Modern Modal Ontological Arguments
Sobel (Jordan)
Source: Sobel (Jordan) - Logic and Theism: Arguments For and Against Beliefs in God, Chapter 3
Paper - Abstract

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Contents

  1. Norman Malcolm's argument – 81
  2. Charles Hartshorne's argument – 82
  3. A fly in the ointment? – 86
  4. Other Anselmian arguments – 88
  5. ‘It's the possibility!' – 89
  6. Foes of ontological arguments say that their possibility-premises beg questions – 90
  7. Friends of ontological arguments respond – 91
  8. But that — that conceivability entails possibility — is simply not true! – 92
  9. A demotion of the argument from a proof, to a license to believe – 96
  10. Appendix A. ‘Possible worlds' – 99
    … A1. Worlds enough – 99
    … A2. Truth and actuality at possible worlds – 101
    … A3. Modal1 realism without tears – 102
    … A4. This is not a story – 103
    … A5. A logic for possible worlds – 103
  11. Appendix B. Modal logic2 – 105
    … B1. Sentential modal logic3 – 105
    … B2. Hartshorne's modal4 ontological argument – 108
    … B3. Quantified modal logic5 – 110

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