Naturalism and Mind
Haldane (John)
Source: Religion and Naturalism, Heythrop College, 12 July 2010
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Naturalism: characterised, compared and contrasted

In contemporary philosophy:


In traditional philosophy
Philosophical and other Knowledge
Naturalism and the Mind
Physicalism and non-physicalism
Arguments from Consciousness

From qualia:
  1. The identity and individuation conditions of qualia are ineliminably phenomenal.
  2. No material entity or property is such that its identity and individuation conditions are ineliminably phenomenal.
  3. Therefore qualia are not material entities or properties.

From subjectivity:
  1. Consciousness is essentially subjective - there it is something it is like to be conscious, and something it is like to be the particular conscious subject that one is.

From self-awareness:
  1. In consciousness one is aware of an object (the self) whose existence and character are indubitable, transparent and self-intimating.

Arguments from Conceptuality

From concepts as fine-grained:
  1. The identity and individuation conditions of concepts (and of the thoughts in which they are expressed) are strongly and ineliminably intensional.
  2. No material entity or property is such that its identity and individuation conditions are strongly and ineliminably intensional.
  3. Therefore, concepts and the thoughts in which they are expressed are not material.

From concepts as universals2:
  1. Thought is essentially constituted by the exercise of concepts and awareness of them as objects of reflection and analysis.
  2. Concepts are universals3
  3. No materially instantiated property is universal.
  4. Therefore, the occurrence of concepts in thought cannot involve their material instantiation.
  5. What is essentially constituted by elements that occur non-materially is itself non-material.
  6. Therefore, thought is non-material.

Arguments from Rationality

From rational constraints
  1. The conditions on having beliefs and desires include non-empirical, a priori rational requirements,
  2. No material attribute is constrained in this way
  3. Therefore, the having of beliefs and desires is not a material attribute.

From logical relations
  1. Logical relations between concepts and the propositions into which they enter as constituents are defined in terms of truth-preserving implications.
  2. The relations between material entities and properties are not (and cannot be) defined in terms of truth-preserving implications.
  3. Therefore, concepts and the propositions into which they enter are not material entities or properties.

From inductive reasoning
  1. Inductive reasoning about empirical facts draws upon capacities to identify the natures of things and to discern intrinsic (non-contingent) relations between these.
  2. No material process draws upon capacities to identify the natures of things and to discern intrinsic (non-contingent) relations between these.
  3. Therefore, inductive reasoning about empirical facts is not a material process.

From hermeneutics
  1. The description and interpretation of psychological phenomena (and their intentional products) requires interpretative-cum-evaluative modes of description, explanation and assessment.
  2. The description and interpretation of (purely) material entities and properties does not require interpretative-cum-evaluative modes of description, explanation and assessment.
  3. Therefore, psychological phenomena are not (purely) material.


Conclusion

Understanding intelligibility

Back to causation4

Comment:

Conference hand-out.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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