<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Hurley (Susan) & Nudds (Matthew) - The questions of animal rationality: Theory and evidence (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_15/PaperSummary_15457.htm">The questions of animal rationality: Theory and evidence</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/H/Author_Hurley (Susan).htm">Hurley (Susan)</a> & <A HREF = "../../Authors/N/Author_Nudds (Matthew).htm">Nudds (Matthew)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Hurley (Susan) & Nudds (Matthew) - Rational Animals?</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=600><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_15/PaperSummary_15457.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_15/PapersToNotes_15457.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><U>Section Headings, Hyperlinks & text extracts</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">Introduction<li>Background: Theoretical questions and distinctions<BR>& 1.1 Rationality and Intelligence<BR>& 1.2 Rationality, generalization, and decentring<BR>& 1.3 Rationality and normativity<BR>& 1.4 Rationality and consciousness<BR>& 1.5 Rationality and conceptual and linguistic abilities<BR>& 1.6 Rationality and reasoning; behavioural versus process rationality<BR>& 1.7 Ends versus means<BR>& 1.8 Instrumental rationality as behavioural rationality<BR>& 1.9 Instrumental rationality as process rationality<BR>& 1.10 Formal versus substantive rationality<BR>& 1.11 Individual versus social rationality<BR>& 1.12 Practical versus theoretical rationality<BR>& 1.13 The landscape of questions about animal rationality<ul type="disc"><li>Rationality differs from intelligence: In requiring a greater capacity for flexible generalization  extending to some capacity for decentring from me here and now, if not to full domain-generality  and in its normativity, which requires the possibility of making mistakes and perhaps some kind of reflective awareness, or metacognition, concerning the possibility of mistake.</li><li>Disciplines vary in their focus on rational behaviour as opposed to on rational processes that explain behaviour.</li><li>Rational behaviour is usually understood in terms of instrumental practical rationality, concerning the rational means to a given end, rather than the rationality of ends. However, it is arguable that the implicit dependence of purely formal conceptions of rationality on some substantive assumptions puts pressure on behavioural rationality to include some process elements.</li><li>Classical conceptions of behavioural rationality, such as EUT, have been challenged by results from the heuristics and biases line of research, and revised and liberalized by the ecological rationality school.</li><li>Process rationality can be understood either as practical, concerning the processes that explain actions, or as theoretical, concerning the processes than explain beliefs.</li><li>A classical view of process rationality in terms of reflective, domain-general reasoning might be revised and liberalized by allowing other processes to count as rational, such as domain-specific heuristics, processes implemented by associative mechanisms, and widely distributed processes.</li><li>Such liberal revisions of classical conceptions of human behavioural and process rationality may make more room for animal rationality.</li><li>In social environments, agents play against other agents (rather than nature), who can manipulate information; this creates selection pressure that may drive the development of advanced cognitive capacities, including behaviour reading and mind reading capacities, in social animals.</li><li>Practical rationality may be more accommodating than theoretical rationality of the forms of social cognition found in non-human animals, and of the domain-specificity of many of their problem-solving abilities. </li></ul> </li><li>Types and levels of rationality<ul type="disc"><li>2.1 <a name="1"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15485.htm">Kacelnik (Alex) - Meanings of rationality</A>"</li><li>2.2 <a name="2"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15484.htm">Dretske (Fred) - Minimal rationality</A>"</li><li>2.3 <a name="3"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15483.htm">Millikan (Ruth Garrett) - Styles of rationality</A>"</li><li>2.4 <a name="4"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15482.htm">Bermudez (Jose Luis) - Animal reasoning and proto-logic</A>"</li><li>2.5 <a name="5"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15481.htm">Hurley (Susan) - Making sense of animals</A>" </li></ul> </li><li>Rational versus associative processes <ul type="disc"><li>3.1 <a name="6"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15480.htm">Allen (Colin) - Transitive inference in animals: Reasoning or conditioned associations?