</A>" and <a name="90"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1375.htm">Unger (Peter) - I Do Not Exist</A>". </li><li>But things like organisms may have a more principled set of existence-criteria (ie. they either work or they don t); but there are other problems. For instance, organisms on life-support are still organisms & aren t they  Olson may deny this?</li><li>Can t the same argument be fired at any criterion of identity? For instance to the PC  just how much of my psychology can I lose before I m no longer me. </li><li>Maybe we just don t have identity, but the ancestral of a similarity relation? I think this is suggested by some philosophers  but I can t remember who. </li><li>Shoemaker equates identity / non-identity with life / death, but these are very different concepts. Only organisms can live or die; the concept is applied to non-organisms only by analogy. </li><li>The <a name="42"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1172.htm">Sorites</A><SUP>42</SUP> argument  when applied to both body and psychology  seems to apply to the process of senescence that most of us will go through, and raises the question of whether we go out of existence before we die. We don t assume this. </li><li>Shoemaker seems to muddle together epistemological and metaphysical objections  he complains that the BC (in the paring-down case) would mean that we d never know whether a person had survived or not, because (given they might be deluded) we can t take their work for it. But, this <ol type="a"><li>applies to all criteria and </li><li>doesn t affect what is actually the case. </ol>This has come up before, and reflects the practical concerns driving this project. </li><li>In all, I think that objections to BC (even if not Shoemaker s) are sound. Most current <a name="43"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_50.htm">Animalists</A><SUP>43</SUP> reject the BC. </ol></li><li>What does <a name="115"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1337.htm">Wilson (Jack) - Biological Individuality - The identity and Persistence of Living Entities</A>" have to say on the BC? Note that <U>bodies</U> are not the same things as <U>animals</U>, or <U>organisms</U>. </li></ul></li><li><B>Brain-based Memory Criterion - BBMC</B>: This is effectively MC2, but with the stipulation that the  right cause is sameness of brain. It is also (as Shoemaker points out) the  hardware analogue of MC1-3, which are  software based. <ul type="disc"><li><B>Advantages</B>: Shoemaker correctly notes that the BBMC has the following advantages:- <ol type="i"><li>It gives an answer in accord with our intuitions in the <em>Julia</em> case. F=Y. </li><li>It avoids the duplication objections (subject to my amendment below), though at the cost of making resurrection impossible. </li><li>It gives the right answer in the <a name="44"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_68.htm">Dicephalus</A><SUP>44</SUP> case. <BR></ol></li><li><B>Shoemaker s Objections</B>: However, Shoemaker finds the BBMC objectionable for the following reasons:- <ol type="i"><li><B>Teletransportation (TT)</B>: Shoemaker gives a brief account of the  information transfer rather than  disassembly and re-assembly variant. His point is just that if we take TT as a fast way of travel rather than death and duplication, then we don t accept the BBMC. True, but so what? Can we really trust our intuitions in a TE as far from our normal experience as TT? </li><li><B>Brain Rejuvenation</B>: This is another TE, which Shoemaker recognises as a terrestrial equivalent of the  Divine Duplication case. The situation is that you have an ailing brain, and an organic, but repaired, exact copy of your brain is manufactured and substituted for your own brain (the ailment is described as vascular, with no explicit psychological impact). According to Shoemaker, there is a dilemma: either you admit that you survive with the new brain or you don t. If you <U>admit</U> to survival, you ve given up the BBMC. But if you <U>deny</U> that you ve survived, then you ve effectively given up on the memory-based identity that motivated the BBMC in the first place. The reason is that there was an  insight that (allegedly) moved us away from a substance-based criterion of personal identity to a relational criterion: that when you awake, you don t need to check a substance (body or soul) to re-identify yourself  you  just know based on your memories, and these over-ride evidence to the contrary (as in the Kafka <em><a name="45"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_37.htm">Metamorphosis</A><SUP>45</SUP></em> case). By insisting on identity of a particular brain, you re choosing a substance, when (it is said) you already have everything you want, psychologically. Shoemaker adds a further TE to this one: your brain is supposed to have been duplicated, and your brain is removed and sat next to the clone. But then an accident