- This pseudo-Paper is intended as the mechanism to record time spent on the Note 'Clones1' during my Thesis research, as from 2011.
- For the actual time recorded, click on "Paper Summary" above.
Write-up2 (as at 11/04/2018 10:06:14): Clones
- Cloning is related to – or is involved in the analysis of – topics such as4
→ Resurrection8 / Reincarnation9,
→ Teletransportation10 (Note11).
- Cloning also features in12 several TEs13.
- We need to contrast:-
- The metaphysical possibility of atom-by-atom cloning, with …
- Biological cloning which uses existing structures, and interferes unnaturally in a fairly minor way.
- I am not concerned (as far as my thesis goes) with the medical ethics of biological cloning. There is never any suggestion that clones in this sense are logically identical, any more than so-called identical twins are.
- That said, there is something of a link – in the metaphysics, if not the ethics – with a critique of Parfit14’s “identity doesn’t matter” account of personal identity.
- Since my clone has my (innate) properties and capacities, Parfit might think I have all that matters (or much of what matters) to me if my clone, rather than I myself, survives and I do not.
- The papers by Agar and Brennan seem to follow this approach.
- In particular, the paper by Brennan suggests that persons might be types rather than tokens which – while an interesting proposal – is about as far from the truth as you can get. Tokens suffer, types do not, qua types. On token of the same type may be luxuriating white another is being tortured.
- What I am interested in is whether atom-by-atom cloning (where the original exemplar is destroyed) can ever preserve identity. Because of the logical possibility of the non-destruction of the “original”, I take it that it cannot. This argument depends on modal logic – and the rejection of the possibility of contingent identity15. For further discussion, see under Teletransportation16.
- We may also need to discuss causality17 to further explain why identity is not preserved. This is particularly the case when discussing Dean Zimmerman’s Falling Elevator model of resurrection18, where – it is supposed – there is a causal connection between the expiring body and its clone19 in the next world.
- The very term CLONING seems to deny the possibility of the logical identity of an original and its clone. It implies that there are two things – the original and the clone – and two things can never be one thing, so cannot be logically identical.
- A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:-
- "Agar (Nicholas) - Cloning and Identity", 2003, Agar
- "Brennan (Andrew) - Survival", 1984, Brennan
- "Gale (Richard) - On Some Pernicious Thought-Experiments", 1991, Gale
- "Ishiguro (Kazuo) - Never Let Me Go", 2005, Ishiguro20
- "Johnston (Mark) - A New Refutation Of Death", 2010, Johnston
- "Kamm (F.M.) - Moral Status and Personal Identity: Clones, Embryos, and Future Generations", 2005, Kamm
- "Nussbaum (Martha) & Sunstein (Cass), Eds. - Clones and Clones: Facts and Fantasies About Human Cloning", 1998, Nussbaum21
- "Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Immortality", 2009, Shoemaker
- This Note is mostly a place-holder22. See the categorised reading-list below, which includes a lot of irrelevant items to do with the ethics of biological cloning.
- This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (11/04/2018 10:06:14).
- Link to Latest Write-Up Note.
- A number of my philosophical Notes are “promissory notes” currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned.
- I’ve decided to add some text – whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive – for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.
- As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance.
- The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists.
- I’ve included the papers primarily treating of these topics under the reading list for this topic where they mention cloning, though they will feature elsewhere.
Footnote 12: Footnote 19:
- This is sometimes rather tendentiously referred to as “Telecloning”.
- Yet, calling it “Teletransportation” is equally tendentious, and
- “Telecloning” has at least the virtue of beig the correct description!
- See "Brennan (Andrew) - Survival".
- Is it agreed that this is indeed a clone, as it seems to be, or …
- Is this body supposed to be the same body, created by supernatural processes by immanent causation – albeit across space and maybe other dimensions – much as a body at one time is self-identical to a body at a later time by natural metabolic processes.
- This would imply – in the absence of perdurantism – the non-identity of the living organism and the post-mortem corpse.
- See "Hershenov (David) - Van Inwagen, Zimmerman, and the Materialist Conception of Resurrection" for the argument that Zimmerman’s resurrected body is a duplicate.
- This is even less relevant than Nussbaum – being a novel. It raises ethical questions in a futuristic situation.
- This book is concerned with the ethics of medical cloning, so is mostly tangential to my concerns.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018