A Simple Logic for Comparisons and Vagueness
Everett (Theodore J.)
Source: Synthese, Vol. 123, No. 2 (May, 2000), pp. 263-278
Paper - Abstract

Paper Summary


Author’s Abstract

  1. I provide an intuitive, semantic account of a new logic for comparisons (CL), in which atomic statements are assigned both a classical truth-value and a "how much" value or extension in the range [0, 1].
  2. The truth-value of each comparison is determined by the extensions of its component sentences; the truth-value of each atomic depends on whether its extension matches a separate standard for its predicate; everything else is computed classically.
  3. CL is less radical than Casari's comparative logics, in that it does not allow for the formation of comparative statements out of truth-functional molecules.
  4. I argue that CL provides a better analysis of comparisons and predicate vagueness than classical logic, fuzzy logic or supervaluation theory. CL provides a model for descriptions of the world in terms of comparisons only.
  5. The sorites1 paradox can be solved by the elimination of atomic sentences.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



© Theo Todman, June 2007 - April 2018. Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page