- This pseudo-Paper is intended as the mechanism to record time spent on the Note 'Psychological Continuity1' during my Thesis research, as from 2011.
- For the actual time recorded, click on "Paper Summary" above.
Write-up2 (as at 06/05/2018 23:16:48): Psychological Continuity
- Psychological continuity (and connectedness4) is central to personal identity for those who adopt the Psychological View5. However, it is said by some animalists6 - Eric Olson in particular – to be irrelevant to our survival7, given that we are8 Human Animals9.
- Following on from discussions on survival10, maybe the way to put things is that without psychological continuity I might survive, but not with what matters11 to me in survival.
- If “Person12” is a phase sortal13 of “Human Animal14”, can there be sequential but different persons within the same animal (as Lewis15 suggests, though not from the perspective of animalism16, in his “Methuselah17” case) or can there be different and encapsulated First Person Perspectives18 (either synchronically – as in MPD19 – or diachronically) within the same animal?
- “Person” may indeed come apart from “animal”, but even then, the person cannot “float free” of the animal, but supervenes20 upon it. See the CV21 for this.
- This topic is related to others in this general area (in addition to those already noted):-
→ Psychological Criterion23
- I also distinguish between backward and forward psychological continuity25. The former – traditionally involving memory26 and psychological traits – is the usual focus, but it is not necessarily identity-preserving even for those espousing the PV27, on account of reduplication objections28. The same may be true of fission29 of the FPP30, but this is more difficult to imagine.
- For a page of Links31 to this Note, Click here.
- The list of works “to be read” below is highly selective, given the overlap with other topics and my focus on animalism32. However, I’ve been more liberal with those items I’ve actually read.
- Works on this topic that I’ve actually read33, include34 the following:-
- "Ayers (Michael R.) - Neo-Lockean and Anti-Lockean Theories of Personal Identity in Analytic Philosophy", Ayers
- "Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity: Preface", Baillie
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Personal Identity Over Time", Baker
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - What Am I?", Baker
- "Blatti (Stephan) - Animalism, Dicephalus, and Borderline Cases", Blatti
- "Campbell (Scott) - Can You Survive a Brain-Zap", Campbell
- "Corcoran (Kevin) - Biology or Psychology? Human Persons and Personal Identity", Corcoran
- "DeGrazia (David) - Are we essentially persons? Olson, Baker, and a reply", DeGrazia
- "Gale (Richard) - On Some Pernicious Thought-Experiments", Gale
- "Mackie (David) - Personal Identity and Dead People", Mackie
- "Mackie (David) - Going Topless", Mackie
- "Noonan (Harold) - An Initial Survey", Noonan
- "Noonan (Harold) - The Thinking Animal Problem and Personal Pronoun Revisionism", Noonan
- "Olson (Eric) - Animalism and the Remnant-Person Problem", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - Immanent Causation and Life After Death", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - Is Psychology Relevant To Personal Identity?", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - Persistence", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - Psychology and Personal Identity", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - Reply to Lynne Rudder Baker", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal: Introduction", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - Was I Ever a Fetus?", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - What Are We? The Question", Olson
- "Parfit (Derek) - How We Are Not What We Believe", Parfit
- "Parfit (Derek) - Nagel's Brain", Parfit
- "Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern", Shoemaker
- "Thomas (Janice L.) - Psychological continuity", Thomas
- "Unger (Peter) - Conscious Experiences and Subjects of Consciousness: Six Metaphysical Doctrines", Unger
- "Unger (Peter) - The Psychological Approach To Our Survival", Unger
- "Unger (Peter) - The Survival of the Sentient", Unger
- A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:-
- "Francescotti (Robert) - Psychological Continuity and the Necessity of Identity", Francescotti
- "Hershenov (David) - The Memory Criterion and the Problem of Backward Causation", Hershenov
- "Kitcher (Patricia) - The Crucial Relation in Personal Identity", Kitcher
- "Madell (Geoffrey) - Personal Identity Through Time", Madell
- "Merricks (Trenton) - Endurance, Psychological Continuity, and the Importance of Personal Identity", Merricks
- "Merricks (Trenton) - Perdurance and Psychological Continuity", Merricks
- "Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Animals", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Brains", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Temporal Parts", Olson
- "Ord (Toby) - Implications of fission, fusion and teletransportation to a view of personal identity through psychological continuity", Ord
- "Parfit (Derek) - What We Believe Ourselves To Be", Parfit
- "Rea (Michael) & Silver (David) - Personal Identity and Psychological Continuity", Rea & Silver
- "Schechtman (Marya) - The Same and the Same: Two Views of Psychological Continuity", Schechtman
- "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Unger's Psychological Continuity Theory", Shoemaker
- "Slors (Marc) - The Diachronic Mind: An Essay on Personal Identity, Psychological Continuity and the Mind-Body Problem", Slors, especially
→ "Slors (Marc) - A Content-Oriented Conception of Psychological Continuity"
→ "Slors (Marc) - Personal Identity, Memory, and Circularity: An Alternative for Q-Memory"
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Materialism and the Psychological-continuity Account of Personal Identity", Van Inwagen
- This is mostly a place-holder35.
- This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (06/05/2018 23:16:48).
- Link to Latest Write-Up Note.
- A number of my philosophical Notes are “promissory notes” currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned.
- I’ve decided to add some text – whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive – for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.
- As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance.
- The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists.
- If only a “non-updating” run has been made, the links are only one-way – ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven’t yet been confirmed as relevant.
- Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the “Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note” and “Summary of Note Links to this Page” sections) are to the “point of link” within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the “links page” remain generic.
- There are two sorts of updating runs – for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run.
- Frequently I’ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note.
- In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time.
- In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course.
- My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I’ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage.
- I may have read others in between updates of this Note – in which case they will be marked as such in the “References and Reading List” below.
- Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018