- This pseudo-Paper is intended as the mechanism to record time spent on the Note 'Numerical Idenity1' during my Thesis research, as from 2011.
- For the actual time recorded, click on "Paper Statistics" above.
Write-up2 (as at 14/07/2019 18:05:46): Numerical Identity
- This Note is really a sub-topic of that on the Logic of Identity4
- There is, however, an initial ambiguity that needs clearing up. To quote the Synopsis of "DeGrazia (David) - Human Identity and Bioethics":
- When philosophers address personal identity, they usually explore numerical identity: what are the criteria for a person's continuing existence?
- When non-philosophers address personal identity, they often have in mind narrative identity5: Which characteristics of a particular person are salient to her self-conception?
- DeGrazia explores both conceptions, and acknowledges a debt6 to Eric Olson for the former and Marya Schechtman for the latter.
- Anyway, numerical identity is the relation a thing holds to itself and to nothing else. The term “numerical” is used because we use the concept of numerical identity in counting things. Things picked out under different concepts are only counted once if they are numerically identical – if they are the very same thing. I may be a man, a person, a father, a grandfather, a student of philosophy but I’m only to be counted once.
- Works on this topic that I’ve actually read7, include the following:-
- A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:-
- This is mostly a place-holder8. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list.
- This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (14/07/2019 18:05:46).
- Link to Latest Write-Up Note.
- Not that Eric Olson is the inventor or even the primary exponent of the concept of numerical identity,
- Nor that Marya Schechtman is not a philosopher!
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)