<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Todman (Theo) - Thesis - Brain Criterion (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_17/PaperSummary_17777.htm">Thesis - Brain Criterion</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/T/Author_Todman (Theo).htm">Todman (Theo)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: </th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=600><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_17/PaperSummary_17777.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_17/PapersToNotes_17777.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_909.htm">Link to Latest Write-Up Note</A></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><ul type="disc"><li>This pseudo-Paper is intended as the mechanism to record time spent on the Note '<a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_909.htm">Brain Criterion</A><SUP>1</SUP>' during my Thesis research, as from 2011. </li><li>For the actual time recorded, click on "Paper Summary" above. </li></ul><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><hr><br><B><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17777_2">Write-up</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17777_2"></A></u> (as at 14/03/2018 10:07:41): Brain Criterion</B><BR><br><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17777_3">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>3</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17777_3"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>There will naturally be some overlap on this topic with the topics of <BR>&rarr; <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_55.htm">Brains</A><SUP>4</SUP> and <BR>&rarr; <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_904.htm">Criteria of Identity</A><SUP>5</SUP>. </li><li>The question is whether the brain is the be-all and end-all of the matter of personal identity for <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_75.htm">human persons</A><SUP>6</SUP>. </li><li>It is acknowledged by most that  conceptually at least  there can be <a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_9.htm">persons</A><SUP>7</SUP> that are not humans (ie. not members of the species <em>homo sapiens</em>)  whether these persons be non-human animals, computers, God, angels, aliens or whatever. Non-animals presumably have no brains, though aliens presumably have a brain-analogue, so brains cannot be identity-criteria for personhood as such (indeed, we might argue that there <U>are</U> no criteria for persons as <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17777_8">such</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17777_8"></A>). But for animal-persons (human or otherwise), the brain seems to occupy a central place, both as the seat of psychology (in the absence of an immaterial <a name="6"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_100.htm">soul</A><SUP>9</SUP>) and as the regulator of the body. </li><li>So, the story would go, X is the same person as Y <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17777_10">iff</A></U><SUB>10</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17777_10"></A> X has the same brain as Y. </li><li>The trouble is  even if this claim is along the right lines  we can press matters further, and ask whether the <U>whole</U> brain is strictly necessary. If what impresses us is a brain-based psychological view, when what we imagine is  really the minimal me is the pair of psychology-bearing cerebral hemispheres, then we might imagine (as some philosophers have) a case of <a name="7"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_33.htm">fission</A><SUP>11</SUP>, where  after equalising the hemispheres in psychological potency, we <a name="8"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplant</A><SUP>12</SUP> one into another body lacking both hemispheres. Or, without needing anything so radical, we sever the corpus callosum in a <a name="9"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_116.htm">commissurotomy</A><SUP>13</SUP>, thereby (on this view) creating two persons in one body. </li><li>However, if we are <a name="10"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_50.htm">animalists</A><SUP>14</SUP>,<a name="11"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm"><SUP>15</SUP></A> wondering what the  minimal animal is, and it s the command-and-control functions of the brain that impress us, then the paring-down process <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17777_16">might</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17777_16"></A> be able to do without the cerebral hemispheres (or at least the psychology-bearing parts) altogether. So, brain-based views from different perspectives might come to different conclusions about the importance of the cerebral hemispheres  one view might make them essential, the other irrelevant to questions of identity (if not to  <a name="12"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_108.htm">what matters</A><SUP>17</SUP> ). It is an empirical question whether the brain-stem can be divided, and hence whether a brain-based animalist approach is also subject to <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17777_18">worries</A></U><SUB>18</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17777_18"></A> about fission. </li><li>Anyway, the appropriateness of the Brain criterion of personal identity depends on <a name="13"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_734.htm">what we are</A><SUP>19</SUP> in particular whether we are (most fundamentally, or in the sense of numerical identity, which is not the same thing) human animals or persons <a name="14"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_62.htm">constituted by</A><SUP>20</SUP> them (or various other things). </li><li><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17777_21">Only if</A></U><SUB>21</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17777_21"></A> we believe that we are (identical to) <a name="15"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_55.htm">brains</A><SUP>22</SUP> will we adopt the brain criterion. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17777_23">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>23</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17777_23"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17777_24">include</A></U><SUB>24</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17777_24"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li><a name="22"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3742.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Criteria of Personal Identity</A>", Garrett</li><li><a name="23"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_262.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17777_25">Johnston</A></U><SUB>25</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17777_25"></A></li><li><a name="24"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15413.htm">Manninen (Tuomas) - Review of Alva Noe's 'Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain'</A>", Manninen</li><li><a name="25"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3963.htm">Noonan (Harold) - An Initial Survey</A>", Noonan</li><li><a name="26"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3583.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Nagel's Brain</A>", Parfit</li><li><a name="27"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21029.htm">Snowdon (Paul) - The Self and Personal Identity</A>", Snowdon</li><li><a name="28"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16540.htm">Thomas (Janice L.) - The bodily criterion</A>", Thomas</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li><a name="31"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3602.htm">Noe (Alva) - Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness</A>", Noe</li><li><a name="29"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12013.htm">Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Brains</A>", Olson</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="16"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_737.htm">place-holder</A><SUP>26</SUP>. </li></ul><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_P17777_2"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17777_2"><B>Footnote 2</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (14/03/2018 10:07:41). </li><li><A HREF = "../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_909.htm">Link to Latest Write-Up Note</A>. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P17777_3"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17777_3"><B>Footnote 3</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P17777_8"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17777_8"><B>Footnote 8</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Hasn t someone said this? Who? <a name="17"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_109.htm">Wiggins</a>? </li><li>This is not to be confused with there being no criteria for <u>identity</u>, which is due to Merricks (eg. in <a name="30"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3448.htm">Merricks (Trenton) - There Are No Criteria For Identity Over Time</A>").</li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P17777_10"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17777_10"><B>Footnote 10</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>And, of course,  X and Y are both persons , to cover the case where the brain is insufficient to support the property of <a name="18"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_9.htm">personhood</a>. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P17777_16"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17777_16"><B>Footnote 16</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Much of this discussion has empirical aspects to it, and depends on the capabilities of real brains  though we might get into the choppy waters of more intricate <a name="19"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_32.htm">TEs</a>, and wonder what might be the case if the biology went differently  but then we would most likely not be talking about <U>our</U> identity criteria, but of some other being. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P17777_18"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17777_18"><B>Footnote 18</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>These worries about fission are essentially set to rest by adopting a <a name="20"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_42.htm">perdurantist</a> account of persistence. </li><li>But, some consider the costs (mainly semantic, I think) of adopting this approach are too great. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P17777_21"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17777_21"><B>Footnote 21</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>But see the Note on Johnston below! </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P17777_23"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17777_23"><B>Footnote 23</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P17777_24"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17777_24"><B>Footnote 24</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P17777_25"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17777_25"><B>Footnote 25</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Johnston thinks we are <a name="21"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_74.htm">human beings</a>, but  when push comes to shove  we would survive as brains, so the criteria of our identity are  for Johnston  brain based. </li></ul> <FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-17T12:08" pubdate>17/08/2018 12:08:01</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>