- This pseudo-Paper is intended as the mechanism to record time spent on the Note 'Continuity1' during my Thesis research, as from 2011.
- For the actual time recorded, click on "Paper Statistics" above.
Write-up2 (as at 15/09/2020 23:57:07): Continuity
- Continuity is one of the principle factors taken into account when determining or deciding whether an object of whatever sort has survived4 some change5.
- “Spatio-temporal” continuity is usually what is intended, though this might be deemed to beg the question against the Psychological View6 of Personal Identity.
- The change must not be too radical or too swift.
- In particular, it is usually held that
- An object cannot survive the loss of one of its essential properties7.
- Nor can it change too many of its parts at once, though some things may change all of their parts over time provided change is gradual8.
- Nor can it change sortal9, which makes radical metamorphosis10 impossible.
- In all of the above cases there is deemed to be insufficient continuity between successive stages of a thing to allow for its persistence11.
- This topic – and the associated reading material – is also covered further under the heads of the following specific applications of continuity:-
→ Connectedness vs Continuity12,
→ Physical Continuity13,
→ Psychological Continuity14, and
→ Psychological Continuity – Forward15.
- For a Page of Links16 to this Note, Click here. There are far too many “hits” for an updating run. I’ve focussed on items with “Continuity” in the title. I’ve ignored items focusing on Psychological Continuity, which has its own Note.
- Works on this topic that I’ve actually read17 include the following:-
- "Hirsch (Eli) - Continuity", Hirsch
- "Oderberg (David) - Continuity as the Criterion of Identity Over Time: The Classical Theory of Continuity", Oderberg
- "Williams (Bernard) - Bodily Continuity and Personal Identity", Williams
- A further reading list might start with:-
- "Brennan (Andrew) - Discontinuity and Identity", Brennan
- "Brennan (Andrew) - Identity and Continuity", Brennan
- "Brennan (Andrew) - Identity and Discontinuity", Brennan
- "Coburn (Robert) - Bodily Continuity and Personal Identity", Coburn
- "Coburn (Robert) - Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity", Coburn
- "Elliot (Robert) - Personal Identity And The Causal Continuity Requirement", Elliott
- "Hall (D. Geoffrey) - Continuity and the Persistence of Objects: When the Whole Is Greater Than the Sum of the Parts", Hall
- "Kilborn (William) - Contact and Continuity", Kilborn
- "LePoidevin (Robin) - Continuants and Continuity", LePoidevin
- "Oderberg (David) - Continuity as the Criterion of Identity Over Time: Continuity Without Stages?", Oderberg
- "Oderberg (David) - The Myth of Continuity: A Coherent Ontology?", Oderberg
- "Park (Desiree) - Persons and Continuity", Park
- "Runggaldier (Edmund) - Sortal Continuity of Material Things", Runggaldier
- "Scaltsas (Theodore) - Identity, Origin and Spatiotemporal Continuity", Scaltsas
- "Wiggins (David) - Identity & Spatio-temporal Continuity", Wiggins
- This is mostly a place-holder18.
- This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (15/09/2020 23:57:07).
- Link to Latest Write-Up Note.
- I don’t think this “gradual” means “slowly”, though this will usually be the case.
- What is needed is for there to be many intermediate steps to allow continuity.
- Each change involved in each of the steps has to be “minor”.
- All this is somewhat vague.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020