|Persistence and Responsibility|
|Tognazzini (Neal A.)|
|Source: Campbell, O'Rourke & Silverstein - Time and Identity, II - Identity, Chapter 7|
|Paper - Abstract|
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"The perdurantist6 can quite plausibly claim that what is required for an attribution of moral responsibility to be appropriate is not that 'the self-same entity' be 'wholly present' at both times, but rather that the self-same person be present (but not wholly) at both times" (154). And the perdurantist7 can easily make sense of this fact.
Footnote 1: Taken from p. 15 of "Slater (Matthew H.) - Framing the Problems of Time and Identity", footnotes removed (for now).
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