- This pseudo-Paper is intended as the mechanism to record time spent on the Note 'Animalism1' during my Thesis research, as from 2011.
- For the actual time recorded, click on "Paper Statistics" above.
Write-up2 (as at 30/11/2019 22:58:05): Animalism
Plug Note3- There are different interpretations of Animalism, which I need to compare and contrast. My preferred option is Olson4’s, namely, that animalism is the view that we are identical to human animals5 and that, since human animals don’t have any psychological properties essentially, neither do we.
- Olson is probably the best known active Animalist6. See:-
→ "Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology" and
→ "Olson (Eric) - What are We? A Study of Personal Ontology".
Follow the above link for other animalists. - Olson’s claim is not that there are no non-animal persons, but that human persons are essentially animals. Other animalists, such as Wiggins7, insist (or are said to insist, or used to insist) that the only persons are indeed human beings8, or are (maybe) other animals.
- I incline to agree with Olson on the topic of what we are9, but need to press hard with thought experiments10 to see why we can’t separate the two – that is, why we can’t separate where we go as persons11 from where we go as animals: our personhood can’t be pealed off from our animality and ported to some other infrastructure – or at least not while preserving our identity.
- There is a distinction between persons and human animals. Is the distinction empirical or conceptual? Why can’t I copy my consciousness12 onto a machine13 and that machine be me? There seem to be two issues here.
- Firstly, my intuition is that phenomenal consciousness essentially involves a brain-like infrastructure and
- Secondly, copying a consciousness onto a machine isn’t identity-preserving, even if possible, but is the creation of a simulacrum14.
- Basically, I reject both functionalism15 and the idea of consciousness “hopping from one infrastructure to another”. Incidentally, I rather hope we can’t copy our phenomenal consciousness onto a machine, or the possibility of hell on earth unfolds. The nasty business of very extended torment could be delegated to another machine that neither knows nor cares what it is doing.
- Also, should we consider fetuses16 and the senile or those in a PVS17 as persons? See Baker18 who alleges that those who have, will have or have had the capacity for a first-person perspective19 should be accounted persons. But is this simply arbitrary retrofitting of philosophy to Christian doctrine (though Wiggins20 seems to share this view; individuals are persons if typical individuals of their kind are persons)?
- I must also discuss animals21 under this head. If we are identical to (human) animals then to what, exactly, are we identical – that is, just what is a human animal – and that are their persistence conditions22? Note that there are disagreements about the referent of “animal” – is it the organism23 or the body24? The key issue is with corpses25. Feldman thinks they are animals, but Olson thinks they aren’t. Death26 is central to the enquiry. Just when does the person or animal commence27 or cease to be? If he is resuscitated (or resurrected28 / reincarnated29, assuming these to be possible) what happens in the interregnum30?
- As noted elsewhere31,32, I need to investigate the termini of human existence, and the issues they raise for the various views – the “fetus problem33” for the constitution view and the “corpse problem34” for animalism.
- For a page of Links35 to this Note, Click here.
- In the reading lists that follow, I’ve intended to exclude items whose primary “home” is in another Note, but have probably included a lot that might feature in36.
- Works on this topic that I’ve actually read37 include the following:-
- "Ayers (Michael R.) - Neo-Lockean and Anti-Lockean Theories of Personal Identity in Analytic Philosophy", Ayers
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Reply to Olson", Baker
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Review of 'What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology' by Eric T. Olson", Baker
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder), Etc. - E-Symposium on 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View'", Baker, etc.
- "Blatti (Stephan) - Animalism (Continuum)", Blatti
- "Blatti (Stephan) - Animalism and its Implications", Blatti
- "Blatti (Stephan) - Animalism and Personal Identity", Blatti
- "Blatti (Stephan) - Animalism Unburdened", Blatti
- "Blatti (Stephan) - Animalism, Dicephalus, and Borderline Cases", Blatti
- "Blatti (Stephan), Ed. - The Lives of Human Animals", Blatti, etc.
