<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Todman (Theo) - Thesis - Bodily Continuity (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_17/PaperSummary_17773.htm">Thesis - Bodily Continuity</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/T/Author_Todman (Theo).htm">Todman (Theo)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: </th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=400><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_17/PaperSummary_17773.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_54.htm">Link to Latest Write-Up Note</A></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><ul type="disc"><li>This pseudo-Paper is intended as the mechanism to record time spent on the Note '<a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_54.htm">Bodily Continuity</A><SUP>1</SUP>' during my Thesis research, as from 2011. </li><li>For the actual time recorded, click on "Paper Summary" above. </li></ul><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><hr><br><B><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17773_2">Write-up</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17773_2"></A></u> (as at 24/04/2018 00:12:58): Bodily Continuity</B><BR><br><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17773_3">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>3</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17773_3"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Historically, philosophers have been divided into those that hold that <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_734.htm">our</A><SUP>4</SUP> <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_91.htm">persistence criteria</A><SUP>5</SUP> are fundamentally <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_114.htm">psychological</A><SUP>6</SUP>,<a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm"><SUP>7</SUP></A> and those that think they are fundamentally <a name="6"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_15.htm">physical</A><SUP>8</SUP>. </li><li>The classic paper that wrestles with this dilemma is <a name="36"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_423.htm">Williams (Bernard) - The Self and the Future</A>".</li><li><a name="46"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/W/Author_Williams (Bernard).htm">Bernard Williams</A> is sometimes thought of as an <a name="7"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_50.htm">Animalist</A><SUP>9</SUP>, possibly <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17773_10">because</A></U><SUB>10</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17773_10"></A> he s inclined to accept the Bodily Continuity (as against the <a name="8"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">Psychological Continuity</A><SUP>11</SUP>) approach to Personal Identity. But, this is probably a mistake, because:- <ol type="i"><li>The  Bodily Continuity view of personal identity is not to be confused with <a name="9"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">Animalism</A><SUP>12</SUP>, which requires the <a name="10"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_53.htm">Biological View</A><SUP>13</SUP>. The Bodily Continuity view is consistent with my persisting as a <a name="11"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_66.htm">Cyborg</A><SUP>14</SUP> or even an <a name="12"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_51.htm">Android</A><SUP>15</SUP>. See <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17773_16">also</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17773_16"></A> <a name="13"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_47.htm">Siliconisation</A><SUP>17</SUP>. </li><li>Also, the <a name="14"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_91.htm">persistence conditions</A><SUP>18</SUP> of <a name="15"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_18.htm">bodies</A><SUP>19</SUP> differ from those of <a name="16"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_113.htm">organisms</A><SUP>20</SUP> in general or (human) <a name="17"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_30.htm">animals</A><SUP>21</SUP> in particular. Consider the arguments about <a name="18"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_65.htm">corpses</A><SUP>22</SUP>, which gives rise to the  Corpse Problem , an attempted <a name="19"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_112.htm">refutation of animalism</A><SUP>23</SUP>. </li></ol></li><li><a name="47"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/B/Author_Baker (Lynne Rudder).htm">Lynne Rudder Baker</A> consistently contrasts her <a name="20"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_25.htm">Constitution View</A><SUP>24</SUP> with that of a bodily view, rather than a biological view. She considers that we <a name="21"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_9.htm">persons</A><SUP>25</SUP> are <a name="22"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_62.htm">constituted</A><SUP>26</SUP> (maybe temporarily) by our <a name="23"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_18.htm">bodies</A><SUP>27</SUP>. </li><li><a name="48"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/O/Author_Olson (Eric).htm">Eric Olson</A> distinguishes between <a name="24"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_113.htm">organisms</A><SUP>28</SUP> and bodies, and is doubtful about the existence of the <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17773_29">latter</A></U><SUB>29</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17773_29"></A>. But he would disagree with Baker even if she claimed that we were constituted by human animals. </li><li>Note also, the <a name="25"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_60.htm">distinction</A><SUP>30</SUP> between <a name="26"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_17.htm">continuity</A><SUP>31</SUP> and connectedness. Continuity is critical to the persistence of bodies, but it is doubtful whether connectedness is. You could probably replace all the parts of a body over time, provided this is done gradually enough, and retain the same body (this is certainly true of organisms). However, it is said by some (eg. <a name="27"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_89.htm">Parfit</A><SUP>32</SUP>) that a psychology disconnected from, though continuous with, another is not the same person. See his discussion of <a name="28"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_45.htm">Methuselah</A><SUP>33</SUP>. </li><li>It seems to me that both the biological view and the bodily continuity view would (theoretically, at least) allow for <a name="29"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_37.htm">metamorphosis</A><SUP>34</SUP> (provided, in the former case, that the <a name="30"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_37.htm">metamorphosis</A><SUP>35</SUP> is into another organism). There are, however, <a name="31"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">sortal</A><SUP>36</SUP> objections to <a name="32"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_37.htm">metamorphosis</A><SUP>37</SUP>. </li><li>Just what a  body is, and what the persistence criteria of bodies are, will be discussed in two other Notes:- <BR>&rarr; <a name="33"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_18.htm">Body</A><SUP>38</SUP>, and <BR>&rarr; <a name="34"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_907.htm">Body Criterion</A><SUP>39</SUP>. <BR>However, I ve not quite decided how the labour would be best distributed between these three Notes. I have parked the bulk of the reading lists under  Body . </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17773_40">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>40</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17773_40"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17773_41">include</A></U><SUB>41</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17773_41"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li><a name="37"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4982.htm">Beck (Simon) - Back To The Self And The Future</A>", Beck</li><li><a name="38"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3972.htm">Noonan (Harold) - The Self and the Future</A>", Noonan</li><li><a name="39"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5254.htm">Odegard (Douglas) - Personal and Bodily Identity</A>", Odegard</li><li><a name="40"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2437.htm">Williams (Bernard) - Bodily Continuity and Personal Identity</A>", Williams</li><li><a name="41"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_423.htm">Williams (Bernard) - The Self and the Future</A>", Williams</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li><a name="42"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6022.htm">Coburn (Robert) - Bodily Continuity and Personal Identity</A>", Coburn</li><li><a name="43"></a>"<A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_06/PaperSummary_6027.htm">Gale (Richard) - A Note on Personal Identity and Bodily Continuity</A>", Gale</li><li><a name="44"></a>"<A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_06/PaperSummary_6023.htm">Shorter (J.M.) - More About Bodily Continuity and Personal Identity</A>", Shorter</li><li><a name="45"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17139.htm">Wiggins (David) - Essentialism, Continuity, and Identity</A>", Wiggins</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="35"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_737.htm">place-holder</A><SUP>42</SUP>. </li></ul><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_P17773_2"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17773_2"><B>Footnote 2</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (24/04/2018 00:12:58). </li><li><A HREF = "../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_54.htm">Link to Latest Write-Up Note</A>. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P17773_3"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17773_3"><B>Footnote 3</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P17773_10"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17773_10"><B>Footnote 10</A></B></U>: According to most interpreters<a name="On-Page_Link_P17773_16"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17773_16"><B>Footnote 16</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Though the Note on Siliconisation focuses on the replacement of <U>neural</U> organic matter by silicon, the general idea could (more easily, as the technology is already partly there) be extended to the replacement of other body parts. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P17773_29"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17773_29"><B>Footnote 29</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is to get round the  Corpse Problem noted previously. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P17773_40"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17773_40"><B>Footnote 40</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P17773_41"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17773_41"><B>Footnote 41</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; 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