- This pseudo-Paper is intended as the mechanism to record time spent on the Note 'Fusion1' during my Thesis research, as from 2011.
- For the actual time recorded, click on "Paper Statistics" above.
Write-up2 (as at 15/02/2018 22:00:29): Fusion
- Like Fission4, though to a lesser degree, Fusion is important in the philosophy of identity – especially of personal identity – in that it provides many thought-experiments5 (TEs), and some real-life examples, that test out the various theories.
- We need to consider the merger of the two psychologies6: Parfit thinks we might like to inherit some of the better characteristics of our partner, as in a marriage – but the creation of a single consciousness7 from two seems difficult to conceive of (much more so than the creation of two consciousnesses from one, as in fission). Do we end up with a single first-person perspective8, or with two? This needs to be related to multiple personality disorder9. Also, consider Parfit’s10 seasonal people that alternately fission and fuse. How conceivable are these TEs?
- We also need to consider physical as well as psychological fusions, as in the case of the dicephalus11 and brain transplants12.
- There may be some overlap between this note and those on Mereology13, and Constitution14, which deal with the fusion of parts into a whole.
- Works on this topic that I’ve actually read15, include16 the following:-
- "Hawley (Katherine) - Fission, Fusion and Intrinsic Facts", Hawley
- A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:-
- "Hudson (Hud) - On Constitution and All-Fusions", Hudson
- "Lowe (E.J.) - Identity Over Time and Change Of Composition", Lowe
- "McGrath (Matthew) - Four-Dimensionalism and the Puzzles of Coincidence", McGrath
- "McInerney (Peter K.) - Conceptions of Persons and Persons through Time", McInerney
- "Miller (Kristie) - Issues of Composition", Miller
- "Ord (Toby) - Implications of fission, fusion and teletransportation to a view of personal identity through psychological continuity", Ord
- "Tanksley (Charley) - The Mereological Constancy Of Masses", Tanksley
- "Wright (John) - Personal Identity, Fission and Time Travel", Wright
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Composition As Identity", Van Inwagen
- This is mostly a place-holder17.
- This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (15/02/2018 22:00:29).
- Link to Latest Write-Up Note.
- A number of my philosophical Notes are “promissory notes” currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned.
- I’ve decided to add some text – whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive – for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.
- As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance.
- The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists.
- Frequently I’ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note.
- In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time.
- In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course.
- My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I’ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage.
- I may have read others in between updates of this Note – in which case they will be marked as such in the “References and Reading List” below.
- Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019