- This pseudo-Paper is intended as the mechanism to record time spent on the Note 'Animalism - Objections1' during my Thesis research, as from 2011.
- For the actual time recorded, click on "Paper Statistics" above.
Write-up2 (as at 04/12/2019 23:36:58): Animalism - Objections
- A convenient starting-point for reviewing objections to Animalism is in "Olson (Eric), Etc. - Abstracta Special Issue on 'The Human Animal'" (2008), reviewed in this Note4.
- The most obvious objection is to the initial implausibility of Animalism’s basic contention that – because I was once a fetus5 and may one day be a vegetable6 – psychological continuity or connectedness7 can have nothing to do with my persistence criteria. Animalists can be accused of not taking persons sufficiently seriously8.
- Additionally, Animalists are said to have a “corpse problem9”. Because I am co-located with my “corpse-to-be”, the Animalist is hoist by his own petard, in that he has the analogue of the “fetus problem10” he alleges against the Constitution View11.
- A spin-off from the alleged irrelevancy of psychology for human identity is the need to deny the Brain Transplant12 intuition – that “I go where my brain goes”. The Transplant Intuition has been defended from an animalist perspective in "Madden (Rory) - Human Persistence" (2016).
- Olson mentions four “favourites13” in "Olson (Eric) - Human Atoms", namely:-
- If you were an animal, you would be identical with your body (or at any rate with some human body). But no human body can think or feel or act, as you can.
- Persons and animals have different persistence conditions: the organism that is your body could outlive you (if you lapsed into a persistent vegetative state), or you could outlive it (if your brain were transplanted and the rest of you destroyed). But a thing cannot outlive itself.
- Persons and animals have different criteria of synchronic identity: any human animal could be associated with two different persons at once (as cases of split personality). Thus, no person is an animal.
- These experiences – the ones I am having now – are essentially mine. But they are only contingently associated with any particular animal. Hence, I have a property that no animal has.
- The above paper is intended, however, to rebut Lowe’s argument against animalism, in "Lowe (E.J.) - Subjects of Experience", which has the unlikely consequence that we are “mereological atoms”.
- Hud Hudson argues against animalism via the “Elimination Argument”, which I’m yet to investigate and understand. Andrew M. Bailey seeks to rebuff it.
- Elselijn Kingma has accused animalists of not taking Pregnancy14 as an important issue for Animalism. She thinks that the fetus is a part of the mother. My view is that animals can share parts, as seems to be necessary for Conjoined Twins15, which are another supposed objection to animalism if it could be successfully argued that there is only one animal in these cases.
- Works on this topic that I’ve actually read16 include the following:-
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Big-Tent Metaphysics", Baker, 2008
→ "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Response to Eric Olson", Baker, 2008
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Review of 'What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology' by Eric T. Olson", Baker
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - When Do Persons Begin and End?", Baker
- "Blatti (Stephan), Ed. - The Lives of Human Animals", Blatti
- "Blatti (Stephan) - Animalism (SEP)", Blatti
- "Garrett (Brian) - Animalism and Reductionism", Garrett
- "Madden (Rory) - Thinking Parts", Madden
- "Madden (Rory) - Human Persistence", Madden
- "Markosian (Ned) - Three Problems for Olson's Account of Personal Identity", Markosian, 2008
- "Marshall (Richard) & Olson (Eric) - Eric T. Olson: The Philosopher with No Hands", Marshall & Olson
- "Noonan (Harold) - Animalism Versus Lockeanism: A Current Controversy", Noonan, 1998
- "Noonan (Harold) - Arguments Against Animalism: Comments on L.R.Baker 'Persons & Bodies'", Noonan, 2001
- "Noonan (Harold) - Animalism versus Lockeanism: Reply to Mackie", Noonan, 2001
- "Olson (Eric) - Animalism and the Corpse Problem", Olson, 2004
- "Olson (Eric) - Animalism and the Remnant-Person Problem", Olson, 2016
- "Olson (Eric) - On Parfit's View That We Are Not Human Beings", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - Replies to Baker, Markosian & Zimmerman", Olson, 2008
- "Snowdon (Paul) - Some Objections to Animalism", Snowdon
- "Snowdon (Paul) - The Self and Personal Identity", Snowdon
- "Zimmerman (Dean) - Problems for Animalism", Zimmerman, 2008
- Dicephalus & Conjoined Twins17
- "Buchanan (Rachael) - The battle to separate Safa and Marwa"
- "Wikipedia - Craniopagus twins"
- "Finn (Suki) - Bun or bump?",
- "Kingma (Elselijn) - Lady Parts: The Metaphysics of Pregnancy", and
- "Kingma (Elselijn) - Were You Part of Your Mother?".
- A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:-
- "Bailey (Andrew M.) - The Elimination Argument", Bailey
- "Blatti (Stephan) & Snowdon (Paul), Eds - Animalism: Introduction", Blatti & Snowdon
- "Hudson (Hud) - I am Not an Animal!", Hudson
- "Lowe (E.J.) - Subjects of Experience", Lowe
- "Moran (Alexander P.) - Animalism and the Thinking Parts Problem", Moran, 2016
- "Olson (Eric) - Human Atoms", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - The Remnant-Person Problem", Olson, 2016
- "Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Animals", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Brains", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - What Are We? What Now?", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - The Role of the Brainstem in Personal Identity", Olson
- "Parfit (Derek) - We Are Not Human Beings", Parfit
- "Petrus (Klaus), Ed. - On Human Persons", Petrus
→ "Puhl (Klaus) - Review of Klaus Petrus's 'On Human Persons'", Puhl
- "Reid (Mark D.) - A Case in Which Two Persons Exist in One Animal", Reid
- "Shoemaker (David) - The Stony Metaphysical Heart of Animalism", Shoemaker
- "Snowdon (Paul) - Animalism and the Unity of Consciousness", Snowdon
- "Snowdon (Paul) - Multiple Personality Disorder", Snowdon
- "Toner (Patrick) - Hylemorphic animalism", Toner
- Dicephalus & Conjoined Twins19
→ "Campbell (Tim) & McMahan (Jeff) - Animalism and the Varieties of Conjoined Twinning"
→ "Olson (Eric) - The Metaphysical Implications of Conjoined Twining"
→ "Stone (James L.) & Goodrich (James T.) - The craniopagus malformation: classification and implications for surgical separation"
- "Damschen (Gregor), Gomez-Lobo (Alfonso) & Schonecker (Dieter) - Sixteen Days? A Reply to B. Smith and B. Brogaard on the Beginning of Human Individuals",
- "Gomez-Lobo (Alfonso) - Sortals and Human Beginnings",
- "Oderberg (David) - The Metaphysical Status of the Embryo: Some Arguments Revisited",
- "Smith (Barry) & Brogaard (Berit) - Sixteen Days".
- This is mostly a place-holder21.
- This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (04/12/2019 23:36:58).
- Link to Latest Write-Up Note.
- These strike me as rather feeble, and I suspect them of being straw men.
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