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Write-up₁ (as at 27/07/2026 23:21:07): Corpses

Plug Note²

• Thesis Text:
  1. The “Corpse Problem”
     • Corpses are troublesome³ for animalism⁴, which alleges (correctly in my view) that corpses are not animals⁵.
     • The claim is that, at death⁶, something ontologically⁷ new comes on the scene – because a corpse has different persistence⁸ conditions⁹ (those of masses of matter¹⁰) to those of organisms¹¹.
     • Some philosophers – eg. Fred Feldman, in "Feldman (Fred) - The Survival of Death" – disagree. Feldman claims that we survive¹² death¹³, but – rather disappointingly – as a corpse, which solves the “corpse problem”, but at the cost – most likely – of saying that we are bodies¹⁴ rather than organisms¹⁵.
     • The problem if we don’t survive death as our corpses – it is said – is to answer the question where the corpse comes from, and to answer the objection that if it was there all along – as a “corpse-to-be” – then we have a situation where we have two things of different sorts¹⁶ in the same place¹⁷ at the same time.
     • If this is taken seriously, then it can be used against the form of the animalist’s “too many thinkers¹⁸” argument.
     • I’m willing to accept that this “thinking animal” argument is unsound. However, just how the analogy would work for the “corpse-to-be” needs to be spelled out. The corpse has the persistence conditions¹⁹ of a mass of matter²⁰. What are the persistence conditions²¹ of the “corpse-to-be”? If they are those of an organism²², then the corpse-to-be cannot be the same individual²³ as the corpse. The Constitution View²⁴ might be happy with this situation, promoting the idea that persons are constitute by bodies²⁵ (rather than organisms) but what about Animalism?
     • I think the issue is again a parallelism in argumentation (the fetus problem for the CV versus the corpse problem for Animalism). We don’t need to follow this argumentative line.
     • The problem is discussed in the following works:-
       → "Markosian (Ned) - Three Problems for Olson's Account of Personal Identity"
       → "Olson (Eric) - Replies to Baker, Markosian & Zimmerman"
       → "Olson (Eric) - Animalism and the Corpse Problem"
       → "Carter (William) - Will I Be a Dead Person?"
       → "Hershenov (David) - Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem for Biological Approaches to Personal Identity"
       → "Olson (Eric) - The Person and the Corpse"
       For now I’ll just transcribe my notes thereon …
     • "Markosian (Ned) - Three Problems for Olson's Account of Personal Identity"
       1. Proponents of the psychological view (PV) have a Fetus Problem, but animalists have an analogous Corpse Problem. While the person pops into existence after the fetus (a problem for the PV) the corpse pops into existence after the animal’s demise (a problem for the animalist).
       2. This summary is a bit quick. What Markosian actually says is that the supporter of the PV faces a dilemma. Since they have to deny that they were a fetus (as fetuses don’t have any psychological properties), they have a choice:-
          1. You replaced your fetus.
          2. Your fetus continued to exist and shares space, parts and matter with you.
       3. Markosian doesn’t like either horn, but thinks the animalist has a similar problem, as is argued in "Carter (William) - Will I Be a Dead Person?". This is the Corpse Problem, but before considering it, we must note that the CV finds no problem with the second option – cohabitation – claiming that constitution gets round this worry.
       4. The Corpse Problem arises because if your persistence conditions are those of an organism, and a corpse is not an organism, then you are not identical to your corpse. Markosian thinks this leaves the animalist with a trilemma:-
          1. When you die, a new object comes into existence.
          2. When you die, nothing is left, not even a corpse – corpses do not exist.
          3. You cohabit space with, and share matter with, a thing that is non-identical with you that will become your corpse.
       5. Markosian thinks this is a problem, because he doesn’t like any of these options, but thinks that he is a physical thing, with the persistence conditions of physical things, and that a physical thing continues after death, and that physical thing – your body – is you as long as it exists. Olson rightly objects to this view – the PCs of animals aren’t at all like the PCs of lumps of matter.
       6. Markosian thinks (rightly) that as Olson is suspicious of bodies, he’ll be suspicious of corpses too, and so will go for option (ii). He thinks other animalists will go for option (i). Again, he ignores the CV whereby option (iii) is not a problem. The dialectical position here, of course, is that considerations concerning the objectionabilty of (iii) – cohabitation – are central to Olson’s main argument for animalism. I don’t think he needs that argument, so should accept (iii).
          
