Time for a Change: A Polemic Against the Presentism-Eternalism Debate
Lombard (Lawrence B.)
Source: Campbell, O'Rourke & Silverstein - Time and Identity, I - Time, Chapter 2
Paper - Abstract

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Abstract1

  1. The relation between time and existence looms large for Lombard in this essay. He assimilates the ancient debate about change between Heraclitus and Parmenides to the contemporary debate between the presentists and the eternalists: perhaps they too are engaged in a merely verbal dispute.
  2. As we have seen above, it is surprisingly difficult to explicate these views in a way that generates a substantive dispute.
  3. Lombard interrogates glosses by "Merricks (Trenton) - On the Incompatibility of Enduring and Perduring Entities" (1995), "Zimmerman (Dean) - Temporary Intrinsics and Presentism" (1998), and "Sider (Ted) - Four-dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time" (2001), concluding that they all founder on an equivocation of tense. "If all the relevant verbs [in the definitions of eternalism and presentism] are in the present tense, there is no substantive dispute between the presentist and eternalist. And if all the relevant verbs are disjunctively omnitemporal, there is again no substantive dispute" (71-72).

Comment:

Pre-print downloaded from academia.edu, 31st August 2019



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1: Taken from p. 12 of "Slater (Matthew H.) - Framing the Problems of Time and Identity", footnotes removed (for now).


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