- This pseudo-Paper is intended as the mechanism to record time spent on the Note 'Functionalism1' during my Thesis research, as from 2011.
- For the actual time recorded, click on "Paper Statistics" above.
Write-up2 (as at 17/08/2018 17:35:31): Functionalism
- Functionalism is a thesis in the philosophy of mind – originally in contrast to the then alternatives of behaviorism and the identity theory – to the effect that “mental states are identified by what they do rather than by what they are made of” (see "Polger (Thomas) - Functionalism").
- However, it has been co-opted by Sydney Shoemaker to support the cause of the Psychological View4 of PID.
- Consequently, I’ve listed in the reading list below the two papers Shoemaker cites as central to his thesis
- Shoemaker is a materialist5 as far as the mind-body problem is concerned (at least in contrast with Swinburne’s soul view). But, this does not carry over into PID, either as the physical6 view or animalism7.
- I am “against” functionalism in the philosophy of mind, and “against” the psychological view of PID, but need to engage with Shoemaker to explain why.
- For a page of Links8 to this Note, Click here. Too many to follow up at the moment.
- Works on this topic that I’ve actually read9, include10 the following (some of which cover Functionalism only tangentially):-
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - A Farewell to Functionalism", Baker
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Functionalism", Baker
- "Dennett (Daniel) - Where Am I?", Dennett
- "Papineau (David) - Introducing Consciousness", Papineau
- A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:-
- "Agar (Nicholas) - Functionalism and Personal Identity", Agar
- "Cole (David) - Artificial Intelligence and Personal Identity", Cole
- "Davis (Lawrence H.) - Functionalism and Personal Identity", Davis
- "Fuller (Gary) - Functionalism and Personal Identity", Fuller
- "Graham (George) - Mind and Belief in Computers", Graham
- "Kim (Jaegwon) - Mind as a Computer: Machine Functionalism", Kim
- "Lavelle (Suilin) - Minds, Brains and Computers", Lavelle
- "Levin (Janet) - Functionalism", Levin
- "McCullagh (Mark) - Functionalism and self-consciousness", McCullagh
- "Metzinger (Thomas) - Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity", Metzinger
- "Olson (Eric) - What Does Functionalism Tell Us About Personal Identity", Olson
- "Polger (Thomas) - Functionalism", Polger11
- "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Personal Identity: a Materialist Account", Shoemaker12
- "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Self and Substance", Shoemaker
- "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Functionalism and Personal Identity - a Reply", Shoemaker
- "Wilson (David C.) - Functionalism and Moral Personhood: One View Considered", Wilson
- This is mostly a place-holder13.
- This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (17/08/2018 17:35:31).
- Link to Latest Write-Up Note.
- A number of my philosophical Notes are “promissory notes” currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned.
- I’ve decided to add some text – whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive – for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.
- As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance.
- The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists.
- If only a “non-updating” run has been made, the links are only one-way – ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven’t yet been confirmed as relevant.
- Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the “Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note” and “Summary of Note Links to this Page” sections) are to the “point of link” within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the “links page” remain generic.
- There are two sorts of updating runs – for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run.
- Frequently I’ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note.
- In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time.
- In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course.
- My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I’ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage.
- I may have read others in between updates of this Note – in which case they will be marked as such in the “References and Reading List” below.
- Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected.
- This article is about Functionalism in the philosophy of mind, but might provide good background.
- This, and the following paper by Shoemaker, are the targets (says Shoemaker) of the papers by Agar and Olson.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019