     • "Olson (Eric) - Replies to Baker, Markosian & Zimmerman"
       1. Olson notes that many critics of "Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology" have accepted that we are animals, that psychology has nothing to do with our identity-conditions, yet have balked at Olson’s account of animal identity. While he hasn’t seen a better account, he would view one as a friendly improvement on his own theory.
       2. The reason he thinks animals cease to exist when they die is that the PCs of corpses are radically different from those of animals.
       3. Olson even seems to doubt the existence of corpses. Why is this? Is that because he’s worried by the “corpse to be” problem, where we would have too many thinkers?
       4. What would the PCs of corpses be? Similar to other inanimate things – such as statues, if there are such things! He considers some possibilities. Retention of shape; the bulk of atoms; gradual change.
       5. What it takes for a living organism to persist is entirely different. There are radical changes of shape from embryo to adult. The adult can survive losses of arms and legs. It might even survive paring down to a head on life-support. It survives because its biological life continues.
       6. Consequently, because the PCs of organism and corpse are so different, he can think of no (disjunctive?) account that covers both. But if there is one, he’d welcome it.
       7. He covers these matters further in "Olson (Eric) - Animalism and the Corpse Problem".
          
     • "Olson (Eric) - Animalism and the Corpse Problem"
       1. The apparent fact that each of us coincides with a thinking animal²⁶ looks like a strong argument for our being animals (animalism). Some critics, however, claim that this sort of reasoning actually undermines animalism²⁷. According to them, the apparent fact that each human animal²⁸ coincides with a thinking body that is not an animal is an equally strong argument for our not being animals. I argue that the critics' case fails for reasons that do not affect the case for animalism.
          
     • "Carter (William) - Will I Be a Dead Person?"
       1. Eric Olson argues from the fact that we once existed as fetal individuals to the conclusion that the standard view of personal identity is mistaken.
       2. I shall establish that a similar argument focusing upon dead people opposes Olson's favored biological view of personal identity.
       3. Rejection of the identity claim that raises the fetal problem;
       4. Analysis of the Biological View and standard view of personal identity;
       5. Eliminativist position of corpses in regard to their biological and psychological activity.
          
     • "Hershenov (David) - Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem for Biological Approaches to Personal Identity"
       1. Part of the appeal of the biological approach to personal identity is that it does not have to countenance spatially coincident entities. But if the termination thesis is correct and the organism ceases to exist at death, then it appears that the corpse is a dead body that earlier was a living body and distinct from but spatially coincident with the organism. If the organism is identified with the body, then the unwelcome spatial coincidence could perhaps be avoided. It is argued that such an identification would be a mistake. A living organism has a different part/whole relationship and persistence conditions than the alleged body. A case will be made that the concept ‘human body’ is a conceptual mess, vague in an unprincipled manner, and that an eliminativist stance towards dead bodies is the appropriate response.
          
     • "Olson (Eric) - The Person and the Corpse"
       1. What happens to us when we die, if there is no afterlife? We might cease to exist, or continue existing as corpses. The view that we become corpses is hard to defend, because it makes it hard to say what our identity over time could consist in. The view that we cease to exist is little better: it seems to imply that there are no such things as corpses. A satisfying metaphysics of death is elusive.
       2. Sections
          → The Person and the Corpse
          → Pluralism
          → Speaking of the Dead
          → The Person/Body Argument
          → The Essentialism Argument
          → The Psychological-Continuity Argument
          → The Dead-Animal Argument
          → Animals and Corpses
          → The Annihilationist’s Dilemma
          → Animal Identity
          → The Historic-Dependence Account
          → Troubles for Historic Dependence
          → Pluralism and Corpse Eliminitivism
  2. Resurrection
     • Corpses are probably also important for most Christian materialists²⁹ who hope for some form of resurrection³⁰.
     • If there is a corpse to be resurrected³¹, it is easier to see how identity is preserved than if we have total destruction. This is obviously so in the case of resuscitation, but even where we have a real case of death³² – not just clinical death, or brain death³³, but real death with a bit of mouldering – there is some physical thing that is responsible for preserving identity.

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  Further Remarks:
  1. This Note overlaps somewhat with the following:-
     • Death³⁴, and
     • Resurrection³⁵
  2. I have tried to avoid items appearing in their reading-lists from the reading lists below.