<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Hurley (Susan) - Making sense of animals (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_15/PaperSummary_15481.htm">Making sense of animals</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/H/Author_Hurley (Susan).htm">Hurley (Susan)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Hurley (Susan) & Nudds (Matthew) - Rational Animals?</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=600><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_15/PaperSummary_15481.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_15/PaperCitings_15481.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><U>Author s Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">We shouldn't overintellectualize the mind. Non-human animals can occupy islands of practical rationality: they can have domain-specific reasons for action even though they lack full conceptual abilities. Holism and the possibility of mistake are required for such reasons to be the agent's reasons, but these requirements can be met in the absence of inferential promiscuity. Empirical work with animals is used to illustrate the possibility that reasons for action could be specific to symbolic or social contexts, and connections are made to simulationist accounts of cognitive skills. </ol> </FONT><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Reasons without conceptual abilities: belief vs. action</li><li>Degrees of generality: holism vs. inferential promiscuity</li><li>A quibble: are conceptual abilities themselves a matter of degree?</li><li>Normativity and the possibility of mistake</li><li>Illustrations of context-bound reasons for action: symbolic context</li><li>Illustrations of context-bound reasons for action: social contexts</li><li>Simulation: context-bound reasons vs. conceptual abilities</li><li>What is the point of making sense of animals?</li><li>Summary and concluding remarks</li></ol> </FONT><hr><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>Comment: </B><BR><BR>Part I: Types and levels of rationality, Chapter 6<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T08:19" pubdate>02/08/2018 08:19:37</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>