<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Todman (Theo) - Thesis - Person (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_17/PaperSummary_17860.htm">Thesis - Person</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/T/Author_Todman (Theo).htm">Todman (Theo)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: </th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=400><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_17/PaperSummary_17860.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_9.htm">Link to Latest Write-Up Note</A></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><ul type="disc"><li>This pseudo-Paper is intended as the mechanism to record time spent on the Note '<a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_9.htm">Person</A><SUP>1</SUP>' during my Thesis research, as from 2011. </li><li>For the actual time recorded, click on "Paper Summary" above. </li></ul><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><hr><br><B><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17860_2">Write-up</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17860_2"></A></u> (as at 11/03/2018 20:19:41): Person</B><BR><br><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17860_3">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>3</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17860_3"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>I must first consider whether the debate on personal identity has been hijacked by a term (whose meaning has changed over time) that can now be dispensed with? Wiggins claims that the Greeks had no term for  person (I need to re-read the paper by <a name="24"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7220.htm">Trendelenberg (Adolf) - A Contribution to the History of the Word Person</A>" to double-check this). Have we always secretly been talking about human animal identity (probably referring to <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_74.htm">human beings</A><SUP>4</SUP> rather than human animals) when we thought we were talking about something separate, namely persons? </li><li>I need to start with some <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_23.htm">conceptual</A><SUP>5</SUP> analysis, though this may lead to somewhat arbitrary (ie. merely <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_99.htm">semantic</A><SUP>6</SUP> or culture-relative) conclusions if PERSON isn t a <a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kind</A><SUP>7</SUP> concept. </li><li>I accept <a name="6"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_83.htm">Locke</A><SUP>8</SUP> s conceptual distinction between <a name="7"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_74.htm">Human Beings</A><SUP>9</SUP> ( Men ), Persons and <a name="8"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_101.htm">Substances</A><SUP>10</SUP>. I accept Locke s assertion that the rational parrot would be a person, but not a man  the latter essentially involving particular physical characteristics, the former specific mental characteristics. </li><li><BR>Can any purely mentalistic definition of the concept PERSON, such as Locke s definition of a person as <ol type="1"> <FONT COLOR = "800080">a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places</FONT> (<a name="25"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5555.htm">Locke (John) - Of Identity and Diversity</A>" - Essay II.27.2)</ol>& be correct? I suspect not, because of the corporeal aspects we take as being essential to our self-image. </li><li>But, when we think of ourselves in this corporeal way, is this qua ANIMAL or qua PERSON. But then, this  qua-ing can lead to <a name="9"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_96.htm">relative identity</A><SUP>11</SUP>, and shows how difficult it is for me, at least, to maintain the strict <a name="10"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_12.htm">logic of identity</A><SUP>12</SUP> in these discussions. </li><li>Some further, fairly random, thoughts:-<ul type="square"><li>We must not ignore potential differences between the Person, the <a name="11"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_98.htm">Self</A><SUP>13</SUP> and the <a name="12"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_77.htm">Individual</A><SUP>14</SUP>. </li><li>I doubt the truth of the contention that one s Self is the sum of one s projects, one s individual  <a name="13"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_905.htm">identity</A><SUP>15</SUP> .</li><li>We must also note the potential for <a name="14"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_870.htm">degrees of personhood</A><SUP>16</SUP>. </li><li>Are persons essentially sentient? Or rational? And is rationality, like the mental generally, overstated by philosophers whose favourite habitat it is? </li><li>What about <a name="15"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_78.htm">temporal gaps</A><SUP>17</SUP> in sentience & rationality in the life of an individual  does the person pop in and out of existence? </li><li>What about legal persons: not companies, but the comatose, who still have estates (but then so do the <a name="16"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_67.htm">deceased</A><SUP>18</SUP>)? </li><li>How important is  person , as against  <a name="17"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_61.htm">sentient being</A><SUP>19</SUP> in my research concerns? The Cartesians denied sentience to <a name="18"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_30.htm">animals</A><SUP>20</SUP> and until recently there has been a down-playing of the capacities of animals, particularly their emotional capacities. Consequently, the <a name="19"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_91.htm">persistence criteria</A><SUP>21</SUP> for sentient non-humans may not have been given the focus they ought. I suspect that many of the <a name="20"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_32.htm">thought experiments</A><SUP>22</SUP> work just as well if we drop some of the more onerous requirements of personhood in such contexts. Some of the thought experiments play on the thought of  <a name="21"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_940.htm">being tortured tomorrow</A><SUP>23</SUP> . While animals may not have the concept TOMORROW, I presume the higher animals have some capacity for anticipating future ills about to befall them. I wonder whether my research concerns should be about all beings that care about the future, whether or not they have a clear concept of it as <em>their</em> future.</li></ul></li><li>I will probably start with Dennett s six criteria of personhood (see <a name="26"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_545.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - Conditions of Personhood</A>") & <ol type="1"><li>rationality, </li><li>intentionality   predicated of </li><li>intentionality   adopted towards </li><li>reciprocation of the personal stance, </li><li>verbal communication and </li><li>consciousness</li></ol> & in investigating what persons are. See the following <a name="22"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_115.htm">essay</A><SUP>24</SUP>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17860_25">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>25</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17860_25"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17860_26">include</A></U><SUB>26</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17860_26"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="23"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_737.htm">place-holder</A><SUP>27</SUP>. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list, which is enormously bloated and needs considerable pruning. </li></ul><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_P17860_2"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17860_2"><B>Footnote 2</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (11/03/2018 20:19:41). </li><li><A HREF = "../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_9.htm">Link to Latest Write-Up Note</A>. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P17860_3"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17860_3"><B>Footnote 3</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P17860_25"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17860_25"><B>Footnote 25</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P17860_26"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17860_26"><B>Footnote 26</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-13T13:21" pubdate>13/08/2018 13:21:53</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>