- This pseudo-Paper is intended as the mechanism to record time spent on the Note 'Dualism1' during my Thesis research, as from 2011.
- For the actual time recorded, click on "Paper Summary" above.
Write-up2 (as at 12/07/2018 17:41:17): Dualism
- I have no great interest in dualism as a thesis in the philosophy of mind. I’m a card-carrying materialist. Consequently, I’ve ignored the great bulk of the works on dualism4 in the categorised reading-list below with the exception of those that relate it to the topic of Personal Identity.
- That said, it would be worth reading the following:-
→ "Robinson (Howard) - Dualism (Stanford)"
→ "Robinson (Howard) - Dualism (Blackwell)"
- However, this topic is important to my research interests because if mind-body substance dualism is true, then animalism5 is false6.
- Also, if dualism is false, I argue that resurrection7 or reincarnation8 is impossible9.
- If dualism is true, the possibility of teletransportation10 is even less likely than would be the case were materialism true. How would the immaterial soul make it to the new location and be re-united with its reconstituted or newly-constituted body?
- There would seem to be the risk of an overlap between this Note and two others, which also overlap with one another:-
→ Soul Criterion12.
I intend to leave anything specific to Souls to one of the above Notes.
- Dualism is unfashionable these days, which makes it a temptation to ignore. Well-known dualists include:-
- Richard Swinburne, and
- Dean Zimmerman.
- The primary text ought to be
→ "Swinburne (Richard) - Personal Identity: The Dualist Theory"
- Time was when all Christians were dualists, but now there is a sub-group of Christian Materialists13. Here’s a skirmish between Baker and Zimmerman … with more from both of them in the general reading list.
→ "Zimmerman (Dean) - Christians Should Affirm Mind-Body Dualism"
→ "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Reply to Zimmerman’s 'Christians Should Affirm Mind-Body Dualism'"
→ "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Christians Should Reject Mind-Body Dualism"
→ "Zimmerman (Dean) - Reply to Baker's 'Christians Should Reject Mind-Body Dualism'"
- For a page of Links14 to this Note, Click here. Unfortunately, far too many to be any use at this stage.
- Works on this topic that I’ve actually read15, include16 the following:-
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Christians Should Reject Mind-Body Dualism", Baker
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Reply to Zimmerman’s 'Christians Should Affirm Mind-Body Dualism'", Baker
- "Carruthers (Peter) - Dualism: Body and Soul", Carruthers
- "Carruthers (Peter) - Strong Dualism: Body and Soul", Carruthers
- "Chalmers (David) - How Cartesian Dualism Might Have Been True", Chalmers
- "Corcoran (Kevin) - Dualist Views of Human Persons", Corcoran
- "Kagan (Shelly) - The nature of persons: dualism versus physicalism", Kagan
- "Robinson (Howard) - Dualism (Stanford)", Robinson
- "Rozemond (Marleen) - Descartes' Case for Dualism", Rozemond
- "Thomas (Janice L.) - Descartes' arguments for dualism", Thomas
- "Thomas (Janice L.) - Other arguments for dualism", Thomas
- "Thomas (Janice L.) - Criticisms of dualism: is substance dualism tenable?", Thomas
- "Wilson (Margaret) - Descartes: The Epistemological Argument for Mind-Body Distinctness", Wilson
- "Zimmerman (Dean) - Christians Should Affirm Mind-Body Dualism", Zimmerman
- "Zimmerman (Dean) - Reply to Baker's 'Christians Should Reject Mind-Body Dualism'", Zimmerman
- A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:-
- "Armstrong (David) - Dualism", Armstrong
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Need a Christian be a Mind/Body Dualist?", Baker
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Review of 'Contemporary Dualism: A Defense' by Andrea Lavazza and Howard Robinson, Eds", Baker
- "Foster (John) - The Immaterial Self: Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of the Mind", Foster
- "Goetz (Stewart) - Modal Dualism: A Critique", Goetz
- "Hornsby (Jennifer) - Dualism in Action", Hornsby
- "Olson (Eric) - A Compound of Two Substances", Olson
- "Snowdon (Paul) - On Formulating Materialism and Dualism", Snowdon
- "Pietroski (Paul) - Personal Dualism", Pietroski
- "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Immortality and Dualism", Shoemaker
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Dualism and Materialism: Athens and Jerusalem?", Van Inwagen
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Nature of Rational Beings: Dualism and Physicalism", Van Inwagen
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Nature of Rational Beings: Dualism and Personal Identity", Van Inwagen
- "Zimmerman (Dean) - From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism", Zimmerman
- "Zimmerman (Dean) - Materialism, Dualism, and “Simple” Theories of Personal Identity", Zimmerman
- This is mostly a place-holder17.
- This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (12/07/2018 17:41:17).
- Link to Latest Write-Up Note.
Footnote 4: Footnote 6:
- A number of my philosophical Notes are “promissory notes” currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned.
- I’ve decided to add some text – whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive – for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.
- As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance.
- The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists.
- I may need to think this through a bit more.
- The argument would go – from “Sunday school dualism” – that if we have souls, then we can’t be animals, as animals don’t have souls.
- But, dualism is really only claiming that the mental cannot be reduced to the physical. But if this is true of human beings – whatever they are – then it is true of human animals, and all animals with minds. So, the topic might be orthogonal to animalism – the claim that we are animals.
- That said, there is a tradition of treating dualism as more sympathetic to the psychological view of personal identity, that our persistence conditions are mental, which animalism claims to be irrelevant to our identity.
- Well, resurrection of (sufficient of) a corpse would be metaphysically possible, but following the total destruction of the body, there is nothing to carry the identity of the individual.
- If only a “non-updating” run has been made, the links are only one-way – ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven’t yet been confirmed as relevant.
- Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the “Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note” and “Summary of Note Links to this Page” sections) are to the “point of link” within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the “links page” remain generic.
- There are two sorts of updating runs – for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run.
- Frequently I’ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note.
- In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time.
- In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course.
- My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I’ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage.
- I may have read others in between updates of this Note – in which case they will be marked as such in the “References and Reading List” below.
- Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018