happens  both brains fall on the floor and get muddled up, so no-one knows which is which. And there can never be enlightenment on the matter  whichever brain is implanted, the recipient will feel the same, though in one case (according to BBMC) identity is preserved, with genuine memories, while in the other it isn t and the memories are delusions. This is said to be  mysterious and to detract from the  lustre of the BBMC. <BR></ol></li><li><U><B>Responses</B></U> <ol type="i"><li><B>Duplication</B>: Given that the BBMC is motivated by reduplication objections, we probably need a non-branching condition as in MC3, given the well-known TE of fission by idempotent <a name="46"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">half-brain transplants</A><SUP>46</SUP>. Shoemaker doesn t mention this possibility. Follow up under <a name="47"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_33.htm">Fission</A><SUP>47</SUP>, and my general thoughts on <a name="48"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_55.htm">Brains</A><SUP>48</SUP> and <a name="49"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">Transplants</A><SUP>49</SUP>.</li><li><B>Brain Rejuvenation</B>: This doesn t seem to take seriously the reason we posited the BBMC in the first place  which was to get round the  Divine Duplication objection. This raises a question about the dialectic at this point in Shoemaker s argument. He s introduced the BBMC as a way round reduplication, but then introduced reduplication himself. The idea is presumably that the BBMC is no defence to the reduplication objections, because, he thinks, the duplicate brain, given that we hold a MC at all, would have such a strong claim to be me that we d have to admit the dilemma that Shoemaker introduced above. </li><li><B>Resurrection</B>: The BBMC is said to rule out resurrection  but why more so than any other form of PID? I think the issue is that resurrection can be viewed (as in the New Testament itself) as something like a change of clothes. Identity is grounded in some non-corporeal way, and that incorporeal thing  has a body. The BBMC is no more in difficulties in this respect than the BC, but is still in trouble, as it doesn t seem possible that the resurrection-body s brain is identical to the pre-mortem body s brain. So, if it s the physical brain that grounds identity, then we don t have it in the case of resurrection. Now, there are a couple of wheezes on offer that try to get round this issue. One is Van Inwagen s divine body-snatching suggestion, previously remarked upon (see <a name="91"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4934.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Possibility of Resurrection</A>"). Then there is <a name="92"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1790.htm">Chisholm (Roderick) - Which Physical Thing Am I? An Excerpt from 'Is There a Mind-Body Problem?'</A>" (<a name="77"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_774.htm">Click here for Note</A>). Neither of them seems promising. </li><li><B>Teletransportation</B>: I have written extensively on this topic elsewhere (<a name="78"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_46.htm">Click here for Note</A>). Enough to say here that TT is  at least in the information transfer variant  a case of death and replication. From Shoemaker s perspective, it just seems a more fanciful version of the <em>Brain Rejuvenation</em> TE, but with the deliverances of Intuition somewhat less certain. </ol> </li></ul></li><li><B>The Possibility of Immortality</B><BR><ul type="disc"><li><B>Conditions</B><BR>Three conditions are assumed  not for the <U>possibility</U> of immortality as such, but for its <U>rational anticipation</U> (= RA). In what follows, HP =  Heavenly Person and  EP =  Earthly Person (= me). I pass over the assumption that the home for the blessed is heaven and not (a reconstituted) Earth:- <ol type="i"><li>Personal <U>Identity</U>  ie. HP = EP  is a necessary condition for RA. </li><li>The criterion of PID that accounts for HP = EP must be free from absurdities.</li><li>Suitable Mechanisms are critical for RI. <BR></ol></li><li><B>Denying the Conditions</B><BR>Any of these three assumptions can be denied, and Shoemaker considers doing so, though not in the order below:- <ol type="i"><li><B>Identity</B>: Can we do without it? It fails for BC, BBMC and for non-substance MC. SC fails condition 3. Are there alternatives? Shoemaker rehearses the <a name="50"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">Brain Transplant</A><SUP>50</SUP> TE (as discussed under the head of the BC) and <U>for the sake of the argument</U>, assumes that F=X, ie. I <U>don t</U>  go with my brain . Even if I accept this premise, should I still go ahead with the <a name="51"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">brain transplant</A><SUP>51</SUP> in the hypothetical circumstances envisaged? There are two variants:- <ol type="a"><li>You (and everyone else) are ignorant of the metaphysics. It <U>looks</U> like you ve  gone with your brain , you <U>thought</U> you d  be <a name="52"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplanted</A><SUP>52</SUP> , the brain recipient thinks she s you, as does everyone else. Everyone s happy & so what s the problem?