Quine's Objection to Quantified Modal Logic
Plantinga (Alvin)
Source: Plantinga - The Nature of Necessity, Appendix; pp. 222-251
Paper - Abstract

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Contents

  1. The Objection Initially Stated – 222
  2. Sizeability is not a Property – 224
  3. The Objection Restated – 228
  4. The Objection Examined – 229
  5. The Hintikka Response – 231
  6. The Smullyan Reply – 232
  7. Proper Terms and Aristotelian Essentialism – 233
  8. Modal Logic1 and Essentialism – 235
  9. Quine's Charge and Professor Marcus – 238
  10. Quine's Charge and Professor Parsons – 243
  11. Essentialism and Applied Semantics – 248

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