- The problems about the mind that are called philosophical concern the general framework of our thinking about particular mental phenomena. These problems arise when we think, in the context of everyday relationships, about the thoughts, feelings, and actions of other people. They also arise, in a scientific context, when we think about the relationship between states of consciousness and the psychological or neurophysiological models advanced as explanations of behaviour.
- Any attempt to classify philosophical questions about the mind under a few simple headings is bound to have some degree of arbitrariness, if only because of the extent to which these questions are interrelated. But one reasonably plausible way of dividing up the problems is under these headings:
- Interpretations: problems of justifying the interpretations we place upon the conduct and mental states of other people, and of ourselves.
- Problems of the description and classification of the phenomena of mental states and behaviour.
- Models: problems raised by models of the mind, or of particular kinds of mental activity, whether proposed by psychologists, or unreflectively presupposed by ordinary people in their thinking about the mind.
- The mind-body problem: the question of the relationship between conscious experiences and either behaviour or states of the brain.
- Problems of personal identity: the question of what, if anything, justifies the view that, despite physical and mental changes, I remain the same person over a period of time; the related question of what kind of alterations in someone would make it no longer reasonable to regard him as the same person; the question of what the unity1 of a mind at any one time consists in.
… "Farrell (B.A.) - The Criteria for a Psycho-analytic Interpretation" (fairly negative2)
- Problems of description and classification
… Appreciation of the precision supplied by Gilbert Ryle, J.L. Austin and Hart3.
… "Gardiner (Patrick) - Error, Faith, and Self-Deception" (positively reviewed)
- Models of the mind
- The mind-body problem
- Problems of personal identity
- Concluding note
Footnote 2: Farrell sees to argue that psychoanalysis doesn’t aim at truth or falsehood in its interpretations, but at cures. Glover thinks it (and psychology generally) might do both.
Footnote 3: Who? Maybe W.D. Hart? I could find nothing in the bibliography.
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