</li><li>You know what s going on metaphysically-speaking, and you know you don t survive  but do you have any reason to care less for the survivor (F) than for yourself? Can we anticipate the experience of HP in the same way we anticipate our future self (with non-identity?). Shoemaker thinks this suggestion is too radical to accept until we have exhausted the alternatives (ie. the Psychological Criterion and the <a name="53"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_911.htm">Biological criterion</A><SUP>53</SUP>) in the next Chapter (<a name="93"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15140.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern</A>"). He will return to the question in Chapter 3 (<a name="94"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15139.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Self-Regarding Ethics - Alternative Approaches</A>").<BR></ol></li><li><B>Absurdities</B>: Can we live with these? Shoemaker notes that MC2 & MC3, while improving on MC1 in (it is said) providing for genuine memories, are still open to the Divine Duplication objection. Shoemaker thinks that we cannot just ignore this difficulty. If we insist on condition 1 (identity) then we cannot have absurdities  two  non-identical things supposedly identical because of the transitivity condition. </li><li><B>Mechanisms</B>: Do we need one? Even though the SC metaphysically-speaking provides a mechanism for survival, it doesn t provide for RA, because there s no way we can know that we have the same soul, as we can t track them. But we could give up this condition and adopt the SC anyway. But, Shoemaker thinks, this would involve abandoning all our usual forensic uses of identity. Because we need re-identification for pronouncements of guilt, ownership and such-like, and we can t have re-identification on the SC account of PID, the SC is no use to us. <BR></ol></li><li><B>Responses</B> <ol type="i"><li><B>Identity</B>: Are there any options with non-standard identity logics? Maybe - <a name="79"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_12.htm">Click here for Note</A> for a discussion of the Logic of Identity, but we need to beware that we don t stray off topic into Exact <a name="54"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_125.htm">Similarity</A><SUP>54</SUP>. Otherwise, we have to hold fire until completing Chapter 3 (<a name="95"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15139.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Self-Regarding Ethics - Alternative Approaches</A>"). </li><li><B>Absurdities</B>: <ol type="a"><li>If we re talking about physical things (BC, BBMC), we might fall back on <a name="55"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_42.htm">Perdurantism</A><SUP>55</SUP> to avoid absurdity. <U>But</U>, for MCs, is there a perdurantist analogue? For instance, multiple co-located personalities? But, what would this mean? Just what are  personalities  are they <a name="56"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>56</SUP> or particulars? If the former, are they located anywhere? </li><li>Shoemaker rejects out of hand bodily resurrection as identity-preserving, but doesn t consider the suggestions of Chisholm or Van Inwagen. Are these ideas absurd, or just silly  and so not really providing for RA? Does <a name="96"></a>"<A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_00/PaperSummary_181.htm">Nagel (Thomas) - The Absurd</A>" have anything to say on these distinctions? </ol></li><li><B>Mechanisms</B>: I think we might have RA under the SC of PID  say if God had explicitly told us this is how it works. So, while we couldn t do the tracking, we could trust him to do it. Also, Shoemaker makes two assumptions here (it seems to me). <B>Firstly</B>, that Ethics is prior to Metaphysics (when it should be the other way round). If the SC is correct, then we need to adjust our ethics to suit. <B>Secondly</B>, maybe things aren t that bad in any event. Maybe we can t be <U>sure</U> of identity of soul  but we could make the simplifying assumption that souls don t hop around capriciously, and act on this basis. This is what Locke does when he has to admit that by his criterion we might be inappropriately punishing the genuinely amnesiac drunk. We have to punish, lest he be dissimulating. We have to act that way as no other practice is open to us. Yet we trust God to sort out the mess in eternity (see <a name="97"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5555.htm">Locke (John) - Of Identity and Diversity</A>" - <a name="80"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_876.htm">Click here for Note</A>, section on <em>Amnesia</em>). <BR></ol><U>Note</U><BR>I may be unfair to Shoemaker in alleging that he holds Ethics to be prior to Metaphysics. He seems to deny this (in his final Chapter - <a name="98"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15133.