- This pseudo-Paper is intended as the mechanism to record time spent on the Note 'Perdurantism1' during my Thesis research, as from 2011.
- For the actual time recorded, click on "Paper Statistics" above.
Write-up2 (as at 14/07/2019 18:05:46): Perdurantism
- As developed by W.V. Quine, David Lewis, Ted Sider and others, Perdurance is to be contrasted with Endurance4 and Exdurance5 – see "Sider (Ted) - Four-dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time".
- "Kurtz (Roxanne) - Introduction to Persistence: What’s the Problem?", the introduction to "Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne), Eds. - Persistence : Contemporary Readings" provides a good overview of these matters.
- The logical problems with 4-D need to be carefully considered and, for good or ill, the four-dimensional approach has the advantage – or maybe disadvantage – of undermining the reduplication objection6 to identity7 being maintained in certain fission8 thought experiments9.
- Does 4-D imply fatalism10? According to perdurantism, a thing is a 4-D object, but not only do we not know the future, but the future may not even exist.
- How does this tie in with Lewis’s realism about possible worlds? Maybe if possible worlds are real, all possible futures are real as well.
- Note that perdurantism is inimical to a high view of substance11. A temporal worm cannot change, it just is. The purpose of positing substances is as the enduring things that change12.
- Perdurance also impacts on Leibniz’s Law, where property exemplification is usually taken to be relative to a time.
- Look at the adverbial defence of endurantism. See "Haslanger (Sally) - Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics" (probably … this is the explicit response to Lewis, though there are also
→ "Haslanger (Sally) - Persistence, Change, and Explanation",
→ "Haslanger (Sally) - Persistence Through Time" and
→ "Haslanger (Sally) - Humean Supervenience and Enduring Things"; and
→ "Kurtz (Roxanne) - Introduction to Persistence: What’s the Problem?" in "Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne), Eds. - Persistence : Contemporary Readings" seems to cover much the same ground).
- If perdurantism really is incompatible with a high view of substance, then I may not need a chapter on perdurance (though I would have thought that I would need to argue for the incompatibility), and I can thereby ignore perdurantist objections to the cogency of reduplication objections.
- Note also that Eric Olson sets perdurance to one side. He assumes that we are concrete substances that “endure through time by being wholly present at different times”. He also sets to one side two other issues, namely that there are no such things as persons13 (taken to be “rational conscious beings such as you and I”) and that the classical notion of strict numerical identity14 is correct, rejecting relative identity15. See
→ "Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal: Introduction", pp. 4-5 and
→ "Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal: Alternatives",
both in "Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology". He claims that if any of these assumptions is false, then there are no substantive metaphysical questions of our identity over time, only semantic ones.
- Works on this topic that I’ve actually read16, include the following:-
- A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:-
- This is mostly a place-holder17. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list.
- This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (14/07/2019 18:05:46).
- Link to Latest Write-Up Note.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019