- I provide an intuitive, semantic account of a new logic for comparisons (CL), in which atomic statements are assigned both a classical truth-value and a "how much" value or extension in the range [0, 1].
- The truth-value of each comparison is determined by the extensions of its component sentences; the truth-value of each atomic depends on whether its extension matches a separate standard for its predicate; everything else is computed classically.
- CL is less radical than Casari's comparative logics, in that it does not allow for the formation of comparative statements out of truth-functional molecules.
- I argue that CL provides a better analysis of comparisons and predicate vagueness than classical logic, fuzzy logic or supervaluation theory. CL provides a model for descriptions of the world in terms of comparisons only.
- The sorites1 paradox can be solved by the elimination of atomic sentences.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)