<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Todman (Theo) - Thesis - Concepts (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_17/PaperSummary_17790.htm">Thesis - Concepts</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/T/Author_Todman (Theo).htm">Todman (Theo)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: </th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=400><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_17/PaperSummary_17790.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_23.htm">Link to Latest Write-Up Note</A></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><ul type="disc"><li>This pseudo-Paper is intended as the mechanism to record time spent on the Note '<a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_23.htm">Concepts</A><SUP>1</SUP>' during my Thesis research, as from 2011. </li><li>For the actual time recorded, click on "Paper Summary" above. </li></ul><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><hr><br><B><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17790_2">Write-up</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17790_2"></A></u> (as at 04/02/2018 11:29:46): Concepts</B><BR><br><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17790_3">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>3</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17790_3"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>See <a name="10"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1375.htm">Unger (Peter) - I Do Not Exist</A>" for the importance of concepts. Unger s answer to the problem of vagueness  as exemplified by the  disappearing chair problem (atom-wise annihilation of the chair & just when does it cease to be?) is that there never were any chairs, just our concept of a chair and atoms arranged chair-wise. We sit on the atoms, not on the concept, but we describe the atom-heap as a chair. But this concept is vague, or there is a family resemblance, so sometimes it s not clear whether it applies or not. The big question is whether <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kind</A><SUP>4</SUP> objects exist independently of our conceptual schemes. Certainly they do as atom-heaps, unclear whether they do as answers to our concepts. So, various atom-heaps carry on existing, but whether our concepts carry on applying is vague. </li><li>Others (<a name="17"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/V/Author_Van Inwagen (Peter).htm">Peter Van Inwagen</A><a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_737.htm">?</A><SUP>5</SUP>) take the view that only mereological simples and organisms exist, which seems to be a similar view. </li><li>There seems to be something special about natural-kind concepts, the persistence of whose exemplars (unlike those of artefact-concepts) don t in any sense seem to depend on us and our concepts. Is <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_9.htm">PERSON</A><SUP>6</SUP> a natural kind concept? If it isn t, then are we simply left with rather inconsequential <a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_99.htm">semantic</A><SUP>7</SUP> arguments? </li><li>Are the arguments above really saying that artefacts don t exist? Presumably artefacts depend on us for their existence as <a name="6"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_52.htm">artefacts</A><SUP>8</SUP>, though not as lumps of matter. </li><li><a name="18"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/B/Author_Baker (Lynne Rudder).htm">Lynne Rudder Baker</A> argues that a new <a name="7"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_8.htm">ontological</A><SUP>9</SUP> entity (a painting) comes into existence because of the relation of an object (a canvas plus paint appropriately distributed) to an art-world. I need to press Baker here. Are all her analogies truly analogous? Given evolution, even species-concepts (paradigms for natural kind concepts) are mobile rather than being eternally fixed. Yet Baker seems to think that it s a relation to evolutionary history that makes an <a name="8"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_30.htm">animal</A><SUP>10</SUP> what it is (as distinct, presumably, from atoms arranged animal-wise).</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17790_11">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17790_11"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17790_12">include</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17790_12"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li><a name="11"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1375.htm">Unger (Peter) - I Do Not Exist</A>", Unger</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17790_13">elsewhere</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17790_13"></A>) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li><a name="12"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20169.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Everyday Concepts as a Guide to Reality</A>", Baker</li><li><a name="13"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21466.htm">Carruthers (Peter) - Invertebrate concepts confront the Generality Constraint (and win)</A>", Carruthers</li><li><a name="19"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_227.htm">Margolis (Eric) & Laurence (Stephen), Eds. - Concepts - Core Readings</A>", Margolis</li><li><a name="14"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20503.htm">McGinn (Colin) - Conceptual Causation: Some Elementary Reflections</A>", McGinn</li><li><a name="15"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20016.htm">Stephan (Achim) - Are Animals Capable of Concepts?</A>", Stephan</li><li><a name="16"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22768.htm">Wiggins (David) - The Concept of the Subject Contains the Concept of the Predicate</A>", Wiggins</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="9"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_737.htm">place-holder</A><SUP>14</SUP>. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_P17790_2"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17790_2"><B>Footnote 2</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (04/02/2018 11:29:46). </li><li><A HREF = "../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_23.htm">Link to Latest Write-Up Note</A>. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P17790_3"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17790_3"><B>Footnote 3</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P17790_11"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17790_11"><B>Footnote 11</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P17790_12"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17790_12"><B>Footnote 12</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P17790_13"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17790_13"><B>Footnote 13</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I ve also added a few interesting but maybe tangential papers!</li><li>These may expand the scope of this Note. </li></ul> <FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-13T13:19" pubdate>13/08/2018 13:19:31</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>