God and Necessity
Plantinga (Alvin)
Source: Plantinga - The Nature of Necessity, Chapter 10; pp. 196-255 (60)
Paper - Abstract

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Oxford Scholarship On-Line

    In Chapter 10, I apply the previous chapters’ account of modality1 to the Ontological Argument for the existence of God. I begin the chapter by attempting to develop a sound version of the Ontological Argument based on the work of St. Anselm. I conclude that this argument fails, as does a more recent attempt by Charles Hartshorne and Norman Malcolm. I then give a modal2 version of the Ontological Argument that is sound and is based on the claim that the property of unsurpassable greatness is possibly exemplified. I grant that this premise is not likely to be accepted by those who do not already hold that the property is actually exemplified, but I argue that it is still rational to accept the premise.
  1. The Anselmian Statement – 197
  2. The Argument Restated – 198
  3. The Argument Examined – 202
  4. A Mistaken Modal3 Version – 205
  5. The Argument Without Possible Objects – 209
  6. The Hartshorne—Malcolm Version – 212
  7. A Victorious Modal4 Version – 213
  8. Final Objections and Reflections – 217

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  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

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