Realization, Micro-Realization, and Coincidence
Shoemaker (Sydney)
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 67, No. 1 (Jul., 2003), pp. 1-23
Paper - Abstract

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Philosopher’s Index Abstract

    Let thin properties be properties shared by coincident entities, e.g., a person and her body, and thick properties ones that are not shared. Thick properties entail sortal1 properties, e.g., being a person, and the associated persistence conditions2. On the first account of realization defined here, the realized property and its realizers will belong to the same individual. This restricts the physical realizers of mental properties, which are thick, to thick physical properties. We also need a sense in which mental properties can be realized in thin physical properties shared by a person and her body. Defining this in turn requires defining a sense in which the instantiations of sortal3 properties and of thick properties are realized in micro-structural states of affairs. A fourth notion of realization is needed to allow for the possibility of coincident entities that share a sortal4 property, e.g., coincident persons.

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