<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Todman (Theo) - Thesis - Perdurantism (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_17/PaperSummary_17856.htm">Thesis - Perdurantism</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/T/Author_Todman (Theo).htm">Todman (Theo)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: </th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=400><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_17/PaperSummary_17856.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_42.htm">Link to Latest Write-Up Note</A></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><ul type="disc"><li>This pseudo-Paper is intended as the mechanism to record time spent on the Note '<a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_42.htm">Perdurantism</A><SUP>1</SUP>' during my Thesis research, as from 2011. </li><li>For the actual time recorded, click on "Paper Summary" above. </li></ul><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><hr><br><B><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17856_2">Write-up</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17856_2"></A></u> (as at 11/03/2018 20:19:41): Perdurantism</B><BR><br><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17856_3">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>3</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17856_3"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>As developed by <a name="23"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/Q/Author_Quine (W.V.).htm">W.V. Quine</A>, <a name="24"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/L/Author_Lewis (David).htm">David Lewis</A>, <a name="25"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/S/Author_Sider (Ted).htm">Ted Sider</A> and others, Perdurance is to be contrasted with <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_760.htm">Endurance</A><SUP>4</SUP> and <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_761.htm">Exdurance</A><SUP>5</SUP>  see <a name="27"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1339.htm">Sider (Ted) - Four-dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time</A>". </li><li><a name="15"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12472.htm">Kurtz (Roxanne) - Introduction to Persistence: What s the Problem?</A>", the introduction to <a name="28"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1390.htm">Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne), Eds. - Persistence : Contemporary Readings</A>" provides a good overview of these matters. </li><li>The logical problems with 4-D need to be carefully considered and, for good or ill, the four-dimensional approach has the advantage  or maybe disadvantage  of undermining the <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1003.htm">reduplication objection</A><SUP>6</SUP> to <a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_12.htm">identity</A><SUP>7</SUP> being maintained in certain <a name="6"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_33.htm">fission</A><SUP>8</SUP> <a name="7"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_32.htm">thought experiments</A><SUP>9</SUP>. </li><li>Does 4-D imply <a name="8"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">fatalism</A><SUP>10</SUP>? According to perdurantism, a thing is a 4-D object, but not only do we not know the future, but the future may not even exist. </li><li>How does this tie in with Lewis s realism about possible worlds? Maybe if possible worlds are real, all possible futures are real as well.</li><li>Note that perdurantism is inimical to a high view of <a name="9"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_101.htm">substance</A><SUP>11</SUP>. A temporal worm cannot change, it just is. The purpose of positing substances is as the enduring things that <a name="10"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_57.htm">change</A><SUP>12</SUP>. </li><li>Perdurance also impacts on Leibniz s Law, where property exemplification is usually taken to be relative to a time. </li><li>Look at the adverbial defence of endurantism. See <a name="16"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6036.htm">Haslanger (Sally) - Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics</A>" (probably & this is the explicit response to Lewis, though there are also <BR>&rarr; <a name="17"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6676.htm">Haslanger (Sally) - Persistence, Change, and Explanation</A>", <BR>&rarr; <a name="18"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4724.htm">Haslanger (Sally) - Persistence Through Time</A>" and <BR>&rarr; <a name="19"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5114.htm">Haslanger (Sally) - Humean Supervenience and Enduring Things</A>"; and <BR>&rarr; <a name="20"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12472.htm">Kurtz (Roxanne) - Introduction to Persistence: What s the Problem?</A>" in <a name="29"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1390.htm">Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne), Eds. - Persistence : Contemporary Readings</A>" seems to cover much the same ground). </li><li>If perdurantism really is incompatible with a high view of substance, then I may not need a chapter on perdurance (though I would have thought that I would need to argue for the incompatibility), and I can thereby ignore perdurantist objections to the cogency of reduplication objections. </li><li>Note also that <a name="26"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/O/Author_Olson (Eric).htm">Eric Olson</A> sets perdurance to one side. He assumes that we are concrete substances that  endure through time by being wholly present at different times . He also sets to one side two other issues, namely that there are <a name="11"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_87.htm">no such things as persons</A><SUP>13</SUP> (taken to be  rational conscious beings such as you and I ) and that the classical notion of strict <a name="12"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_977.htm">numerical identity</A><SUP>14</SUP> is correct, rejecting <a name="13"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_96.htm">relative identity</A><SUP>15</SUP>. See <BR>&rarr; <a name="21"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3506.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal: Introduction</A>", pp. 4-5 and <BR>&rarr; <a name="22"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3513.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal: Alternatives</A>", <BR>both in <a name="30"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_130.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology</A>". He claims that if any of these assumptions is false, then there are no substantive metaphysical questions of our identity over time, only semantic ones.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17856_16">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17856_16"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17856_17">include</A></U><SUB>17</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17856_17"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="14"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_737.htm">place-holder</A><SUP>18</SUP>. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_P17856_2"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17856_2"><B>Footnote 2</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (11/03/2018 20:19:41). </li><li><A HREF = "../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_42.htm">Link to Latest Write-Up Note</A>. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P17856_3"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17856_3"><B>Footnote 3</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P17856_16"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17856_16"><B>Footnote 16</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P17856_17"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17856_17"><B>Footnote 17</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-13T13:21" pubdate>13/08/2018 13:21:47</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>