<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Haldane (John) - Naturalism and Mind (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_15/PaperSummary_15932.htm">Naturalism and Mind</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/H/Author_Haldane (John).htm">Haldane (John)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Religion and Naturalism, Heythrop College, 12 July 2010</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=600><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_15/PaperSummary_15932.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_15/PapersToNotes_15932.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><U>Full Text</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"> <BR><BR><B>Naturalism: characterised, compared and contrasted</B><BR><BR>In contemporary philosophy: <ul type="disc"><li>a rejection of  supernaturalism'</li><li>an endorsement of  scientific explanation'</li><li>an avowal of  physicalism'</li></ul><BR>In traditional philosophy<ul type="disc"><li>a commitment to the intelligibility of the world </li><li>an endorsement of the power of natural reason </li><li>an avowal of the integral unity of substances</li></ul><BR><B>Philosophical and other Knowledge</B><ul type="disc"><li>metaphysics as science</li><li>metaphysics as prior to and independent of empirical knowledge </li><li>metaphysics as interpretative of empirical and other knowledge</li></ul><BR><B>Naturalism and the Mind</B><ul type="disc"><li>Ontology as the shadow of stable commitments.</li><li>Ontology as constrained by metaphysical requirements (criteria of being) </li><li>Realism about the mind, as involving <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causality</A><SUP>1</SUP> (powers active and passive) </li></ul><BR><B>Physicalism and non-physicalism</B><ul type="disc"><li>Arguing from realism to physicalism (Davidson, Lewis, Kim) </li><li>Arguing against physicalism - from sensibility and from intelligibility</li></ul><BR><B>Arguments from Consciousness</B><BR><BR>From <I>qualia</I>: <ol type="1"><li>The identity and <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_77.htm">individuation</A><SUP>2</SUP> conditions of qualia are ineliminably phenomenal.</li><li>No material entity or property is such that its identity and <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_77.htm">individuation</A><SUP>3</SUP> conditions are ineliminably phenomenal.</li><li>Therefore qualia are not material entities or properties. </li></ol><BR>From <I>subjectivity</I>: <ol type="1"><li>Consciousness is essentially subjective - there it is something it is like to be conscious, and something it is like to be the particular conscious subject that one is.</li></ol><BR>From <I>self-awareness</I>:<ol type="1"><li>In consciousness one is aware of an object (the self) whose existence and character are indubitable, transparent and self-intimating. </li></ol><BR><B>Arguments from Conceptuality</B><BR><BR>From <I>concepts as fine-grained</I>: <ol type="1"><li>The identity and <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_77.htm">individuation</A><SUP>4</SUP> conditions of concepts (and of the thoughts in which they are expressed) are strongly and ineliminably intensional.</li><li>No material entity or property is such that its identity and <a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_77.htm">individuation</A><SUP>5</SUP> conditions are strongly and ineliminably intensional.</li><li>Therefore, concepts and the thoughts in which they are expressed are not material. </li></ol><BR>From <I>concepts as <a name="6"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>6</SUP></I>: <ol type="1"><li>Thought is essentially constituted by the exercise of concepts and awareness of them as objects of reflection and analysis.</li><li>Concepts are <a name="7"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>7</SUP></li><li>No materially instantiated property is universal.</li><li>Therefore, the occurrence of concepts in thought cannot involve their material instantiation. </li><li>What is essentially constituted by elements that occur non-materially is itself non-material. </li><li>Therefore, thought is non-material. </li></ol><BR><B>Arguments from Rationality</B><BR><BR>From <I>rational constraints</I><ol type="1"><li>The conditions on having beliefs and desires include non-empirical, a priori rational requirements,</li><li>No material attribute is constrained in this way</li><li>Therefore, the having of beliefs and desires is not a material attribute. </li></ol><BR>From <I>logical relations</I><ol type="1"><li>Logical relations between concepts and the propositions into which they enter as constituents are defined in terms of truth-preserving implications.</li><li>The relations between material entities and properties are not (and cannot be) defined in terms of truth-preserving implications.</li><li>Therefore, concepts and the propositions into which they enter are not material entities or properties. </li></ol><BR>From <I>inductive reasoning</I><ol type="1"><li>Inductive reasoning about empirical facts draws upon capacities to identify the natures of things and to discern intrinsic (non-contingent) relations between these.</li><li>No material process draws upon capacities to identify the natures of things and to discern intrinsic (non-contingent) relations between these.</li><li>Therefore, inductive reasoning about empirical facts is not a material process. </li></ol><BR>From <I>hermeneutics</I><ol type="1"><li>The description and interpretation of psychological phenomena (and their intentional products) requires interpretative-cum-evaluative modes of description, explanation and assessment.</li><li>The description and interpretation of (purely) material entities and properties does not require interpretative-cum-evaluative modes of description, explanation and assessment. </li><li>Therefore, psychological phenomena are not (purely) material. </li></ol><BR><BR><B><U>Conclusion</U><BR><BR>Understanding intelligibility </B><ul type="disc"><li>intrinsic vs extrinsic intelligibility </li><li>potential vs actual intelligibility</li><li>The [intellectual] soul has no matter. ... We may proceed from the specific notion of the human soul, inasmuch as it is intellectual. For it is clear that whatever is received into something is received according to the condition of the recipient. Now a thing is known in as far as its form is in the knower. But the intellectual soul knows a thing in its nature absolutely [ie not as something particular but as having such and such a nature] ... Therefore, the intellectual soul itself is an absolute form, and not something composed of matter and form. For if the intellectual soul were composed of matter and form, the forms of things would be received into it as individuals, and so it would only know the individual; just as it happens with the sensitive powers which receive forms in a corporeal organ. For matter is the principle by which forms are individuated. It follows, therefore, that the intellectual soul, and every intellectual substance which has knowledge of forms absolutely, is exempt from composition of matter and form. <BR>Aquinas, <I>Summa Theologiae</I> Ia, q.75, a5</li></ul><BR><B>Back to <a name="8"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</A><SUP>8</SUP></B><ul type="disc"><li>The integration of intellect, sensibility and agency. </li></ul></FONT><hr><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>Comment: </B><BR><BR>Conference hand-out.<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T08:25" pubdate>02/08/2018 08:25:16</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>