- This pseudo-Paper is intended as the mechanism to record time spent on the Note 'Intermittent Objects1' during my Thesis research, as from 2011.
- For the actual time recorded, click on "Paper Summary" above.
Write-up2 (as at 04/07/2018 18:31:41): Intermittent Objects
- I allude to the possibility of intermittent existence in these Notes:-
- Are the classic cases of possibly intermediate objects, in that the same object can be disassembled and then reassembled, and it is usually thought that the reassembled object is numerically identical to the original.
- But it is not clear whether the watch (say) ceases to exist when disassembled for cleaning, or whether it continues to exist in a scattered10 state. The recipient of a bag of watch-parts would still consider they had received their watch back, even if annoyed at having to reassemble it themselves.
- But, as with all things artefactual, there’s a question whether our intuitions are conventional, and could be otherwise. My gut-feel, however, is that disassembled artefacts just exist in a disassembled, scattered state, rather than ceasing to exist. Hence, disassembled artefacts are examples of scattered objects rather than of intermittent objects.
- I suppose the counter-argument might be that artefacts are the things they are for functional reasons, but does a disassembled thing have a function (or, at any rate, the same function it had when assembled)? I imagine we could say that an object might be delivered in kit-form, and then assembled, and it is probably arbitrary (or can be stipulated) whether the kit is of the same kind as the object or not.
- The Write-up11 of "Carter (William) - Artifacts of Theseus: Fact and Fission" covers all this in more detail12.
- When it comes to Persons, it’s the possession of certain capacities, not the present exercise of them, that qualifies an individual as a person.
- David Wiggins holds the view that a person is one who belongs to a kind whose typical members possess some open-ended list of properties.
- In that case, a foetus or someone in a PVS14 would still be a person. They would not “intermit” while in that state.
- However, on a “present capacity” view, they would not qualify as persons in such a state, and a person might have intermittent existence. For instance if I were to fall into, and then recover from, a PVS I would not be a person when in the PVS, but would on recovery again be a person, and (importantly) the same person.
- So, someone like Baker15 might be committed to persons as intermittent objects because she thinks of human persons as ontologically separate from the human animals that constitute them.
- However, an animalist like Olson16 would not be so committed. For the animalist, it’s the animal that’s the persisting thing, and the animal persists throughout the PVS.
- I’m not sure what Olson’s view is of the ontological status of persons (I don’t think he considers them a kind); they are just individuals of another kind (most notably human animals) with special, maybe temporary, properties.
- Phase Sortals17
- My view is that human persons are phase18 sortals19 of human animals.
- So, I side with Olson against Baker in the controversy about what Persons are.
- While persons are ontologically significant, this does not bring into being a new kind of PERSON, but raises the status of the kind whose typical members are persons (and of the individuals who are persons, of course).
- So, I do not think that persons – at least persons falling under the kind HUMAN ANIMAL – can have intermittent existence. A fetus or a human animal in a PVS remains the same human animal.
- Scattered Objects26
- The topic of physical contiuity27 addresses – amongst much else – both scattered objects28 and intermittent objects, the former intermitting in space, the latter in time (and maybe in space as well).
- So, if persons are things constituted by other things, then the person intermits during a PVS, but there is no physical discontinuity.
- But, as Baker believes, the very same person can be constituted by different bodies at different times, then there must necessarily be persistence in the absence of spatio-temporal continuity, which it usually taken as a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for persistence.
- This leads on to our next topic.
- The possibility of Resurrection30 is the main reason for my interest in intermittent objects.
- Clearly, if we are to claim that the very same individual who died is resurrected somewhere else (maybe not a place as such, though it is difficult to envisage bodies that are not at places) at some other time (or not in time – but similar worries apply) then we have an intermittent object.
- This process (or fiat) would also seem to involve some sort of metamorphosis31, though maybe the Constitution View does not worry about such things, as it is the constituted person that persists, not the constituting body.
- For a page of Links32 to this Note, Click here.
- Works on this topic that I’ve actually read33, include34 the following:-
- "Ayers (Michael R.) - Locke on 'Masses of Matter'", Ayers
- "Carter (William) - Artifacts of Theseus: Fact and Fission", Carter
- "Cooper (John) - Body, Soul and Life Everlasting: Preface to the Second Printing", Cooper
- "Fine (Kit) - The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter", Fine
- "Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings", Johnston
- "Lowe (E.J.) - Identity Over Time and Change Of Composition", Lowe
- "Markosian (Ned) - Three Problems for Olson's Account of Personal Identity", Markosian
- "Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Immortality", Shoemaker
- "Wiggins (David) - On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time", Wiggins
- A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:-
- "Beck (Simon) - Let's Exist Again (Like We Did Last Summer)", Beck
- "Corcoran (Kevin) - Dualism, Materialism and the Problem of Post Mortem Survival", Corcoran
- "Hershenov (David) - The Metaphysical Problem of Intermittent Existence and the Possibility of Resurrection", Hershenov
- "Johnston (Mark) - Is Heaven a Place We Can Get To?", Johnston
- "Merricks (Trenton) - There Are No Criteria For Identity Over Time", Merricks
- "Oderberg (David) - Fission, Intermittence and the Primitiveness of Identity", Oderberg
- "Simons (Peter) - Temporary Parts and Intermittent Existence", Simons
Footnote 12: Or will do, once I’ve completed it!
- This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (04/07/2018 18:31:41).
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- There are two sorts of updating runs – for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run.
- Frequently I’ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note.
- In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time.
- In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course.
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