<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Plantinga (Alvin) - The Nature of Necessity: Preface (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_16/PaperSummary_16511.htm">The Nature of Necessity: Preface</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/P/Author_Plantinga (Alvin).htm">Plantinga (Alvin)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Plantinga - The Nature of Necessity, Preface; pp. v-vi (2)</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=400><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_16/PaperSummary_16511.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Although the notion of necessity has had a long and distinguished career in Western thought, it has not, on the whole, been treated kindly by twentieth-century philosophy. The dominant traditions (both Anglo-American and Continental) have for the most part made a determined effort to dispense with necessity, or to explain it away in favour of linguistic, psychological, or sociological surrogates.</li><li>I think this is a mistake; and in the present book I take the idea of necessity seriously and at face value. <ul type="disc"><li>In the <B>first chapter</B> I try to locate and fix the idea in question  the idea of broadly logical necessity  and to distinguish it from others in the neighbourhood. I also distinguish <I>de dicto</I> necessity  a matter of a proposition's being necessarily true  from <I>de re</I> necessity, which involves an object's having a property essentially or necessarily. </li><li>In <B>Chapters II and III</B>, I consider and reject some objections to <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modality</A><SUP>1</SUP> <I>de re</I> and argue that it can be explained by way of <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modality</A><SUP>2</SUP> <I>de dicto</I>. </li><li><B>Chapter IV</B> introduces and explains the idea of possible worlds; this notion, I believe, permits a genuine advance in our grasp of matters <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modal</A><SUP>3</SUP>. </li><li>The question of <B>Chapter V</B> is whether an object has an essence: a property essential to it and essentially unique to it; the answer is indeed it has. </li><li><B>Chapter VI</B> examines the so-called problem of transworld identity, widely thought to afflict the view that the same object exists in more than one possible world; it concludes that this problem is more appearance than reality. </li><li>In <B>Chapters VII and VIII</B>, I explore one aspect of the venerable problem of not-being. Some possible worlds contain objects that do not in fact exist: must we conclude that there are some things that do not exist? Can we think and talk about what does not exist? The answer is we must not and cannot. </li><li><B>Chapters IX and X</B> consider the bearing of some of the foregoing ideas on two traditional concerns of natural theology: the problem of evil and the ontological argument for the existence of God. I argue that these ideas enable us to resolve the former and find a sound formulation of the latter. </li><li>Finally, in the <B>appendix</B>, I examine and partly concur with Quine's claim that quantified <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modal logic</A><SUP>4</SUP> presupposes what he calls Aristotelian Essentialism  the view that objects typically have both accidental and essential properties. </li></ul></li><li></FONT> [Snip & re-publications, etc.] <FONT COLOR = "800080"> I am especially eager to express my indebtedness to a large number of colleagues  in particular, those at Calvin and U.C.L.A.  students, and friends for penetrating criticism, stimulating discussion, and wise advice. Special thanks for such benefits are due Roderick Chisholm, Peter De Vos, David Kaplan, David Lewis, Lawrence Powers, and Nicholas Wolterstorff. </li></ol></FONT><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-03T00:12" pubdate>03/08/2018 00:12:53</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>