McGinn on Existence
Van Inwagen (Peter)
Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 230, Special Issue: Existence and Identity (Jan., 2008), pp. 36-58
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. I compare the theory of existence and being (and of non-existence and non-being) presented in "McGinn (Colin) - Logical Properties" with those of well-known predecessors such as Quine, Frege and Meinong.
  2. More recently, neo-Meinongians have held that being and existence are different concepts, and that although nothing lacks being, there are things which do not exist; possibilists have held that there are mere possibilia, things which possibly exist but do not actually exist.
  3. I examine a thesis advanced by McGinn1 which these two positions have also endorsed, namely, that there are things which do not exist.
  4. I survey the function of 'existential quantification', and finally contend that the predicate 'does not exist' has at least three meanings, meanings which are determined by the context in which the predicate occurs and which are importantly different from one another.


In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1: Presumably in "McGinn (Colin) - Existence".

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