<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Plantinga (Alvin) - Possible But Unactual Objects: The Classical Argument (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_16/PaperSummary_16228.htm">Possible But Unactual Objects: The Classical Argument</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/P/Author_Plantinga (Alvin).htm">Plantinga (Alvin)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Plantinga - The Nature of Necessity, Chapter 7; pp. 121-149 (29)</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=400><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_16/PaperSummary_16228.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><U>Oxford Scholarship On-Line</U> <FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">Chapter 7 explores the question: Are there or could there be, possible but non-existent objects? In the first half of the chapter, I critically assess the claim that an applied semantics for <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modal logic</A><SUP>1</SUP> commits us to the claim that there are non-existent possible objects. I conclude that it does commit us to there being some possible world distinct from the actual world that contains some object distinct from anything that exists in the actual world; but it does not, however, commit us to the claim that there really are some things that do not exist. In the second half of the chapter, I develop a historically based argument for the conclusion that there are non-existent possible objects, which I call the Classical Argument. Importantly, the Classical Argument presupposes that singular negative existentials are possible. I end the chapter by showing that certain objections to the possibility of singular negative existentials fail, and that such existentials are indeed possible.</ol></FONT><U>Contents</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>The Question  121</li><li><a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">Modal Logic</A><SUP>2</SUP> and Possible Objects  123</li><li>How Shall we Take the Semantics?  125</li><li>Pure and Applied Semantics  126</li><li>Applied Semantics and Possible Objects  128</li><li>Are There Nonexistent Objects?  131</li><li>The Classical Argument  133</li><li>Proper Names and Negative Existentials: Russell  137</li><li>Proper Names and Negative Existentials: Searle  139</li><li>Proper Names and Negative Existentials: the Historical Chain View  143</li><li>Some Varieties of Singular Existentials  144</li></ol></FONT><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-03T00:12" pubdate>03/08/2018 00:12:52</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>