The Nature of Necessity: Preliminary Distinctions and Remarks
Plantinga (Alvin)
Source: Plantinga - The Nature of Necessity, Chapter 1; pp. 1-14 (14)
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    I clarify the notion of necessity that I will be examining in the book. In the first section , I claim that the relevant notion of necessity is ‘broad logical necessity’, which I distinguish from causal necessity, unrevisability and a proposition being self-evident or a priori. In the second section, I distinguish between modality1 de dicto and modality2 de re. An assertion of modality3 de dicto predicates a modal4 property of another dictum or proposition, while a claim of modality5 de re asserts of an object that it possess a property either essentially or contingently. I conclude by examining the use of the de dicto / de re distinction in the works of Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, G.E. Moore, and Norman Malcolm.
  1. Necessity Circumscribed – 1
  2. Modality6 de ditto and Modality7 de re – 9

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