- My thesis is that the sorites1 paradox can be resolved by viewing vagueness as a type of irremediable ignorance.
- I begin by showing that the paradox cannot be solved through restrictions, revisions, or rejection of either classical logic or common sense.
- I take the key issue raised by the sorites2 to be "limited sensitivity": are there changes too small to ever affect the applicability of a vague predicate?
- I argue that the only consistent answer is negative, and blame our tendency to think otherwise on a fallacious proportionality principle and a background of anti-realist theories of meaning.
- These theories of meaning encourage the view that perceptual, pedagogical, and memory limits would preclude unlimited sensitivity.
- Refutation of this view comes in the form of a reduction of vague predicates to "blurry" predicates.
- Since blurry predicates have unlimited sensitivity and are indistinguishable from their vague counterparts, I conclude that either vague predicates are dispensable or they are identical to blurry predicates.
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