- "Campbell (Scott) - Can You Survive a Brain-Zap", Campbell
- "Carter (William) - Death and Bodily Transfiguration", Carter
- "Carter (William) - Do Zygotes Become People?", Carter
- "Carter (William) - How to Change Your Mind", Carter
- "Carter (William) - Will I Be a Dead Person?", Carter
- "Corcoran (Kevin) - Biology or Psychology? Human Persons and Personal Identity", Corcoran
- "Dainton (Barry) - Review of Eric Olson's 'The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology'", Dainton
- "Francescotti (Robert) - Fetuses, corpses and the psychological approach to personal identity", Francescotti
- "Garrett (Brian) - Animalism and Reductionism", Garrett
- "Garrett (Brian) - Some Thoughts on Animalism", Garrett
- "Gendler (Tamar Szabo) - Review of Eric Olson's 'The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology'", Gendler
- "Hershenov (David) - Countering the Appeal of the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity", Hershenov
- "Hershenov (David) - Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem for Biological Approaches to Personal Identity", Hershenov
- "Hudson (Hud) - A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person: Introduction", Hudson
- "Johansson (Jens) - What is Animalism?", Johansson
- "Liao (S. Matthew) - The Organism View Defended", Liao
- "Mackie (David) - Animalism Versus Lockeanism: No Contest", Mackie
- "Mackie (David) - Going Topless", Mackie
- "Mackie (David) - Personal Identity and Dead People", Mackie
- "Madden (Rory) - Human Persistence", Madden
- "Markosian (Ned) - Three Problems for Olson's Account of Personal Identity", Markosian
- "Noonan (Harold) - Animalism Versus Lockeanism: A Current Controversy", Noonan
- "Noonan (Harold) - Animalism versus Lockeanism: Reply to Mackie", Noonan
- "Noonan (Harold) - Arguments Against Animalism: Comments on L.R.Baker 'Persons & Bodies'", Noonan
- "Noonan (Harold) - Persons, Animals and Human Beings", Noonan
- "Olson (Eric) - An Argument for Animalism", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - Animalism and the Corpse Problem", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - Animalism and the Remnant-Person Problem", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - Human People Or Human Animals", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - Is Psychology Relevant To Personal Identity?", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - Personal Identity", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - Personal Identity (Stanford, 2002)", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - Personal Identity and the Radiation Argument", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - Precis of 'The Human Animal'", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - Relativism and Persistence", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - Replies to Baker, Markosian & Zimmerman", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - Reply to Lynne Rudder Baker", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - Review of Hud Hudson's 'A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person'", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology", Olson38
- "Olson (Eric) - There Is No Problem of the Self", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - Thinking Animals and the Constitution View", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - Thinking Animals and the Reference of 'I'", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - Warum wir Tiere sind (Why we are animals)", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - Was I Ever a Fetus?", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - Was Jekyll Hyde?", Olson
- "Olson (Eric), Etc. - Abstracta Special Issue on 'The Human Animal'", Olson
- "Rosenberg (Jay) - Bodies, Corpses, and Chunks of Matter: A Reply to Carter", Rosenberg
- "Scarlett (Brian) - The Moral Uniqueness of the Human Animal", Scarlett
- "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Review of Eric Olson's 'The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology'", Shoemaker
- "Snowdon (Paul) - Persons and Personal Identity", Snowdon
- "Snowdon (Paul) - Persons, Animals, and Bodies", Snowdon
- "Snowdon (Paul) - Persons, Animals, and Ourselves", Snowdon
- "Snowdon (Paul) - Persons, Animals, Ourselves: Introduction", Snowdon
- "Snowdon (Paul) - Some Objections to Animalism", Snowdon
- "Snowdon (Paul) - The Self and Personal Identity", Snowdon
- "Steinhart (Eric) - Persons Versus Brains: Biological Intelligence in Human Organisms", Steinhart
- "Tollefsen (Christopher) - Abortion and the Human Animal", Tollefsen
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Material Beings: Preface", van Inwagen
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Material Beings: Introduction", van Inwagen
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Ontology, Identity, and Modality: Introduction", van Inwagen
- "Wiggins (David) - Reply to Snowdon (Persons and Personal Identity)", Wiggins
- "Wilson (Jack) - Biological Individuality - The identity and Persistence of Living Entities", Wilson
- "Wollheim (Richard) - Living", Wollheim
- "Yourgrau (Palle) - Can the Dead Really Be Buried?", Yourgrau
- "Zimmerman (Dean) - Problems for Animalism", Zimmerman
- A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:-
- "Blatti (Stephan) & Snowdon (Paul), Eds - Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity", Blatti&Snowdon
- "Campbell (Scott) - Animals, Babies, and Subjects", Campbell
- "DeGrazia (David) - Human Identity and Bioethics", DeGrazia
→ "Hershenov (David) - Review of David DeGrazia’s Human Identity and Bioethics", Hershenov - "Hershenov (David) - Death, Persons, and Sparse Ontologies: The Problem of Too Many Dying Thinkers", Hershenov
- "Hershenov (David) - Merrick's Identification of the Person and Organism", Hershenov
- "Hershenov (David) - Persons as Proper Parts of Organisms", Hershenov
- "Hershenov (David) - Soulless Organisms? Hylomorphism vs. Animalism", Hershenov
- "Hershenov (David) - Who Doesn't Have a Problem of Too Many Thinkers?", Hershenov
- "Hudson (Hud) - A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person", Hudson
- "Hudson (Hud) - I am Not an Animal!", Hudson
- "Koch-Hershenov (Rose J.) - Conjoined Twins and the Biological Account of Personal Identity", Koch-Hershenov
- "Larkin (William S.) - Persons, Animals, and Bodies", Larkin
- "Moran (Alexander P.) - Animalism and the Thinking Parts Problem", Moran
- "Noonan (Harold) - Persons, Animals and Human Beings (2010)", Noonan
- "Noonan (Harold) - The Thinking Animal Problem and Personal Pronoun Revisionism", Noonan
- "Olson (Eric) - Personal Identity (Stanford, 2015)", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - Review of P. Snowdon, Persons, Animals, Ourselves", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - Was I Ever a Fetus? ('New Version')", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - What are We? A Study of Personal Ontology", Olson
- "Persson (Ingmar) - Our Identity and the Separability of Person and Organism", Persson
- "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Persons, Animals, and Identity", Shoemaker
- "Snowdon (Paul) - Persons, Animals, Ourselves", Snowdon
- "Sutton (Catherine S.) - The Supervenience Solution to the Too-Many-Thinkers Problem", Sutton
- "Toner (Patrick) - Hylemorphic animalism", Toner
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - A Materialist Ontology of the Human Person", van Inwagen
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Material Beings", van Inwagen
- "Zimmerman (Dean) - Material People", Zimmerman
- This is mostly a place-holder39.
In-Page Footnotes
Footnote 2: - This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (30/11/2019 22:58:05).
- Link to Latest Write-Up Note.
Footnote 38: - I’ve not explicitly listed the individual chapters, though my comments and write-ups are variable.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020