A Quantum-Mechanical Argument for Mind-Body Dualism
Barrett (Jeffrey A.)
Source: Erkenntnis Vol. 65, No. 1, Prospects for Dualism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (2006), pp. 97-115
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

    I argue that a strong mind-body dualism is required of any formulation of quantum mechanics1 that satisfies a relatively weak set of explanatory constraints. Dropping one or more of these constraints may allow one to avoid the commitment to a mind-body dualism but may also require a commitment to a physical-physical dualism that is at least as objectionable. Ultimately, it is the preferred basis problem that pushes both collapse and no-collapse theories in the direction of a strong dualism in resolving the quantum measurement problem. Addressing this problem illustrates how the construction and evaluation of explanatorily rich physical theories are inextricably tied to the evaluation of traditional philosophical issues.

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