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Ethics - Conclusion: Notes on Method</A>" - though there he says that <U>Personal Identity</U> is prior to Ethics, which may not be quite the same thing), but doesn t seem (to me) to stick rigidly to his own guidelines. </li></ul> </li><li><B>Works Cited</B>:- <ul type="disc"><li><a name="116"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2505.htm">Aquinas (Thomas), Dominicans - Summa Theologica - Volume 1  The First Part</A>" (presumably QQ75-102; Treatise on Man)</li><li><a name="117"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_729.htm">Aristotle, Lawson-Tancred (Hugh) - De Anima (On the Soul)</A>"</li><li><a name="99"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_535.htm">Butler (Joseph) - Of Personal Identity</A>"</li><li><a name="118"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_586.htm">Descartes (Rene), Cottingham (John) - Meditations on First Philosophy - With Selections from the Objections and Replies</A>"</li><li>Harris (Barbara) - <em>Who is Julia?</em></li><li><a name="100"></a>"<A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_11/PaperSummary_11705.htm">Kafka (Franz), Pasley (Malcolm) - Metamorphosis and Other Stories</A>"</li><li><a name="101"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5555.htm">Locke (John) - Of Identity and Diversity</A>"</li><li><a name="119"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_41.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Reasons and Persons</A>"</li><li><a name="120"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_651.htm">Perry (John) - A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality</A>"</li><li><a name="121"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_137.htm">Perry (John), Ed. - Personal Identity</A>"</li><li><a name="122"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_881.htm">Plato, Gallop (David) - Phaedo</A>"</li><li><a name="102"></a>"<A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_00/PaperSummary_537.htm">Reid (Thomas) - Of Mr. Locke's Account of Our Personal Identity</A>"</li><li><a name="103"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2409.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Persons and Their Pasts</A>"</li><li><a name="104"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4934.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Possibility of Resurrection</A>"</li></ul></li><li><B><a name="57"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_737.htm">Outstanding Tasks</A><SUP>57</SUP></B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Review <a name="123"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_651.htm">Perry (John) - A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality</A>",</li><li>Write a file-note on <a name="105"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4934.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Possibility of Resurrection</A>", </li><li>Flesh out a Note on <a name="58"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_100.htm">Souls</A><SUP>58</SUP></li><li>Flesh out a Note on <a name="59"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_102.htm">Haecceity</A><SUP>59</SUP></li><li>Write a file-note on <a name="106"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4876.htm">Wollheim (Richard) - Living</A>",</li><li>Expand the Note on <a name="60"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_897.htm">Quasi-Memory</A><SUP>60</SUP>,</li><li>Expand the Note on <a name="61"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">Transplants</A><SUP>61</SUP>,</li><li>Write a file-note on <a name="107"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7743.htm">Olson (Eric) - Review of Jack Wilson's 'Biological Individuality: The Identity and Persistence of Living Entities'</A>",</li><li>Follow up <BR>&rarr; <a name="124"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_569.htm">Bynum (Caroline) - Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200 - 1336</A>", and<BR>&rarr; <a name="125"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_570.htm">Bynum (Caroline) - Metamorphosis and Identity</A>"</li><li>Flesh out a Note on <a name="62"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_125.htm">Similarity</A><SUP>62</SUP>,</li><li>Review <a name="108"></a>"<A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_00/PaperSummary_181.htm">Nagel (Thomas) - The Absurd</A>".</li></ul></li></ol><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; 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