Modality De Re: Explanations
Plantinga (Alvin)
Source: Plantinga - The Nature of Necessity, Chapter 3; pp. 27-44 (18)
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsDisclaimer

Oxford Scholarship On-Line

    I explain modality1 de re in terms of modality2 de dicto because there are those who feel that modality3 de dicto is easier to understand. I argue that the de dicto properties of what I call the kernel proposition can indicate whether x has P essentially. I then provide directions on how to determine the kernel proposition for an object x and a property P. I conclude by addressing some objections. In particular, I argue that my account is not circular despite its reliance on proper names.
  1. The Locus of Necessity – 27
  2. The Kernel Function – 29
  3. Some Objections – 32
    … A. The Kernel Function and Kripke Semantics – 33
    … B. Identity and The Kernel Function – 34
    … C. Circularity and the Kernel Function – 36

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

© Theo Todman, June 2007 - May 2019. Please address any comments on this page to File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page