Identity, Schmidentity: It's Not All the Same
Benfield (David) & Erwin (Edward)
Source: Philosophical Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Feb., 1975), pp. 145-148
Paper - Abstract

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Authors’ Abstract

  1. In "Kripke (Saul) - Naming and Necessity" and more recently in a lecture at New York University Saul Kripke has attempted to dismiss objections to certain philosophical analyses by employing a device which he suggests is of use "... for a number of philosophical problems."
  2. The analyses concern, respectively, the concept of identity and the concept of a definite description.
  3. Although we agree with Kripke that the objections are defective, we doubt that he demonstrates this. Furthermore, we suspect that even if his device has some heuristic value, it is of little or no use in countering objections to philosophical analyses.

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