</A>"</li><li>3.2 <a name="7"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15479.htm">Papineau (David) & Heyes (Cecilia) - Rational or associative? Imitation in Japanese quail</A>"</li><li>3.3 <a name="8"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15478.htm">Clayton (Nicola), Emery (Nathan) & Dickinson (Anthony) - The Rationality of Animal Memory: Complex caching strategies of western scrub jays</A>" </li></ul> </li><li>Metacognition <ul type="disc"><li>4.1 <a name="9"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15477.htm">Call (Josep) - Descartes two errors: Reason and reflection in the great apes</A>"<BR>(a) Causal Reasoning<BR>(b) Metacognition</li><li>4.2 <a name="10"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15486.htm">Shettleworth (Sara J.) & Sutton (Jennifer E.) - Do animals know what they know?</A>"</li><li>4.3 <a name="11"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15487.htm">Proust (Joelle) - Rationality and metacognition in non-human animals</A>"<BR>(a) Rationality as cognitively-operated adaptive control<BR>(b) Rationality as metacognitive control<BR>(a) Rationality as explicit metarepresentation of reasons</li><li>4.4 <a name="12"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15488.htm">Currie (Gregory) - Rationality, decentring, and the evidence for pretence in non-human animals</A>"</li></ul> </li><li>Social behaviour and cognition <ul type="disc"><li>5.1 <a name="13"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15489.htm">Sterelny (Kim) - Folk logic and animal rationality</A>"</li><li>5.2 <a name="14"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15490.htm">Addessi (Elsa) & Visalberghi (Elisabetta) - Rationality in capuchin monkey's feeding behaviour?</A>"</li><li>5.3 <a name="15"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15491.htm">Connor (Richard) & Mann (Janet) - Social cognition in the wild: Machiavellian dolphins?</A>"<BR>(a) Male multilevel alliances and social complexity<BR>(b) Female associations and social learning<BR>(c) Affiliative interactions </li></ul></li><li>Mind reading and behaviour reading<ul type="disc"><li>6.1 <a name="16"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15492.htm">Tomasello (Michael) & Call (Josep) - Do chimpanzees know what others see - or only what they are looking at?</A>"<BR>(a) Gaze following<BR>(b) Competing for food<BR>(c) Begging and gesturing<BR>(d) Self-knowledge</li><li>6.2 <a name="17"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15493.htm">Povinelli (Daniel) & Vonk (Jennifer) - We don't need a microscope to explore the chimpanzee's mind</A>" <BR>(a) Louisiana vs. Leipzig: The logical problem with existing experimental paradigms for animal mind reading<BR>(b) How to avoid the logical problem</li><li>6.3 <a name="18"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15494.htm">Tschudin (Alain J.-P. C.) - Belief attribution tasks with dolphins: What social minds can reveal about animal rationality</A>"<BR>(a) Pilot study<BR>(b) Experiment 1<BR>(c) Experiment 2</li></ul></li><li>Behaviour and cognition in symbolic environments<ul type="disc"><li>7.1 <a name="19"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15495.htm">Herman (Louis M.) - Intelligence and rational behaviour in the bottlenosed dolphin</A>" <BR>(a) The declarative and procedural domains<BR>(b) The social domain<BR>(c) The domain of self-knowledge</li><li>7.2 <a name="20"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15496.htm">Pepperberg (Irene M.) - Intelligence and rationality in parrots</A>"<BR>(a) Transitions to referential labelling and model rival training<BR>(b) Responses to being tricked and playing tricks</li><li>7.3 <a name="21"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15497.htm">Boysen (Sarah T.) - The impact of symbolic representations on chimpanzee cognition</A>" <BR>(a) Candies and numerals: interference effects and symbolic facilitation<BR>(b) Reaction time effects of combining numerals with symbols for  same and  different <BR>(c) Solving problems with scale models</li><li>7.4 <a name="22"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15498.htm">Savage-Rumbaugh (E. Sue), Rumbaugh (Duane M.) & Fields (William M.) - Language as a window on rationality</A>" <BR>(a) Lana<BR>(b) Sherman and Austin<BR>(c) Kanzi<BR>(d) Panbanisha and Panzee</li></ul></li><li>Why does it matter?</li></ol></FONT><hr><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>Comment: </B><BR><BR>Editors' Introduction<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T08:19" pubdate>02/08/2018 08:19:22</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>