- This pseudo-Paper is intended as the mechanism to record time spent on the Note 'Lewis1' during my Thesis research, as from 2011.
- For the actual time recorded, click on "Paper Statistics" above.
Write-up2 (as at 06/03/2018 21:21:36): Lewis
- David Lewis’s views on personal identity are characterised by his espousal of perdurantism4.
- As is discussed under that Note, perdurantist metaphysics avoids the reduplication5 problems for identity-preservation following fission6. See also my Note on Counting Persons7.
- Lewis is also important for espousing realism with respect to possible worlds. The modal8 counterpart relation is used as an analogy in exdurantism9. I will not discuss any of this here.
- Lynne Rudder Baker charges Lewis with trying to reduce the First Person Perspective10.
- Lewis discusses the Thought Experiment11 of Methuselah12, important for the Psychological View13 of personal identity. Lewis espouses the PV and thinks that several persons14 can exist successively in a single human animal.
- Works on this topic that I’ve actually read15, include16 the following:-
- "Lewis (David) - Attitudes De Dicto and De Se", Lewis
- "Lewis (David) - Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies", Lewis
- "Lewis (David) - Survival and Identity", Lewis17
- "Lewis (David) - The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics", Lewis
- A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:-
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Reductive Approaches to the First-Person Perspective", Baker18
- "Belzer (Marvin) - Self-Conception and Personal Identity: Revisiting Parfit and Lewis with an Eye on the Grip of the Unity Reaction", Belzer
- "Hawley (Katherine) - David Lewis on Persistence", Hawley
- "Lewis (David) - Individuation By Acquaintance and By Stipulation", Lewis
- "Lewis (David) - Counterparts or Double Lives", Lewis
- "Lewis (David) - Many, But Almost One", Lewis
- "Lewis (David) - Noneism or Allism?", Lewis
- "Lewis (David) - Vague Identity: Evans Misunderstood", Lewis
- "Moyer (Mark) - A Survival Guide to Fission", Moyer
- "Roberts (Melinda) - Lewis's Theory Of Personal Identity", Roberts
- "Williams (J. Robbie G.) - An Argument for the Many", Williams
- This is mostly a place-holder19. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list.
- This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (06/03/2018 21:21:36).
- Link to Latest Write-Up Note.
- A number of my philosophical Notes are “promissory notes” currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned.
- I’ve decided to add some text – whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive – for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.
- As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance.
- The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists.
- Frequently I’ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note.
- In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time.
- In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course.
- My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I’ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage.
Footnote 17: Footnote 18:
- I may have read others in between updates of this Note – in which case they will be marked as such in the “References and Reading List” below.
- Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019