Transworld Identity or Worldbound Individuals?
Plantinga (Alvin)
Source: Plantinga - The Nature of Necessity, Chapter 6; pp. 88-121 (34)
Paper - Abstract

Paper Summary


Contents

  1. The Question – 88
  2. Socrates in alpha and Socrates in W – 89
  3. The Problem of Transworld Identity – 92
    … A. The Problem Stated – 92
    … B. A Temporal Analogy – 94
    … C. The Problem Resolved – 96
    … D. Essence and Transworld Identity – 97
    … E. Does Ramsification Destroy Information? – 99
  4. Objections to TWI – 101
  5. Counterpart Theory – 102
  6. Semantic Inadequacies of Counterpart Theory – 108
    … A. Socrates and Xenophon – 109
    … B. Socrates and Socrates-identity – 110
  7. Metaphysical Inadequacies of Counterpart Theory – 114

Comment:

Also in "Schwartz (Stephen P.), Ed. - Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds" & "Loux (Michael), Ed. - The Possible and the Actual: Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality".

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